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1.1  Introduction  
 
Problems related to pest control and pesticide use in agriculture can be found in similar 
forms across the world. Worldwide, crop production losses from agricultural pests1 average 
35-40% before harvest and 10-15% after harvest (e.g. Oerke et al. 1994, Struik and Kropff 
2003). After the introduction of synthetic pesticides after World War II, agriculture in many 
countries became reliant on chemical pest control. In the 1960s, the environmental and 
health problems became apparent, as did the problems of pests becoming resistant to 
pesticides and the destruction of natural enemies leading to pest resurgence and secondary 
pest outbreaks. Farmers often use pesticides injudiciously, and find themselves caught on a 
pesticide treadmill,2 which increases the social, environmental and economic costs of 
chemical control (Bale et al. 2008, Carson 1962, Kishi 2005, Palladino 1996, Perkins 1982, 
Pretty and Waibel 2005). These problems with pesticides gave way to the Integrated Pest 
Management (IPM) approach, which utilises ecological principles to manage agro-
ecosystems in an economically and environmentally sustainable fashion (Kogan 1998, 
1999, Morse and Buhler 1997, Struik and Kropff 2003). IPM has become an alternative 
approach to exclusive reliance on pesticides as the sole means of pest control (Van Huis 
and Meerman 1997). This change in approach has been quite widely accepted, although not 
universally.   
This thesis explores the case of Kazakhstan where integrated pest management, 
once widely practised, has given way to an exclusive reliance on pesticides. IPM/ecology-
based pest-control approaches were extensively developed and practised in the 1970s and 
1980s in the USSR, which Kazakhstan was then part of. The USSR was an early adopter of 
IPM. This changed dramatically in Kazakhstan after 1991 with the fall of the Soviet 
system, when sustainable approaches to pest control were substituted by an exclusive focus 
on chemical pest control. This has given rise to indiscriminate pesticide use. The focus of 
plant protection research also shifted from IPM/ecology-based studies to pesticide testing. 
The starting point of this study is to examine this paradox that, at the moment, when 
Kazakhstan became more strongly incorporated in a world that sees sustainable production 
methods and ecologically-friendly pest control as an important priority the country 
abandoned an IPM approach to pest control. To date, no literature has addressed this shift 
and looked for reasons behind abandoning the ecological approaches for pest control 
developed and practised in the past. This paradox leads us to the central research question 
of this dissertation: Why did the shift occur from an IPM/ecology-centred to pesticide-
centred pest-control perspective in Kazakhstan after 1991?   
The hypothesis of this study is that the shift from IPM/ecology-based pest control to 
indiscriminate pesticide use is a consequence of the post-1991 socio-economic changes. 
This hypothesis suggests that the shift in pest-control perspectives cannot be explained by 
references to the internal dynamics in the knowledge domain, but may be strongly 
influenced by the political-economic changes. These changes occurred after the 
 3 
disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991 when the government of Kazakhstan adopted a 
neoliberal system, in line with the advice of international financial institutions (e.g. World 
Bank 1993, 1994). This hypothesis informs the key sub-questions that are addressed: How 
did agrarian structures change and how did this impact upon the agricultural knowledge 
structure? And, under what conditions did particular pest-control perspective come to 
dominate farming practice and research? 
To answer the research questions, this study specifically examines and compares the 
post-1991 farming structures and activities, pest-control practices and functioning of plant 
protection research and extension with those of the Soviet past. These are discussed in four 
empirical chapters (Chapters 2 to 5) of this dissertation. This dissertation will describe how 
within the wider knowledge system (farming, research, extension and policymaking) 
thinking about pest control changed and the essential elements of sustainable forms of pest 
management were abandoned in Kazakhstan after 1991. Crucial factors influencing pest-
control perspectives that came to the fore in this study (and which will be discussed in 
detail in the various chapters) are the transformation of the agrarian structure, the 
destruction of the state/public level organization of pest management, the neglect of 
research and extension and the aggressive pesticide promotion campaigns. The thesis will 
discuss how these factors had negative consequences for those forms of pest control that 
require higher levels of social integration and sophisticated forms of knowledge, which 
have a long-term perspective and are able to deal with complexity, variability and 
uncertainty in open agro-ecosystems. The thesis also analyses the conditions that enable or 
restrict concerted action for pest control and the extent to which the plant protection 
domain, which developed and promoted ecologically sustainable pest control methods and 
technologies, is conceptualized as a public good. 
The focus on one particular field of agricultural research and practice, namely plant 
protection, is instructive for exploring wider political, socio-economic and technological 
issues. The study of plant protection perspectives in Kazakhstan in two different socio-
economic and political formations reveals the crucial role of state organization and public 
and market institutions in shaping pest-control perspectives. It puts upfront the issue as to 
which elements of scientific knowledge and knowledge/skill configurations have to be 
preserved when dramatic political-economic changes tend to undermine the dynamic 
development and application of science.    
 
 
1.2  Conceptual framework 
 
The conceptual focus of this thesis is mainly on transition, public goods, collective action, 
integrated pest management and knowledge. These topics will be elaborated in detail in the 
four empirical chapters (2-5) of this dissertation. This section introduces these concepts.   
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1.2.1  Transition  
 
In the 1990s, the world witnessed an unprecedented scale of price liberalization, 
privatization and deregulation in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and the 
former Soviet Union. After the collapse of the USSR in 1991, Kazakhstan became 
influenced by neoliberal ideology and was drawn into a transitional process towards a free 
market economy (World Bank 1993). The concept of transition was theoretically viewed as 
an economic, social and political transformation towards a free market economy and 
democracy (Sasse 2005, Spoor 2003, Svejnar 2002, Tanzi 1999). Markets appeared, though 
not in the form envisioned in theoretical prescriptions, and new political regimes emerged, 
though not necessarily democratic. The failure of neoliberal prescriptions (liberalize, 
privatize and deregulate) has become evident in many countries, where the invisible hand 
of the free market has not been able to regulate the economy for the benefit of its people 
and national interests have not been served (Harvey 2003, 2005, Henry 2008). Now, 
especially after the global financial crisis, from the autumn of 2008 onwards, it is 
increasingly accepted that only a visible state with well-defined functions is able to regulate 
the market so that it serves common interests. Currently, many societies are seeking a new 
balance between state and market institutions.                  
The process of transition from a state-centred to a neoliberal economic formation 
points to the importance of studying the extent to which the new socio-economic 
configuration that emerged after 1991 in Kazakhstan influenced changes in technological 
thinking and practices, such as plant protection.  
 
1.2.2  Public good 
 
This thesis conceptualizes the development and promotion of sustainable ecology-based 
plant protection approaches as a public good, even though many on-farm pest-control 
activities have to be dealt with privately. A public good is any good that, if supplied to 
anybody is necessarily supplied to everybody, and from whose benefits it is impossible or 
impracticable to exclude anybody (McLean and McMillan 2003). In other words, public 
goods are non-exclusive and non-rivalled (Kaul and Mendoza 2003, Scott and Marshall 
2005).  In most cases, the state provides a public good, e.g., national defence or a fire 
service.  
This thesis identifies three reasons to support the notion that the development and 
promotion of ecologically sound methods and technologies for pest control is a public 
good. First, when national food and/or health security is at stake research on, and control of, 
highly harmful pest organisms, including quarantine and migratory ones, becomes the task 
of public institutions (e.g. Perrings et al. 2002, Toleubayev et al. 2007). Second, investment 
in, and the development and promotion of environmentally friendly pest-control measures, 
resolves several problems associated with chemical control – the pollution of the 
environment, health hazards during application and pesticide residues in food that affect the 
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health of people (Kishi 2005). Third, considerable resources are necessary to develop and 
promote long-term ecologically sound methods and technologies of pest control and, to a 
large extent, only the state can afford this (Pretty and Waibel 2005). Hence, the concept of 
public good is essential for analysing the shift from an IPM/ecology-based perspective to 
one based on the use of pesticides in Kazakhstan after 1991. 
Problems caused by agricultural pests are significant – from outbreaks of highly 
destructive migratory insect-pests (e.g. locusts) to crop diseases causing epiphytotics 
(epidemics) across vast cropping areas (e.g. stem rust). These pest organisms recognise no 
frontiers, can devastate thousands of hectares of crops and pose a threat to national food 
security. Individual farmers cannot monitor such pest organisms or develop ecologically 
sustainable and environmentally friendly preventive and/or protective measures against 
them. Thus, these activities very often require formalized knowledge systems and collective 
(concerted) action from government offices, researchers, extensionists and farmers.    
 
1.2.3  Collective action 
 
Collective action in the spheres of agriculture, environment and development can take 
various forms (e.g. Agrawal 2003) and there is disagreement about how to distinguish 
between different forms of collective action (Meinzen-Dick et al. 2004, Poteete and Ostrom 
2004).  Contemporary issues in this area largely focus on the management of common-pool 
resources, which are discussed in relation to processes of the decentralization of central 
state control over natural resources (Agrawal and Ostrom 2001, Acheson 2006), and the 
large-scale political activism of social movements (Edelman 2001, Hargrave and Van de 
Ven 2006). Collective action can emerge in situations where uncoordinated individual 
actions may not result in the best outcome (McLean and McMillan 2003).   
One illustrative example is uncoordinated pest control in a farming community. If 
one farmer controls pests on his/her plot but the neighbour does not, then pest organisms 
accumulate on uncontrolled fields and subsequently re-infest adjacent plots where control 
measures were carried out. Thus the efforts of the farmer who carried out control measures 
fail. Equally if the timing of control measures is different on neighbouring fields this also 
may result in unsuccessful pest control, because one farmer carries out control measures too 
early and the other neighbour is too late in controlling pests. Therefore, an optimal control 
time needs to be set and neighbouring farmers should agree on appropriate control methods 
and synchronize their plant protection activities. In many cases, this requires the 
involvement of plant protection professionals. Furthermore, problems associated with 
agricultural pests and pesticides frequently require collective action at a higher level than 
that of individual farmers’ fields.  
Collective action involves a group of people with a shared interest who are prepared 
to take some kind of common action in pursuit of that shared interest (Meinzen-Dick et al. 
2004). This thesis does not address many of the models or concepts, e.g. such as a game 
theory, prisoner’s dilemma, free-riding or rational behaviour often associated with the term 
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‘collective action’ (Harding 1982, Olson 1971, Sandler 1992). Instead, it simply 
conceptualizes collective action as joint and concerted action from policymakers, plant 
protection researchers and practitioners, service and input providers and agricultural 
producers in order to deal with pest and pesticide problems. Equally, the phrase ‘loss of 
collective action’ is used in this thesis to imply the shift from an IPM/ecology-based to 
pesticide-based pest control, as happened in Kazakhstan after 1991.  
 
1.2.4  The knowledge-intensiveness of Integrated Pest Management   
 
One could argue that the concept of collective action underlies recent developments in 
participatory approaches to Integrated Pest Management (IPM), often through Farmer Field 
Schools (FFS), where farmers obtain knowledge about the ecology and functioning of their 
own agro-ecosystems (e.g. Norton et al. 1999, Van den Berg 2004, Van den Berg and 
Jiggins 2007).    
IPM-based pest control needs to be incorporated into everyday farming routines 
through explicitly knowledge-based plans for action. Integrated pest management, as any 
knowledge domain, requires certain skills, often of a highly specialized nature, on the part 
of the practitioner and user of the knowledge (Holzner and Marx 1979). For this reason, the 
role of plant protection professionals and facilitators is very important in promoting IPM 
knowledge in farming communities (Flint and Gouveia 2001, Morse and Buhler 1997, Van 
den Berg 2004), particularly through FFSs. While it has the direct effect of reducing 
pesticide use and/or elevating yields, it also enhances farmers’ technical, educational, social 
and political capabilities (e.g. Bartlett 2004).    
IPM is a multifaceted technological approach that incorporates a wide range of 
sustainable pest-control methods (e.g. biological, agronomic and physical) to manage 
agricultural pests in complex agro-ecosystems and to reduce pesticide use (Bale et al. 2008, 
Kogan 1998, Morse and Buhler 1997, Van Huis and Meerman 1997, Van Lenteren 1997). 
IPM is very knowledge-intensive (Flint and Gouveia 2001, Morse and Buhler 1997) and 
requires an extensive knowledge of agro-ecosystems. The knowledge-intensity of IPM is 
one key factor in explaining the decline in IPM/ecology-centred approach and the rise in to 
pesticide-centred approach to plant protection in post-1991 Kazakhstan. 
 
 
1.3  Research methodology  
 
This research has employed an in-depth qualitative account to study micro-processes within 
two different (Soviet and post-Soviet) political and socio-economic formations to generate 
data for comparative analysis. More specifically it uses a technographic approach to 
observe, describe and locate the technical facts (i.e. related to agricultural production and 
pest control) within the socio-economic contexts (Sigaut 1994). Richards (2001) suggests 
that ‘technography’ is a useful label to emphasize the importance of capturing the full 
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complexity of social and biological worlds and to achieve contextual understanding of 
agro-ecosystem development. This thesis deals with the impact of post-1991 neoliberal 
reforms on an established sustainable pest-control system from the Soviet era, and a 
technographic approach was adopted as an analytical instrument to study plant protection in 
the context of agrarian and broader changes in post-Soviet era.  
Interpretation of data of the specific case studies (Bernard 2002, Miles and 
Huberman 1994, Yin 2003) is presented in the four empirical chapters of this thesis, 
following the type of reasoning applied in the extended case method (Burawoy 1998), and 
combining this with the use of technical knowledge concerning crops, pest organisms and 
plant protection approaches. The extended case method takes the social situation and 
context as the point of empirical examination, to understand how micro-situations are 
shaped by wider structures and vice versa. It extracts the general from the unique, moves 
from the micro to the macro and connects the present to the past in anticipation of the 
future.  
Data and information were obtained and cross-checked through open-ended and 
semi-structured interviews, participant observations and study of literature, documents and 
media (Bernard 2002, Mason 2002, Miles and Huberman 1994, Silverman 2001, Spradley 
1980, Verschuren et al. 1999). 
One potential weakness of the predominant use of qualitative methodology was the 
lack of quantitative indicators derived from own surveys (except for data on the research 
staff of the Kazakh Research Institute for Plant Protection in Chapter 4) to support the 
points made throughout the thesis. However, the quantitative findings of other scholars do 
support the qualitative findings of this study (e.g. Gurevich and Suleimenov 2006, Peabody 
et al. 2000).   
 
1.3.1  Interviews with research actors 
 
To understand the depth and complexity in people’s situated and contextual accounts and 
experiences, open-ended and semi-structured interviews were conducted. The interviewees 
were people who had worked and lived in Soviet collective farms, practising farmers and 
rural inhabitants, farmers’ representatives, current and former agricultural researchers, 
research managers, plant protection practitioners, university lecturers, local authorities, 
policymakers and input suppliers and service providers for the farming sector. In total 111 
interviews were conducted, of which 58 were digitally recorded, providing 48 hours of 
recorded interviews - an average of 50 minutes per interview. All the digitally recorded 
interview files were stored in a computer and played back for transcription purposes, for 
clarification of points made by interviewees and/or for refreshing the researcher’s memory 
about a particular interview and the context in which it was carried out. Interviews were 
conducted in the Kazakh and Russian languages.     
Being a Kazakh native speaker and fluent in Russian made communication with 
research actors unconstrained in terms of language. In most cases, interviews were 
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conducted as ‘a conversation with a purpose’ rather than a ‘dry’ inquiry. Interview 
questions were open-ended and the interviewee had the freedom to elaborate on issues. But 
as interviewer I kept in mind a certain set of issues to ask about, discuss or clarify. In cases 
where people did not want the interviews recorded, I jotted down the main points during or 
immediately after the interview. Others asked to pause recording when they wanted to 
reveal sensitive information. An advantage of having a compact digital recorder is that it 
has twelve hours of non-stop high-quality mode of recording and can capture voices from a 
remote distance. This meant that, after asking permission to record the interview, the 
recorder could be placed out of the sight of the interviewee. In this way, the interviewee 
was not disturbed and the interview generally proceeded in a relaxed manner.  
Depending on the context, situation and interviewee, I emphasized specific aspects 
of my background as a villager, agronomist, plant protection researcher and/or a doctoral 
researcher at a foreign university. This helped to gain the confidence of respondents, as 
someone who could understand their concerns and follow the points they were making.     
                  
1.3.2  Participant observation 
 
I participated in numerous farming activities, research fieldtrips and meetings involving 
farmers, agricultural researchers, government bodies, input suppliers and/or service 
providers. The ways in which they communicated between each other were noted, photos of 
the activities were taken and any speeches made during these gatherings were recorded on a 
digital recorder.   
  
1.3.3  Archives and secondary data sources 
 
In this study, the archive of the Republican Plant Protection Station should have been a key 
resource in generating an overview of pre-1991 pest-control activities throughout 
Kazakhstan. However, its location could not be traced since archives in post-Soviet 
Kazakhstan have been neglected and some archives have been lost entirely. According to 
key informants, this particular archive was neglected in the 1990s, and lost when the 
Ministry of Agriculture moved from Almaty,3 the former capital, to the new capital, Astana, 
in 1997-1998. Fortunately, it was possible to find archival documents, such as the annual 
reports of some Soviet collective farms and the plant protection stations that were located in 
the Almaty region, in the Almaty regional archive. However, it took some time to gain 
approval from the Head of the Archive to access and photocopy material. Documents from 
this archive were studied carefully to reconstruct past activities, and some of these archive 
items are referenced in this dissertation. The archive of the Kazakh Research Institute for 
Plant Protection was also studied to gather data on staff statistics and to review scientific 
reports and grey documents. Personal ties were important in gaining access to these 
documents; normally access would not be granted to an outsider.    
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Literature, documents, media and press coverage on the past and current state of the 
farming sector, agricultural research and the plant protection service in the Soviet and post-
1991 periods were also reviewed. 
Photographs were taken of deteriorated and dismantled farming and social 
infrastructures to provide ‘material evidence’4 for the arguments made in Chapter 2. Photos 
taken at village markets provide material evidence for Chapter 3 about the illegal pesticide 
trade in contemporary Kazakhstan. Pictures of Soviet era research equipment in the Kazakh 
Research Institute for Plant Protection were taken to provide material evidence for the 
points made in Chapter 4.  
 
1.3.4  Fieldwork period 
 
Formally, this PhD project started in January 2005. The fieldwork for this study took place 
in July-October 2005, April-September 2006 and May-August 2007. Thus, in sum, 14 
months fieldwork was carried out during three years. In addition, I did a pilot study for this 
research in 2004 while being employed at the Kazakh Research Institute for Plant 
Protection. This allowed me to become acquainted with some research actors and sites, and 
allowed me to conduct preliminary interviews and make the first observations. Hence, 
before commencing the actual research, preliminary findings helped to compose the 
research design and develop a research strategy.     
 
1.3.5  Research sites and case studies  
  
This research was carried out in two regions of Kazakhstan: the Almaty region in the 
southeast and the Semey region in the northeast. There were two main reasons for selecting 
these two spatially separate regions. First, to have a broader research context for drawing 
inferences about certain socio-economic (e.g. land distribution or farm types), technological 
(e.g. farming practices) and natural phenomena (e.g. agro-climatic conditions). Second, a 
long familiarity with both regions saved time in becoming acquainted with the research 
sites and actors.    
The selection of the cases for each empirical chapter had a purposive character 
(Bernard 2002, Mason 2002, Yin 2003), in order to reveal the situation on the ground and 
support a particular argument developed in the chapters in question. Three kinds of 
argument were developed throughout the empirical chapters, viz.: developmental (how 
something has developed), mechanical (how something works or is constituted) and 
comparative (how a social phenomenon is explained from a specified set of comparisons) 
(Mason 2002). The developmental argument was constructed to provide a detailed, 
contextual and multilayered interpretation of data, and to illustrate developmental processes 
(in particular, the process of post-Soviet transition in an agrarian context in Chapter 2 and 
the evolution of locust control system in Chapter 5). Second, the mechanical argument was 
used to focus on how certain phenomena and processes operate or are constituted in certain 
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contexts (in particular, IPM and pesticide use in Soviet and post-Soviet context in Chapter 
3, and plant protection research in the Soviet and the post-Soviet periods in Chapter 4). 
Third, the comparative argument aimed to draw explanatory significance from a specified 
set of comparisons (all chapters). The qualitative research was particularly useful here, 
since its sensitivity to context increased the opportunities for developing meaningful points 
of comparison between the material in the four empirical chapters.                   
Chapter 2 reconstructs the Soviet agricultural setting by using and cross-referencing 
information obtained from interviews, archival documents and the literature. This analysis 
benefited from rethinking personal observations made in the 1980s, when I lived in 
sovkhoz Sotsialistic (Socialist) in the Semey region. It was relatively easy to characterize 
Soviet farming setting because of its homogeneity, although rather more difficult to picture 
the extremely heterogeneous post-Soviet agricultural setting. In total, 21 crop production 
farms of various sizes were studied. They had different technological processes, 
infrastructure, division of labour and access to inputs and machinery. In this research, the 
sizes of farm fields used for crop production varied from one ha to 3,000 ha.5   Farms with 
different amounts of arable land were purposively selected to compare the way in which 
different types of agricultural producers operate on and deal with pest problems. 
Soviet era data on Integrated Pest Management in Chapter 3 were obtained from the 
archives of the Kazakh Research Institute for Plant Protection and the Alma-Ata Oblast6 
Plant Protection Station and its raion7 branches. Moreover, a complete review was made of 
the contents of all the issues of the All-Union Journal of Plant Protection between 1935 and 
1991. Information about the pest-control research and practices since 1991 was obtained 
through a study of recent issues of the journal Plant Protection (and Quarantine) in 
Kazakhstan,8 interviews with farmers, plant protection researchers and practitioners and 
from own observations made in the Almaty and Semey regions.  
The Kazakh Research Institute for Plant Protection (KRIPP) was selected as a case 
study for Chapter 4, to highlight the evolution of agrarian science and the pest-control 
research agenda before and after 1991. KRIPP is located in the Almaty region in the 
southeast of Kazakhstan. An internship in 1998 during my bachelor study and my 
employment at this institute since 2002 gave me a chance to establish a rapport with its 
personnel (most of whom I interviewed for this study) and to know the dynamics and 
conditions under which KRIPP has to operate. Sharing together grey and sunny days in the 
working environment and mutual support in informal situations allowed building a high 
level of trust and rapport with many employees. In addition, I established good 
relationships with managers and researchers of the Research Institute for Potato and 
Vegetable Farming and the Research Institute for Arable Farming in the course of joint 
projects, and this helped in carrying out unconstrained in-depth interviews for this study.     
In Chapter 5, locust pests, namely the Italian Locust (Calliptamus italicus L.) and 
the Asiatic Migratory Locust (Locusta migratoria migratoria L.), served as a case study in 
order to examine from an interdisciplinary perspective the co-evolution of locust 
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populations, land-use systems, knowledge about locusts, campaigns against them and 
institutions in Soviet times and in the post-Soviet period. 
In general, all four empirical chapters are lined up to demonstrate that knowledge 
development, technological processes, farming practices and institutions related to pest 
control heavily depend upon the political and socio-economic situation, and cannot be 
explained through an exclusive focus on scientific aspects. 
 
1.3.6  Data analysis 
 
Data analysis was based on cross-checking information from documents, the literature, 
media, own observations and interviews. The analysis focused on the period 1967-2007 
when interviewees witnessed events personally, so information obtained from them orally 
was important. Archival documents and literature sources gave insights into earlier periods, 
from the establishment of the Soviet state. Thus, in total, a period of about 90 years (1917-
2007) was analysed.  
A computer program (Atlas.ti 5.0) was used to assist with the qualitative analysis, 
by providing data storing, retrieval, structuring and processing. Most of digitally recorded 
interviews were literally transcribed and incorporated into Atlas.ti 5.0 for further analysis. 
A list of codes and related key words was composed to analyse the interviews, identify 
analytical categories and concepts and to compare and link them to each other (see 
Appendix 1.1 for illustration of an activated window of Atlas.ti 5.0).             
Emotions expressed by interviewees during the interviews were also noted, and 
linked to various arguments made in the thesis. For instance, it was noted that interviewees 
were often inspired and passionate while talking about professional activities or livelihood 
in the Soviet past, but less enthusiastic when talking about the post-1991 period. These 
swings in the moods of interviewees can be regarded as ‘emotional evidence’,9 which often 
points to institutional values among informants.  
 
 
1.4  Agro-geographical profile of the Republic of Kazakhstan  
 
Kazakhstan was one of the 15 constituent republics of the Soviet Union. It is located in 
Central Asia (sometimes known as Middle Asia). With a total area of 2.7 million square 
kilometres, Kazakhstan is the ninth largest country in the world. It stretches from the 
Caspian Sea and the Volga River plains in the west to the mountainous Altai in the east, 
and from the foothills of Tien-Shan in the south and southeast to the West-Siberian 
lowlands in the north. The country extends more than 3,000 km from east to west and 1,700 
km from north to south. It has borders with Russia in the east, north and northwest (these 
two countries share one of the longest land borders in the world of 7,591 km.), Uzbekistan, 
Kyrgyzstan and Turkmenistan in the south and China in the southeast.    
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At the same time, Kazakhstan is one of the most sparsely populated countries in the 
world, with 5.6 people per square kilometre. As of December 2006, the Kazakhstan 
population was 15.4 million people (Agency for Statistics of the Republic of Kazakhstan 
2007). About 57% live in urban settlements and the remaining 43% in rural areas. This 
makes agriculture a key activity for almost half the population. As of 2006, Kazakhstan 
administratively is comprised of 14 oblasts (provinces), while the oblasts are subdivided 
into 168 raions (districts).   
Kazakhstan is a landlocked country that is equidistant from the Atlantic and the 
Pacific Oceans. Its remoteness from the oceans determines the climate of the country. The 
climate is sharply continental with long cold winters and comparatively short, yet hot 
summers. It is arid and semiarid with an uneven distribution of natural precipitation. The 
average temperature in January varies between -19ºC and -4ºC, while the average 
temperature in July fluctuates between +19ºC to +26ºC. The temperature may go down to   
-45ºC in winter and rise to +45ºC in summer. The cropping season lasts from 105 to 165 
days, and is longer in the southern regions. Annual precipitation in the arable zones of the 
country is quite low, (only 150-320 mm) with the exception of mountainous areas, where it 
is between 460-880 mm per annum. Most of the precipitation falls during autumn, winter 
and spring, which means that during the cropping season in the summer there is a shortage 
of moisture in the soil.           
In 2006, 18 million ha of land was used for arable farming (with about 3 million ha 
of this under irrigation), 5 million ha for haymaking and 188 million ha for grazing (most 
grazing land is natural pastures). Livestock husbandry is a traditional and important part of 
the agricultural sector. Sheep breeding is predominant, while cattle, horse and camel 
breeding are also well developed. Animal husbandry accounts for about half of the 
production value in agriculture and crop production for the other half. Kazakhstan is also 
one of the world's major wheat producers and exporters. Most wheat production is 
concentrated in the northern wheat-belt, where it is grown under rain-fed conditions. In 
2006, Kazakhstan produced 18 million tons of wheat, exporting about 6 million tons. Other 
important crops grown in Kazakhstan are barley, rye, maize, rice, potatoes, soybeans, sugar 
beet, cotton, tobacco, sunflower, flax, buckwheat and vegetables. Orchards and vineyards 
are widespread in the southern part of the country.  
With its large territory Kazakhstan has a great diversity of agricultural pests that 
reduce the quantity and quality of yield of these crops. There are about 50 species of 
polyphagous and more than 100 species of specialized insect-pests, more than 70 diseases 
and about 120 weed species that cause problems in crop production (Sagitov 2002:12). A 
broad range of pest organisms over vast territories makes plant protection an essential part 
of agricultural production in Kazakhstan.  
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1.5  Notes 
 
                                                 
1
 In this thesis, an agricultural pest is defined broadly, as a living organism (rodent, insect, mite, 
nematode, fungus, bacterium, virus or weed) that damages crops, affects crop development or 
reduces quantity and quality of yield before or after harvest. The terms ‘agricultural pest’, ‘pest 
organism’ and ‘pest’ will be used interchangeably. 
 
2
 A pesticide treadmill – is a metaphor to express the process of pests becoming resistant to the 
effects of pesticides, which means that higher doses, or new and more potent, pesticides are 
required, to which pests sooner or later become resistant again. There is no end to this spiral. 
 
3
  This city was named Verny (1854-1921), Alma-Ata (1921-1993) and Almaty (1993-now). 
 
4
 ‘Material evidence’ (Paul Richards, personal communication, 16.02.2006). 
 
5
 For the sake of indicative categorization according to farm size, I distinguish farms having 1-50 ha 
as small-scale, 50-500 ha as medium-scale and more than 500 ha as large-scale. In Chapter 2 
various farm types and sizes in post-Soviet Kazakhstan will be discussed.   
 
6
 Oblast [in Russian] – an administrative division of the territory of the country into 
regions/provinces. Alma-Ata oblast before 1991 occupied 105,210 square kilometres. It consisted of 
11 administrative districts with 39 kolkhozes and 97 sovkhozes. Total cropping area was 839,556 
ha.   
 
7
 Raion [in Russian] – an administrative sub-division of the oblast; English equivalent – district.   
 
8
 Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the All-Union Journal of Plant Protection has become the 
Russian Journal of Plant Protection. Since independence in 1991, the Journal of Plant Protection 
in Kazakhstan was issued for the first time in 1997. It was renamed Plant Protection and 
Quarantine in Kazakhstan in 2001.  Because of financial constraints, only 20 issues have been 
published between 1997 and 2007. 
 
9
 
 
‘Emotional evidence’ (Paul Richards, personal communication, 16.02.2006).     
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2.1  Introduction 
 
The relative viability and efficiency of large-scale farming and smallholder agriculture is a 
topic of constant debate in agrarian circles.  After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, 
many observers hailed the opportunity to re-introduce family-farm agriculture in former 
communist countries, as this would improve efficiency.  However, more than fifteen years 
later large farm enterprises continue to dominate the agricultural landscape and, in several 
countries of the former Soviet Union, they still control most of the arable land (Davydova 
and Franks 2006, Kitching 1998, Spoor and Visser 2001, 2004, Visser 2008, Wegren 2004, 
2006, 2007).   
This chapter examines the post-Soviet transformation of the farming sector in 
Kazakhstan.  It first describes the transformation of the agrarian structure and the new 
ordering of large farms and smallholdings in the context of changing socio-economic, 
political and technological relations.  This part of analysis follows a relatively conventional 
approach in explaining these changes by providing an historical description of major 
agrarian policies and the changing economic context.  It identifies the major changes in 
land use, farm types and farm sizes and how state interventions influenced access to land 
and other inputs during the different stages of transition.  The chapter then moves to an 
analysis of how different actors perceive the transformation of agriculture, livelihoods and 
social infrastructure in rural areas since independence, why they talk about this period in 
terms of crisis and chaos, and why many people have a feeling of nostalgia for the Soviet 
past.  The chapter subsequently examines the role of knowledge and the remarkable loss of 
knowledge in the transition process.  It describes the technological rationale and the 
organization of knowledge within Soviet agriculture and examines what has happened to 
those knowledge structures.  It argues that the loss of knowledge and the lack of knowledge 
are the key elements of the crisis in agriculture after the collapse of the Soviet Union.  
Neoliberal ideology, which informed much of the policy changes in the transition period, 
has severely constrained the maintenance of essential crop protection knowledge required 
for sustainable forms of agriculture. 
This argument is a preface for a discussion of the demise of knowledge-intensive 
IPM in Chapter 3, the collapse of the plant protection research system in Chapter 4, and the 
lack of interest in maintaining knowledge about complex ecological processes and pest 
problems that require collective action as elaborated in Chapter 5.  
This argument about the fate of knowledge under neoliberal driven changes also has 
implications for theoretical perspectives on agrarian change.  Our starting point for 
interpreting agrarian change begins with general macro-economic descriptions of larger and 
concrete formations but then descends to a more meso-level analysis of the conditions that 
structure these forms of production (cf. Friedmann 1980).  The focus on knowledge 
employed here coincides with the work of several scholars who recognize that agricultural 
labour processes contain specific intrinsic structures (e.g. Benton 1996, Mollinga 1989, 
Veldwisch 2008, Veldwisch and Spoor 2008).  The ‘labour process’ approach includes 
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studying the division of labour, the organization of work, tasks, hierarchy, control, 
technology, tools, knowledge, skills and the means of production (Thompson 1989).  The 
Soviet agricultural labour process was organized around large-scale, highly mechanized and 
knowledge intensive farming systems.  The labour process approach has been used to 
demonstrate the importance of analysing processes of deskilling and reskilling as a means 
of understanding agrarian change (e.g. Stone 2007).  This chapter examines whether and 
how such processes occurred in the post-1991 transition period in Kazakhstan.  This 
theoretical position means a departure from the notion that knowledge and skill are just 
another input (or external) factor that can be acquired in discrete units (Jansen et al. 2004).  
Rather, as will be argued below, one can have different degrees of access to relevant 
sources of knowledge.  Practical knowledge implies not just blindly following given 
prescriptions, e.g. regarding pesticide or fertilizer application, but combining previous 
experiences with an interpretation of the existing situation to guide practices.  Equally, 
skills owe their existence to a constant renewal through practical action and turning 
knowledge into skills always involves a learning period (Sigaut 1994).  These aspects make 
it more difficult to assess the impact of knowledge and skills on efficiency or productivity 
than other, more measurable factors such as farm size, inputs and outputs levels of farms or 
the size of the labour force. 
The importance of a better theoretical consideration of the relation between 
knowledge and skills and technology (and in particular agricultural labour processes) is 
illustrated by the exchanges between Griffin et al. (2002) and Kitching (2004).  Griffin et 
al. (2002) defended the need for redistributive land reform on the grounds that small farms 
tend to be more efficient than large farms.  In the empirical part of their paper, they 
associate the decline of agricultural output during the transformation of the former Soviet 
Union with macroeconomic imbalances, very high rates of inflation, falling rates of 
investment, a declining level of mechanization and falling labour productivity.  According 
to Griffin et al. (2002) land reform really only occurred in name and collective or corporate 
farms continue to dominate and land continues to be cultivated collectively.  The many 
smallholdings that exist are mostly a continuation of the former household plots, but these 
households lack proper support, access to credit or input markets.  They argue that the 
failure of land reform is related to the absence of institutions (land market, state 
procurement, input markets, etc.) required by smallholders.  Kitching (2004:167) disputes 
the land reform agenda put forward by Griffin et al. (2002), arguing that the division of 
labour in the later years of Soviet agriculture (producing basic grain crops and beef and 
dairy cattle on large farms and the bulk of horticultural crops and smaller animals on small 
farms) was ‘sensible enough’.  Kitching (2004) makes the case for a dualist model of post-
Soviet agricultural reform with (privately owned and managed) large farms producing basic 
grains and large animal products and small farmers producing other foodstuff.1 He does 
not, however, qualify why he considers it ‘sensible enough’ that large farms continue to 
produce as large farms instead of splitting up, nor why it is difficult to let small farms 
benefit from redistributive land reform.  We interpret the notion of ‘sensible enough’ as an 
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implicit reference to what can be conceptualized as a mere technical element of the labour 
process: the knowledge and skills required to practise agriculture under given conditions.  It 
is implied in Kitching’s response (Kitching 2004) to Griffin et al. (2002) that this 
knowledge and skills is relatively fixed and cannot be readily changed in a transition of 
large-scale to medium or small-scale agriculture.  A more explicit recognition of the core 
role of knowledge and skills in agricultural labour processes could help to resolve this 
controversy. 
This chapter looks at changes in knowledge and skills in order to understand the 
constraints and possibilities facing the agrarian transition process in post-Soviet societies.  
It highlights how the knowledge and skills shaped the development of Soviet agriculture 
and have continued to shape post-Soviet agriculture in Kazakhstan.  It also looks at what 
happened when some knowledge became obsolete as situations changed and when 
knowledge is lost or not maintained. 
 
 
2.2  Agrarian transition in Kazakhstan 
 
Agrarian change in Kazakhstan has evolved in parallel to political economic changes in 
Russia ever since Kazakhstan joined the Russian Empire in the 18th century and continued 
to do so throughout 70 years of a common Soviet heritage. Even in the post-1991 period, 
with a drastic reduction of agricultural exports to Russia and diminished support for the 
agricultural sector, the new Kazakhstani economic policies have closely followed Russian 
policy-making.  In the Soviet era Kazakhstan, which specialized in cereal and meat 
production was, to borrow Laird and Chappell’s (1961:326) words, ‘Russia’s agricultural 
crutch’ (or to put it more precisely: USSR’s agricultural crutch).  Khrushchev’s Virgin 
Land Campaign particularly targeted Kazakhstan.  In 1960, Kazakhstan produced 0.7 
million tons of meat and 10.5 million tons of cereals, 22.4% of the USSR’s total production 
(Churin 1962:324).  This increased significantly to 1.4 million tons of meat and 27.4 
million tons of cereals in 1987 (State Committee for Statistics of Kazakh SSR 1989), a 
significant share of the agricultural output of the USSR.  The collapse of the Soviet Union 
resulted in a crisis in agriculture.  Crucial aspects of this crisis included: a disengagement of 
the state from the rural economy; the break up of the Soviet inter-republican trade links; a 
strong disparity between the pricing of inputs (liberated) and farm outputs (regulated and 
set at low levels); the unavailability of credit and an underdeveloped marketing 
infrastructure (Deberdeev and Idrisov 1997, Gray 2000, Kaliev 2003, Spoor 1999).  The 
following sub-sections describe this agrarian crisis in more detail, together with the 
vacillating course of Kazakh agrarian policies in the transition period. 
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2.2.1  Post-Soviet land policies and the farm privatization process 
After the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991, the government of Kazakhstan cut ties 
with the centralized planned economy and took a neoliberal course that sought to establish 
a free market economy.  The government led the farm privatization and the top-down 
restructuring process, abolished subsidies and credits to agricultural producers, regulated 
farm output prices, liberalized input prices and removed protection from external market 
forces.  Since the post-Soviet era Kazakhstan’s agricultural policy has passed through three 
identifiable stages. 
In the first stage, which started in 1992, privatization remained largely an intention 
on paper, with little actual change in farm structure and ownership.  Former Soviet farms 
were legally registered as either ‘collective enterprises’ or ‘private enterprises’.  The 
revision of the Civil Code in 1995 abolished these categories and introduced three new 
legal statuses:  ‘Producer Cooperative’, ‘Economic Partnership’ and ‘Joint Stock 
Company’.  The first transfer of control over land from the state to farming units was laid 
down in the Presidential Decree ‘On Land’ of December 22, 1995, which included a 
provision for 99-year long-term land leases to individuals and legal entities.2 Land 
remained state owned. 
The second stage of restructuring started in 1997 and, in contrast to the first stage, 
involved not only an expanded privatization but also an incipient individualization of 
property. A law ‘On the Peasant Farm’ issued in March 31, 1998 added the category of 
‘peasant farm’ (see further in the text) to the three legally recognized forms of farm units.  
Local authorities were obliged to issue land title certificates and define property shares for 
farm employees.  These property shares defined individuals’ share in the property of former 
collective farm including livestock, farm machinery and equipment and buildings.  The 
certificates generally did not demarcate the individual plots of land (Gray 2000) so 
individuals acquired entitlements to ‘virtual’ shares in the land within the farm entity rather 
than obtaining control over a defined piece of physical land.  In practice, the plots of land 
were only demarcated when individuals decided to leave the larger entity in order to farm 
independently.  Further changes in land legislation came with the law ‘On Land’ of January 
24, 2001, which reduced usufruct rights from 99 to 49 years.  Article 124 of this law 
obliged holders of land titles to personalise, within three years, the specific land plots that 
were previously no more than a virtual share in the land stock of the collective.  After 
demarcation and personalization, the land could be sub-leased to other agricultural 
producers or farm entities (such as large agricultural firms), with no obligation for the 
holder to be personally engaged in farming.  This land law paved the road for a full 
transition to private ownership of land through a new land code, issued in 2003. 
The third stage of the privatization process of farms was initiated with the 
introduction of private ownership for land within the new ‘Land Code’ of the Republic of 
Kazakhstan, issued on June 20, 2003, which finally turned agricultural land into a 
commodity.  The government set a deadline (January 1st of 2005) for land-titleholders to 
reach an agreement with the state over the purchase, or 49-year lease, of specific plots of 
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land, for which a buyer would receive a ‘Certificate of ownership’ and lessee would get a 
‘Certificate of lease’.  Individuals buying land had up to ten years to pay for the plots of 
land but they could only sell, lease, mortgage or do other legally permissible deals with the 
land once it was fully paid for. Individuals leasing land were obliged to be personally 
engaged in farming and had no rights to sub-lease, what was allowed previously.  Owners 
and lessees can farm individually or contribute their land to the land-stock of other legal 
entities engaged in agriculture, with the lessee being employed by that particular entity.  
Hence, it was only after fourteen years of independence and a number of different laws and 
regulations that individual farming, combined with individual control over land, became a 
possibility.  This long transition period reflects an ambivalence in policy about the desired 
structure and scale of farm units, and the bundle of rights that land owners could have over 
land.  The origins of this ambivalence are less important to explore here than its 
consequences for the farming sector. 
The top-down organized privatization of farm assets and land took place in a 
context of uncertainty about the direction and scope of the transition process, giving local 
administrators and former managers of collective farms a lot of room for manoeuvre. 
Interviews carried out for this research showed that rural dwellers from different parts of 
Kazakhstan saw the farm manager as playing a key role, with the redistribution of farm 
assets and land being critically dependent on the honesty and dignity of individual farm 
managers.  
There were many stories told about farm workers who received nothing.  In other 
cases, people had to push very hard to get their shares and some gave up demanding.  The 
following quotation from an interview with a former kolkhoz worker in the Almaty region 
illustrates the key role of managers in the redistribution process (transcribed Interview 
07/10/2005, with field note observations of expressions of emotions): 
 
Q: Who was redistributing farm assets and land?  
A: The farm management did as they wanted [angry].  The chairman of our 
kolkhoz [gets very angry]…such a…[curses him with her right  fist waving 
on the air ] grabbed everything [moves her arm as a child grabbing a toy 
when somebody wants to take it away].  He grabbed everything, the milk 
farm with its cows, the land and the farm machinery.  In our kolkhoz, the 
redistribution of farm assets and land was unfair.  Everything depended on 
the manager.  The manager of kolkhoz 24 PartSiezd [kolkhoz named after 
24th congress of the Communist Party of the USSR] fairly redistributed the 
farm assets and land among his workers.  But ours…!!! [again gets very 
angry] grabbed everything and no one could do anything, maybe he has a 
strong ‘krisha’ [‘roof’, meaning having personal ties with authorities] that 
let him boldly grab everything.  The same happened at sovkhoz 
Tomarovskogo, where farm workers were left without any share of land or 
assets.  There was a big scandal.  This sovkhoz was a very rich one, with 
vineyards, orchards, vegetable production, tobacco fields, numerous 
livestock and farm machinery.  An uncle of my husband lived and worked 
there his whole life, and he received nothing.  Their manager cheated them 
and sold all the farmland and assets to ‘krutim’ [jargon - here, she means 
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‘rich and powerful outsiders’].  
Q: What did farm workers do? 
A: What can ordinary people do against ‘krutikh’?3  
 
Apart from illustrating the central role that farm managers played in the 
redistribution process this quote also highlights the importance of ties between the 
managers and the authorities.  Equally, the reference to the manager who redistributed the 
land among his workers reflects the importance of personal and patrimonial relationships.  
Workers continued to consider themselves as a member of a collective rather than as 
individuals engaging in new contractual relationships that they had to negotiate and defend 
themselves.  Incidents of maldistribution and appropriation, such as the scandal referred to 
in the quote, occasionally received national media coverage but never led to larger scale 
organized resistance.4 
The central role of the farm manager in the redistribution process and the possibility 
of appropriation (part of what Harvey (2003:144) calls ‘accumulation by dispossession’) 
was confirmed by farm managers who had redistributed land and property more equitably.  
The concept of ‘accumulation by dispossession’ refers, in short, to the robbing of people’s 
rights and resources. An instructive example is a former manager of a sovkhoz with 2,500 
ha of arable land under mixed production who now owns a 55 ha peasant farm in the 
Almaty region.  He remarked that he could have gotten more land by using his position and 
that other colleagues bit off 200, 300 or even 500 ha for themselves.  However, he did not 
do so because he ‘did not want to be cursed and hated by the villagers’.  In 1996, he first 
redistributed land shares to the workers, each worker getting 1 to 10 ha depending on their 
employment history in the sovkhoz.  His personal share was only 10 ha and his wife got 5 
ha.  He acquired the other 40 ha of his 55 ha farm plot by ‘buying out’ concession rights 
(pravo ustupki) from emigrating ethnic Germans, Polish, Russians and Ukrainians in 1996-
1997.5 This manager did not use his position for expropriation.  However, he knew the 
needs and strategies of other shareholders, and maybe has used this information to buy their 
shares and entitlements at favourable times or rates.  The top-down character of the 
privatization process, the information imbalance and the unequal distribution of land and 
property shares were also evident within a survey of 600 households carried out in northern 
and south-eastern of Kazakhstan (Peabody et al. 2000:185).  Thirty nine percent of the 
households interviewed in this survey responded that they did not know what privatization 
meant and 29% said that privatization options and implications were never discussed with 
them.  Thus, the privatization of the agricultural sector in Kazakhstan was developed and 
carried out without the involvement of a broad social base and with little effort made to 
inform rural people of their rights, opportunities and responsibilities.  
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2.2.2  Bringing the state back in 
 
The neoliberal reforms to foster the transition of a planned economy to a free market 
economy turned out to be a shocking devastation in the farming sector.6 Before 1991, 
Kazakhstan fully provided for its own food security, with domestic production of many 
agricultural products (e.g. wheat, meat, potato, eggs) sufficient to meet internal demand.  
By the end of the 1990’s neoliberal economic policies had severely aggravated the crisis in 
Kazakhstan’s rural economy and had done little to solve the supposed inefficiency in 
agricultural production inherited from the Soviet period (Baydildina et al. 2000, Kaliev 
2003).  The high share of the agricultural sector in the GDP – 24% in 1970 (Kembaev and 
Komlev 2004:54) and 34% in 1990 (Ziyabekov 2006:11) declined very rapidly to 8.7% in 
2001 (Agency for Statistics of the Republic of Kazakhstan 2002a). The decline in the 
agricultural sector threatened the country’s food security (Baydildina et al. 2000, 
Kurganbayeva et al. 2002, Satybaldin et al. 2001, Ziyabekov 2006) and recognition of this 
by the government led to a more interventionist stance, following Russia’s steps (after 
1998) to ‘bring the state back in’ (Wegren 2007:513).  In the early 2000’s the Ministry of 
Agriculture introduced a new set of policies designed to mitigate against the devastating 
effects of the transition policies, to make agricultural producers more competitive in the 
world agricultural market and to meet the country’s food security needs.  The starting 
document was the ‘State Agro-Food Programme for 2003-2005’ (‘Years of Village’), 
formulated in 2002.  Its primary objective was to meet national food security by providing 
assistance to agricultural producers.7 Further policy documents followed: the ‘State 
Programme for Development of Rural Areas in 2004-2010’ and a policy document on ‘On 
the Sustainable Development of the Agro-Industrial Complex of the Republic of Kazakhstan 
in 2006-2010’.  These documents reflected a new political view that the earlier 
restructuring of the agricultural sector had caused more harm than good (Cummings 2005).  
Legal instruments such as the law ‘On the State Regulation of the Development of the Agro-
Industrial Complex and Rural Areas’ (issued on 8 July 2005) further extended this 
interventionism.  Interviewees in this study saw the first decade of the post-Soviet agrarian 
transition in Kazakhstan as a period of destruction, stagnation and demoralisation, and the 
years since 2003-2004 as the beginning of recovery from the shock of transition.  
Expressions such as ‘nachali podnimat golovu’ (started to get up) or ‘nachali prixodit v 
sebya’ (started to regain consciousness) were very common among farmers who survived 
the economic slump and institutional insecurity. 
 
 
 
 23 
2.3  Emerging farm types 
 
Agrarian transition was intended to transform the Soviet-era farms into something new.  In 
1937, there were 193 sovkhozes (soviet state farms) and 7,483 kolkhozes (collective farms) 
in Kazakhstan (Kembaev and Komlev 2004), but over time most of these kolkhozes were 
liquidated or merged into sovkhozes.  By 1988, there were 2,125 sovkhozes and 391 
kolkhozes (State Committee for Statistics of Kazakh SSR 1989).8 Over time the 
organization, management and labour process in both farm types became so similar that 
there were few practical differences between them.  This chapter therefore uses the term 
‘Soviet (collective) farm’ to describe both the sovkhoz and the kolkhoz.  If there was a 
difference between these two types of farm it was in their allotted areas.  The average size 
of a sovkhoz in 1961 was 107,100 ha, including pastures, grasslands and arable land, with 
an average 19,400 ha of arable land (Churin 1962:81).  The average size of a kolkhoz in 
Kazakhstan was 37,000 ha, with an average 10,600 ha of arable land of (State Committee 
for Statistics of USSR 1988).  Farms in Kazakh SSR were on average 2 to 3 times larger 
than in other Soviet republics.  While policymakers were convinced that the Soviet type 
collective farms should be privatized, they were less clear about what to replace them with. 
The privatization and restructuring of these Soviet collective farms was a long 
process from which a wide range of agricultural enterprises has emerged. At one extreme 
former farm employees have become independent agricultural producers, varying in size 
and income; at the other extreme, large Soviet farms have been transformed into large 
commercial farm enterprises that continue to employ their shareholders.  By the end of 
2006 there were 173,132 active agricultural enterprises in Kazakhstan, including 65 state 
farms,9 5,224 private agricultural enterprises – in the form of various economic 
partnerships, joint stock companies and producer cooperatives, and 167,843 peasant farms 
(Table 2.1).  Despite the large number of peasant farms they only cover 36% of the total 
cultivated land in Kazakhstan, compared to the 62% covered by large agricultural 
enterprises (Table 2.2).  Thus, a small number of large agricultural enterprises continue to 
occupy much more of the cultivated area, despite the large number of peasant farms. Table 
2.1 shows that in 1990, before the collapse of the USSR in 1991, there were already some 
non-state agricultural enterprises and peasant farms in Kazakhstan, created in the wake of 
the perestroika reforms after 1985.  The USSR had already constructed a basic legal 
platform for privatizing state enterprises and had endorsed economic diversification (via a 
number of legal documents such as On private entrepreneurship, On state enterprises and 
their privatization, On private farm, On cooperatives and On land reform).  Most large-
scale private enterprises were established in the first phase of the transition period and the 
majority of individual farmers started up in the early 2000s, mainly as a consequence of the 
1998 law On the Peasant Farm and the 2003 Land Code. 
In Kazakhstan (and in this thesis) the notion of ‘peasant farm’ is used quite 
differently from its standard use in the rural sociology literature.  It is a much larger 
category than the classical object of peasant studies.  According to Article 1 of the law On 
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the Peasant Farm (issued on March 31, 1998) a peasant farm is defined as ‘a joint family 
labour union in which individual entrepreneurial activities are directly linked with the use 
of land for agricultural purposes to produce, process and market farm outputs’.  The term 
‘peasant’ here is an official translation into English of the term шаруа/sharua from Kazakh 
or крестьянин/krest’yanin from Russian.  Many peasant farms are actually large farms: 
13.9% of them have 50-200 ha of arable land, 5% have 200-500 ha and 2.7% have more 
than 500 ha (Agency for Statistics of the Republic of Kazakhstan 2002a). These areas can 
be much larger when grazing lands are included.  One of the main reasons for legally 
registering as a peasant farm is that it brings a reduction in tax liability and the assent of the 
tax office for simplified bookkeeping and reporting schemes, which in turn permits greater 
flexibility in the way workers are paid.  By way of example one peasant farm in the 
southeast of Kazakhstan visited during this research covers 1,000 ha and is owned by the 
former manager of a crop producing sovkhoz.  Together with the chief agronomist of this 
sovkhoz, he retained and privatized most of the production infrastructure and machinery, 
bought out the land and property shares of many former sovkhoz workers, and hired the 
best workers.10 Sharakhimbaev and Bildebaeva (2002) describe another peasant farm in the 
southeast of Kazakhstan with 1,400 ha of land, 47 oxen, 505 sheep and goats, 40 pigs and 
27 horses and 6 tractors.  
However, there are also many small peasant farms whose emergence can be best 
understood in relation to the evolution of cooperatives.  For a time, collective farming 
through cooperatives proved to be an appropriate survival strategy for former Soviet farm 
workers facing an insecure market environment.11 Joint labour, commonly owned farm 
machinery and relatively large fields (aggregated plots of cooperative members) allowed 
them to produce enough to stay in business. However, this changed after the new Land 
Code was issued in 2003 (discussed earlier in Section 2.2.1).  While the Code was not 
intended to break up the joint farming, a deadline to arrange ownership or lease by January 
2005 generated this unintended consequence.  The responsible government offices did not 
properly inform the farming community about the new land legislation and assist with legal 
procedures to obtain a certificate about land ownership or lease. Rumours were spread that 
land-title holders must buy their plots at once, otherwise it would be withdrawn by the Land 
Committee and subsequently be sold to those, who could buy it immediately.  In 2004, 
many rural title-holders, unfamiliar with legal matters, panicked because they did not have 
money to buy out their entitled plots.  While they were hesitating over what to do, land-
dealers were offering ready cash to moneyless rural dwellers and buying out their land at 
low prices.  As a result of this 126 agricultural cooperatives collapsed in 2004 (Grigoruk 
2006:44).12  
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Table 2.1 Number of functioning agricultural enterprises in Kazakhstan  
 
Type of agri-formations 1990 1995 2000 2005 2006 
Total 4,918 36,285 81,078 161,962 173,132 
Including: 
State agricultural enterprises 2,223 1,405 74 65 65 
Non-state agricultural enterprises 
(includes economic partnerships, 
joint stock companies and 
producer cooperatives) 
2,371 4,095 4,631 4,919 5,224 
Peasant farms 324 30,785 76,373 156,978 167,843 
 
Source: Agency for Statistics of the Republic of Kazakhstan (2002a, 2007). 
 
 
The emergence of different farm types has also been conditioned by environmental 
factors that favour particular production activities (e.g. crop, livestock or mixed 
production).  The size of crop producing farms ranges from 1 ha farms in the south of 
Kazakhstan (producing fruit or vegetables) to 100,000 ha (wheat producing enterprises in 
the northern wheat belt). 
Between 1990 and 2000 there was a dramatic fall in the area under cultivation.  
Table 2.2 shows that the area with cultivated land plummeted from about 35 million ha in 
1990 to about 16 million ha in 2000 (with a slight increase in the following years).  In 
Table 2.2 wheat, rice, potato and vegetables have been selected from the wider range of 
crops grown in Kazakhstan because these are the staple vegetative diet of the local 
population.  Wheat occupies most of the cultivated area in Kazakhstan, with much of it 
produced by large agricultural enterprises (although the share of peasant farms has 
increased) and between a third and a half of this wheat is exported annually.13 Rice is also 
mostly produced on large farms, but also increasingly on peasant farms.  By contrast 
potatoes and vegetables are mostly produced on household plots, mainly for own 
consumption with some surplus being marketed.  Households often store enough of these 
crops to consume them through the winter.  Household plots remain relatively unchanged 
from the Soviet time and are not officially registered as farm enterprises (cf. Veldwisch and 
Spoor 2008, Wegren 2008).  Many workers on large enterprises may have their own 
household plot, which produce a large proportion of the potatoes grown within the country.  
Care should be taken not to confuse these household plots with ‘peasant farms’, a legal 
entity, usually managed by one single family but sometimes by two, three or more families.  
This picture of different farm types, specializing in different production activities, coincides 
with Kitching’s depiction (2004) of Russia where large farms produce grains and large 
animal products much more efficiently than smallholders, while a mass of small farmers 
continues to produce horticultural products.  Medium size peasant farms in Kazakhstan 
produce grains, large livestock and horticultural crops. 
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It is not possible to predict the direction in which the agrarian structure will evolve, 
nor do we have sufficient data to draw firm conclusions about the relative efficiency of the 
different farm types (even if we assume constant conditions).14 The data show that the 
different farm types have found diverse ways to survive and to provide a livelihood for 
managers, farmers and workers.  The types of farms range from large entrepreneurial wheat 
farms in vertically organized firms (a successful strategy when most trade took place as 
barter; Peabody et al. 2000) to household plot cultivation of potatoes and vegetables.  In 
these circumstances efficiency cannot be measured by a single standard as different logics 
are at play.  Furthermore, analysing efficiency requires taking into account the 
interrelationships between different farm types, in terms of the supply of labour, renting 
inputs such as farm machinery, paying those workers who own a few livestock with fodder 
or marketing each other’s outputs.  We know these interactions have been important (cf. 
Gray 2000, Peabody et al. 2000, authors’ observations and interviews) but we do not know 
their precise role in local agrarian dynamics. 
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Table 2.2 Area (ha) of different crops cultivated by all categories of farms  
in Kazakhstan. 
 
Year 1990 1995 2000 2005 2006 
 
 
Total 
cultivated 
land, 
including: 
35,182,100 28,679,600 16,195,300 18,445,200 18,369,100 
(Large) agricultural enterprises 
 35,011,500 27,316,300 10,855,400 11,137,200 11,391,100 
      
Wheat 14,067,800 11,856,200 7,061,400 8,250,100 8,354,400 
Rice 124,300 92,700 55,400 65,800 65,400 
Potato 102,000 38,800 8,700 4,900 4,900 
Vegetables 48,300 25,700 10,700 5,900 5,600 
Peasant farms 
 13,900 1,111,400 4,847,800 6,871,300 6,655,100 
Wheat 1,900 691,100 2,986,900 4,353,300 4,043,700 
Rice - 1,600 21,700 19,800 22,500 
Potato 100 3,600 17,200 24,500 27,100 
Vegetables - 4,400 22,800 56,800 60,500 
Household plots 
 156,700 251,900 492,100 436,700 322,900 
Wheat - 4,600 65,000 44,500 27,700 
Rice 200 500 500 100 100 
Potato 103,800 163,500 134,400 138,800 121,900 
Vegetables 22,500 46,000 69,100 91,300 78,100 
 
Source: Agency for Statistics of the Republic of Kazakhstan (2002a, 2007). 
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2.4  Feelings of nostalgia and identification with the Soviet 
collectivity 
 
This overview of the how various farm types have come to emerge and co-exist in 
Kazakhstan has not yet elucidated the problems that many workers and small farmers faced 
in the process of restructuring.  Before exploring how the transition period was a painful 
and difficult period for many people, and how it brought havoc in the agricultural sector, 
we first discuss how the crisis gave rise to a widespread feeling of nostalgia.  This allows us 
also to describe some of the main characteristics of the Soviet collectivity to which these 
representations refer. 
Kazakhstani people tell strongly nostalgic narratives about their lives in the Soviet 
past. These express a strong appreciation of social security, stability in incomes, low food 
prices and a sense of egalitarian communal life that they enjoyed in the Soviet past. These 
feelings are in stark contrast to the current environment of ‘wild capitalism’ (dikii 
capitalism) in which people have experienced a devaluation of their life savings, prolonged 
uncertainty, insecurity, social differentiation and a decline in their purchasing power 
(interviews from this study, Nazpary 2002, Werner 1998).  The Soviet collective 
agricultural setting provided a form of social solidarity (in the Durkheimian sense), 
fraternity and cooperation.15 Contemporary rural society in Kazakhstan is now far removed 
from the relative social cohesiveness that was provided by the farm community.  Many 
interviewees talked with inspiration and passion about their livelihoods and professional 
activities in the Soviet past, but displayed much less enthusiasm and regularly became 
angry while talking about the post-1991 period.  An old woman, who practices subsistence 
farming on a 1.5 ha plot in the Almaty region framed the difference between the old system 
and the current situation as follows (Field notes, Interview 07/10/2005):  
 
I worked for 40 years, never missing a single working day.  Now I receive a 
pension of 9700 tenge [about 65 US$] per month.  In the Soviet time with 
my 40 years of working record, I would get about 120 roubles [before 1991, 
one rouble was about one US$] of monthly pension.  This would have 
provided me with a prosperous retirement.  From one-month’s pension I 
could buy a lorry of coal and a lorry of firewood and my food stock for the 
winter and still some money would remain for other things [because prices 
in the USSR were very low].  Now two months of my pension is even not 
enough to buy a lorry of coal [because after 1991, prices were liberalized 
and everything became very expensive].  If I had to rely on my pension 
alone, I would not survive.  Now, instead of having a restful retirement, I 
still have to work.  At least [having a piece of] land will not let me die of 
starvation and I will not beg for food.   
 
Her neighbour who participated in the conversation added:  
 
 29 
In the Soviet time, we thought we were still building communism for a 
prosperous life. Now [considering the severe hardship of the present 
situation] we understand that we actually used to live in communism 
[before 1991]. 
 
These sentiments are very common among people who remember living under the Soviet 
system.  One survey among rural dwellers in the late 1990s in Kazakhstan showed that 90% 
of the respondents considered that they lived better during the Soviet time (Peabody et al. 
2000:198).  Rural dwellers in Russia express similar nostalgic perceptions (Koznova 2004).  
 
2.4.1  Secure livelihoods in the Soviet collective system 
 
Narratives about a ‘better’ Soviet past seem to be informed by two elements.  Firstly, many 
stories refer to the more secure livelihoods and the favourable socio-economic 
infrastructure of the Soviet collectivity.  Secondly, individual farmers, farm managers and 
agro-technicians often mention the technological superiority of the Soviet farm.  The 
unsurpassed description of economic, socio-cultural and political life in a Russian 
collective farm by Humphrey (1983) is equally applicable to collective farms in 
Kazakhstan, since the Soviet farm took the same form throughout the entire USSR.  
Humphrey analyses the collective farm as an economic institution and its role as an 
instrument of political and cultural integration.  The collective farm acted as a ‘microcosm 
of the state’ (Humphrey 1983:3), or as one of our interviewees, a former sovkhoz director 
in the southeast of Kazakhstan, puts it ‘the Soviet farm was the state within the state’ 
(Interview 05/04/2006).  The ideology of uniformity produced similarities all over the 
USSR, as Humphrey (1983:17) argues: 
 
 …constant efforts are made to try to bring about a state in which real 
conditions are equal.  One result of these efforts is an astonishing and 
perhaps admirable uniformity in material life.  In the most distant corners of 
the Soviet Union rural workers live in the same standard house, wear the 
same padded jacket (vatnik), eat the same brand of tinned sprats.  
 
The similarity was not only material but also political, since all rural dwellers in the USSR 
were subject to the same ‘code of ideological intent’ (Humphrey 1983:17). 
The typical Soviet farm in Kazakhstan was either one large rural settlement or 
consisted of several spatially scattered sub-settlements with a single farm administration.  
The farm community was made up of households whose members were employed in 
various capacities in the farm as farm management staff, agro-technicians, field workers, 
‘mechanisators’,16 medical and education professionals and others.17 Households had home 
gardens of up to half a hectare, 2-3 cattle, 5-10 sheep, goats and poultry (‘domestic 
husbandry’).  From spring to late autumn privately-owned livestock was grazing on 
communal lands.  For the winter, the collective farm supplied its workers with hay and 
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forage for their household livestock.  The farm collective also provided basic social 
services to its dwellers: a kindergarten, school, small hospital or clinic, fresh water supply 
station, bathhouse, library, cinema club, amateur art activities club, food and miscellaneous 
shops, canteen and a sport stadium.  The Soviet farms invested a significant part of their 
revenues in these social infrastructures.  A former manager of the Soviet farm in Almaty 
region depicted the role of the farm collectivity as follows (Interview 05/04/2006): 
 
The sovkhoz dealt with all social, production or construction issues. From 
the sovkhoz budget we supported the local kindergarten, the school, the 
cultural house, the library, the bathhouse, the stadium and the swimming-
pool.  For example, our sovkhoz made a net profit of 1.5 million roubles at 
the end of the year and up to 70% of this money was invested in social 
infrastructure.  Now nobody cares about social infrastructure, everything we 
built has deteriorated or has been dismantled.  Today producers think only 
about production and profit; nobody cares about people and social life.   
 
 
2.4.2  Knowledge in Soviet agriculture 
 
The second storyline in nostalgic narratives concerns what people consider to be ‘good 
farming practice’ and contains two major themes: firstly, the organization of labour and the 
division of tasks in agriculture and, secondly, the level of mechanization of farming and the 
high levels of specialization and coordination within the knowledge structure.  Together, 
these made it possible to run the Soviet farm as a large-scale, knowledge intensive farming 
system. 
Farms consisted of several production divisions; each composed of several brigades, 
made up of several units.  A mixed farm would specialize in meat or dairy production 
together with crop production.  In such a setting one division, with its brigades and units 
would deal with livestock and other division(s) would be engaged in crop production, 
including fodder and hay production.  Other farms, or divisions, specialized entirely in 
cereal, vegetable or fruit production.  Farm specialization was supported by highly qualified 
professionals specialized to carry out specific tasks.  The managers of farms and divisions 
were agro-technicians with a high level of agricultural education.  The heads of brigades 
usually had received agricultural training at vocational schools and the head of units were 
usually experienced field workers.  Although the number of workers varied from one 
production group to another, a typical composition could be a division of 200-300 workers 
with brigades of 60-80 workers, divided into units of 15-20 workers.  Task assignment, 
responsibilities and reporting were organized hierarchically (worker, head of unit, brigadier, 
head of division, farm management, including chief agro-technicians and farm manager).  
In turn, the farm management was responsible to the district administration and the District 
Communist Party Committee.  The Party had significant influence over the rotation, 
appointment and promotion of farm managers.  Managers of successful farms were often 
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used to replace managers of poorly performing farms, or were promoted to higher official 
positions at local, district and regional level.  According to current narratives about the past, 
this structure ordered information, defined clear tasks, built trust in specialized technical 
knowledge and created the capacity to deal with technological complexity of the Soviet 
farming system. 
The second theme conveys the central role of agro-technicians as the driving force 
of technological processes and the carriers of agricultural knowledge.  On each farm a 
dozen highly educated agro-technicians (agronomists, vets and engineers) would lead and 
coordinate all the production activities.  Internal sub-division based on specialized, 
technical knowledge was often emphasized by the interviewees, and is supported by 
archival data and own observations. As a former brigadier of a sovkhoz in the Almaty 
region recalls (Interview 02/09/2005): 
 
At that time our sovkhoz had 5 or 6 agronomists: a chief agronomist, a plant 
protection agronomist, an orchard agronomist, a vegetable agronomist, and 
a field agronomist.    
 
In other situations a team of agronomists might also contain specialists in seeds and agro-
chemistry. 
Aside from specialization there was another crucial element: what was known as the 
‘technological map’ (see Appendix 2.1 for an example).  Every cropping season the chief 
agronomist and his team of agronomists and engineers made a complete technological map 
for each crop.  It included all the required agronomic measures, the irrigation schemes and 
estimated the labour needs and costs of particular operations and inputs.  The application of 
fertilizers and pesticides, in terms of volume, timing, method, required machinery (possibly 
including aerial spraying) and location, were planned in great detail.  The map also set out 
the crop rotation schemes,18 which were necessary to use soil nutrients effectively, to 
maintain and improve soil structure and fertility and to avoid pest and disease 
accumulation.  One example of the role of specialization within the farm illustrates the 
intensive knowledge structure.  Together with specialists of the District Plant Protection 
Station, the plant protection agronomist would develop plans to protect particular crops 
from particular insect pests, diseases or weeds occurring and causing damage on farm fields 
or orchards.  This plan was based on monitoring pest organisms and forecasting their 
population dynamics.  A phenological table of major insect pests was drawn up, that 
allowed them to plan the application of insecticides or bio-control agents at susceptible 
phases, to monitor population dynamics and to predict damage periods.  The crop 
protection plan defined specific combinations of agronomic, chemical, and/or biological 
protection measures that would be carried out.  The economic efficiency of crop protection 
measures was calculated, based on estimates of the costs of protection measures against the 
cost of saved yield.  A range of integrated pest management measures was drawn up and 
implemented and the crop protection plan was incorporated into the master technological 
map for a particular crop (Chenkin 1974).19 
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The farm-level agro-technicians were well connected with the wider agricultural 
knowledge system.  They had access to agronomic manuals, handbooks, and the 
recommendations of the All-Union, republican and regional research institutes relating to 
general or specific agronomic issues; which were either applicable to a wide range of 
climatic conditions found within the USSR or adapted to local conditions.  They regularly 
received updated information on agronomic practices from agronomic journals.  The farm 
agro-technicians collaborated with the research community of 32 agricultural research 
institutes directly or via 28 experimental research stations and 45 experimental farms 
established throughout Kazakhstan.  Researchers and specialists from the various research 
institutes and agricultural research stations regularly invited farm agro-technicians to attend 
conferences, seminars and trainings, so they could transfer new knowledge back to their 
own farms.  Every off-season period the chief agro-technicians organized trainings for their 
staff, inviting researchers from the research institutes, lecturers from universities and 
polytechnic institutes and specialists of the agricultural research stations to visit and share 
their knowledge. 
 However, the knowledge intensive character of Soviet farming was not necessarily a 
guarantee that agriculture would be successful.  Some would argue that the investment in 
this knowledge structure was part of the inefficiency of agriculture as it was very costly.  
This view corresponds with representations of the crisis in Soviet agriculture that were 
constructed during the Cold War (e.g. Hedlund 1984, Osofsky 1974), which negatively 
depicted all aspects (institutional, structural, organizational, etc.) of the Soviet system and 
reduced all the developments to the effect of the brutal collectivization that occurred under 
Stalin.  In somewhat different terms, one could contend that investment in the knowledge 
structure was part of the inherent drive of different levels of the production structure to 
procure resources (Verdery 2005).20 To answer the question as to whether investment in an 
intensive knowledge structure was efficient would first require a discussion about what 
efficiency means under different conditions (as it is clear that the rationalities of capitalism 
and communism differ and that one cannot simply assess ‘efficiency’ in universal and 
neutral terms).  Such an analysis is beyond the scope of this chapter.  But we can at least 
recall here some arguments which suggest that neither the scale of agricultural production, 
nor its collective form, necessarily constrained the quality and quantity of agricultural 
production.  Kazakhstani informants emphasized that there were periods of economic 
prosperity under socialized agriculture in the thirty years before the collapse of the USSR 
(1960-1990). 
According to interviewees it was not primary production, the production of crops 
and livestock, which caused most problems but more the processes of storage, 
transportation, trade and distribution (retailing).  Former vegetable agronomists spoke 
frequently of the spoilage of farm outputs in storage facilities.  All of them said that their 
task was to fulfil the assigned quota by growing a certain amount and quality of vegetables, 
including potatoes.  In many seasons, they exceeded these targets and received bonuses for 
that.  At the end of the season, the state bought all the farm outputs at guaranteed prices and 
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delivered them to fruit and vegetable storage facilities (plodo-ovoshnaya baza) located in 
the cities.  The subsequent destiny of the farm outputs was not the concern of agricultural 
producers, but they knew about the spoilage of delivered outputs in storage facilities.  
Kaliev (2003:175) estimates that the USSR annually produced up to 80-85 million tons of 
potatoes of which, at maximum, only 56% were delivered to consumers.  The remainder 
was spoiled.  According to Kaliev, this was a result of the backwardness of technologies of 
storage, transportation and processing and the underdeveloped marketing system.  
The view that collective farming was not ‘unproductive’ or technically backwards, 
as voiced by many interviewees, can also be found in parts of the literature.  Brada and 
King (1993) conclude that the internal organization of socialized farm units did not make 
them inherently less technically efficient then private farms, as assumed by neoliberals.  
The American scholar Gale Johnson (1983:3) expresses a similar view: 
 
At one time I accepted the conventional explanation that the relatively poor 
performance of Soviet agriculture was due to the fact that most agriculture 
was socialized, organized into either collective or state farms, and to 
adverse climatic conditions for much of the agricultural area. However, I 
believe now that the socialized nature of Soviet agriculture is not the major 
source of difficulties. Many other aspects of Soviet planning, management 
systems, and pricing are far more important in limiting agriculture’s 
performance than is its socialized character.    
  
Former USSR President Mikhail Gorbachev, who served as Party Secretary for Agriculture 
during 1978–1985, also contests the notion that collective farming was unproductive 
(Gorbachev 1996:120): 
 
Statements claiming that agriculture was ‘unprofitable’ were found to be 
wrong. All data pointed to the fact that much more was siphoned off from 
agriculture than invested in it. And, of course, the nation’s economic 
development had been achieved largely at the expense of the countryside. 
 
The collective farm played a key role in legitimizing the single party system and 
state planning.  It could only do so by supplying food to the urban population and 
exercising its political function in the overall system of communist surveillance (Walder 
1994, Wegren 2006).  Rural people in Kazakhstan remember the collective farm sector in 
the Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic producing an ever-increasing amount of farm outputs 
and being important for the Soviet system.  Today rural people still identify strongly with 
the collective farm and believe that it was a technically superior knowledge intensive 
agricultural system, which provided a good social infrastructure and secure livelihoods.  
The deterioration of the social and production infrastructures in rural areas after the 
collapse of the Soviet system, which will be discussed below, has strengthened, rather than 
weakened, this perception and people’s attachment to the previous system.  
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2.5  The shock 
 
What happened to ‘the state within the state’ after the collapse of the Soviet Union?  Those 
interviewed characterized the first decade of post-Soviet agrarian transition in Kazakhstan 
(1992-2002) with words such as zastoi (stagnation), razrukha (devastation), upadok 
(decline), bardak (chaos), razval (breakdown), raspad (disintegration), razbombili 
(destroyed) or razderbanili (torn apart).  In the years after independence the liberalization 
of input prices and the control on farm prices led to low farm incomes, which together with 
continuing wage obligations, led many farms into debt (e.g. Gray 2000, Peabody et al. 
2000).  The incapacity to pay wages led to a reduction of the workforce and a decline in 
production.  Access to credit was limited or absent and much machinery did not work due 
to a lack of, or interruptions in, the supply of spare parts, fuel and electricity.  As other 
forms of marketing failed, barter (in many cases through units of livestock and grains) was 
often used as the last resort to keep production units operating.  Payment to labour was 
often in kind as consumption goods (e.g. bread, meat, vegetables) or as inputs to household 
husbandry (e.g. fodder, hay).  The influence of these economic constraints on the 
profitability and chances of survival of new privatized farms have already been addressed, 
to some extent, in the literature (e.g. Davydova and Franks 2006, Visser 2008).  The 
following section discusses those aspects of the transition crisis that have received less 
attention. 
 
2.5.1  Dismantled infrastructure 
 
Crossing the Kazakh countryside, the collapse of Soviet farming is symbolized by the 
derelict skeletons of totally empty buildings, where only the walls remain.  A visit to a 
former sovkhoz or kolkhoz can feel like travelling through the desolate built-landscapes 
pictured in the movies of Andrei Tarkovski, in which time and productive life seem to have 
vanished.  Old people sadly point at heaps of stones or open spaces that once were local 
cinemas, libraries, clinics or bathhouses.21   
The extent of this devastation can be seen as the base village settlement Bokenshi of 
the former sovkhoz Sotsialistik (Socialist), in the northeast of Kazakhstan, 36 km from 
Semey city.22 It used to be a well performing sovkhoz (producing profits under the Soviet 
accounting system), specialized in meat, hides and wool production.  The former farm 
accountant (Interview 02/10/2005), who worked there for 20 years, claimed that the 
sovkhoz was always profitable and the farm workers received luxury bonuses at the end of 
every year.  Three divisions took care of the livestock and one division produced fodder 
crops and hay on 4000 ha of rain-fed area for winter fodder for the livestock.  The sovkhoz 
reared 44,000 sheep in flocks of 500-700, more than 1000 cattle and about 2000 horses. 
Many of these were kept at remote satellite farms with barns to keep livestock during 
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winter and a few houses for workers.  These were located up to 40 km away from the base 
village.  The sovkhoz’s territory stretched up to 40 km with pastures for livestock to graze 
from early spring until late autumn.  About 500 adults were employed in the base village 
Bokenshi (with more than 300 households) and a further 400 or so were employed in 
satellite farms.  The base village had a production infrastructure, including a large 
machinery-tractor park with a garage and repair workshop, a gas station, storage for inputs 
and grain and administrative buildings.  The social service infrastructure included a two-
storey kindergarten, a three-storey school, a hostel for children of workers living at remote 
satellite farms, a small hospital, a post-office, a cultural club, a library, a food and 
miscellaneous shops, a fresh water supply station and a bathhouse.  Except for the school, 
all these buildings were dismantled during the 1990s (see Appendix 2.2 for a photograph).  
Every useful material, the wood and brick walls were dismantled by hand and used as 
second-hand construction materials by local villagers or sold to city entrepreneurs.  Visiting 
the site in 2006 all one could see was the ruins of some buildings and no sign at all of 
others that had once stood there.  Today, basic services such as fresh water supply to 
households have ceased to function and people now have to manually pump salty 
groundwater.  Much of the livestock was sold before 1995 to repay debts to the state for 
expensive inputs. In 1996, the remaining livestock and the machinery were divided among 
farm employees, as property shares.  The moneyless workers then sold their shares to 
outsiders or to local and newly emerged peasant farms and the collective ceased to exist.  A 
few agro-technicians based at the satellite farms set up livestock peasant farms, while other 
agro-technicians moved to Semey city. 
A similar process of dismantling productive and social infrastructure took place in 
the neighbouring village Dostyk.  This settlement of the former sovkhoz 60 Let Octiyabrya 
(60 Years of October) is located 30 km from Semey city and 5 km from Bokenshi village.  
It specialized in crop production and used to grow potatoes, corn, sunflowers, peas, alfalfa 
and other crops on more than 5,000 ha of irrigated area.  A team of engineers managed the 
irrigation scheme.  They lived with their families in a separate small settlement of eight 
houses next to the Irtysh River near the water pumping-station.23  When visiting the area in 
2006, there was no sign of this settlement as their houses and the pumping station had been 
dismantled for construction materials (see Appendix 2.3 for a photograph).  It was possible 
to trace the structure of the irrigation scheme by following the deep trenches made by 
excavators that had dug up the big irrigation tubes in order to sell them.  As in many other 
places, people (outsiders and local villagers) had dismantled and sold irrigation devices 
made from non-ferrous metal to firms who melted them down for export.  With the 
irrigation infrastructure gone 5,000 hectares of arable land has been abandoned and most of 
the inhabitants of the village have left as there are hardly any wage jobs in the local 
villages.24  Most able-bodied people have moved to the nearby city of Semey and other 
places in search of employment.  The remaining people survive thanks to some livestock, 
which graze in the vicinity of the village and are kept at night near the house and a small 
pension for elderly or people or invalids.  The population of these villages is now less than 
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half what it was in 1991.  The collapse of most of the farming infrastructure and the 
deterioration of social infrastructure and population exodus is a widespread consequence of 
the transition that occurred throughout Kazakhstan.25 
 
2.5.2  The de-mechanization of agriculture 
 
Most of the farm machinery in use today in Kazakhstan dates back to the Soviet period. As 
such it is becoming outdated (interviews and own observations, Kembaev and Komlev 
2004, Kurganbayeva et al. 2002, Satybaldin et al. 2001).  Mechanics are trying to keep the 
machines alive by collecting second-hand spare parts from completely broken tractors 
dating back from the 1970s and 1980s.26 The chairperson of a cooperative of agricultural 
producers in Almaty region described the state of farm machinery in his cooperative 
(Interview 02/09/2005):  
 
Our farm machinery was made in 1972, 1976 and 1978. We inherited it 
from the sovkhoz. This machinery has already become outdated and 
overused its potential.  The only thing we can do is look for spare parts. We 
cannot afford new machinery. It is too expensive.  
 
Nowadays having a brand new tractor is just a dream for the majority of farmers.  The 
number of tractors used in Kazakhstan dropped by more than 80% between 1990 and 2005 
(Table 2.3).  
 
Table 2.3 Number of tractors used in the farming sector in Kazakhstan 
 
Year 1990 1995 2000 2005 
Number of tractors 243,333 184,243 52,084 44,116 
Source: Agency for Statistics of the Republic of Kazakhstan (2002a, 2006). 
 
The lack of machinery has had a major impact on agronomic practices.  One effect 
is the improper timing of agricultural activities.  Farmers lacking farm machinery have to 
wait their turn to be served by local entrepreneurs who provide such services; a friend who 
still owns a tractor or sowing-machine or a neighbour-farmer who owns a plough or 
pesticide spraying equipment.  However, these people first cultivate or prepare their own 
fields.  For example, an agronomist from the district agricultural department explained that 
the optimal period for sowing winter wheat in southeast Kazakhstan is between September 
10 and October 10, but because of lack of machinery, sowing continues until mid-
November (interview 10/06/2004).  These delays affect crop development; crops become 
susceptible to diseases, pests and competition from weeds, all leading to yield losses.  
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Harvesting is also delayed, because of the scarcity of harvesting combines, again leading to 
significant yield losses. 
Another effect is the shift from mechanized to manual farming.  Many interviewed 
farmers deplore this change and are practising manual agriculture out of necessity, not as a 
new mode of ‘peasant thinking’.  Smaller and larger peasant farms share a preference for 
mechanized farming.  The next quote from a new independent farmer expresses the 
frustrations of many farmers about the low level of mechanization (Interview 05/06/2006).  
This former Soviet-time agronomist grows vegetables on 30 ha, although in the past she 
managed 600 ha of highly mechanized vegetable production in the northeast of Kazakhstan. 
 
I cannot be proud of what you see now on this 30 ha because it is not a real 
agricultural production.  It is nonsense! If you could see the hundreds of 
hectares of vegetable fields during the Soviet time, then I would be proud 
because I was managing all of them as the chief agronomist.  We never did 
manual weeding; we had all types of machinery for all kind of agronomic 
operations. 
 
The interviewed agro-technicians consider farming with manual labour as dedushkini 
metodi (grandfather’s methods) or primitive farming; and do not recognize it as proper 
farming.  These agro-technicians were employed at large-scale, highly mechanized Soviet 
farms for many years and it is not surprising that they are highly disapproving of the shift 
to manual labour.  
 
2.5.3  Depleted knowledge systems 
 
While the destruction of much of the material part of agricultural technology is quite visible 
and therefore much discussed, the loss of knowledge and the shaken knowledge structure is 
somewhat less visible although it also has grave consequences for agricultural production. 
This aspect may take much more time to recover.  Today, there is a high demand for agro-
technicians with specialized technical knowledge.  Farm enterprises seeking to employ 
agro-technicians submit a request to the local agricultural departments, which help find 
them.  A study of these requests revealed a demand for 1,462 agronomists, 2,031 vets and 
749 agricultural engineers throughout Kazakhstan (Aubakirov 2006:71-72).  Real demand, 
however, is probably much higher than these numbers since many farm enterprises do not 
submit such requests. 
When interviewing the chairperson of a cooperative of agricultural producers about 
farm machinery and who repairs it, she said that there is only one mechanic for hay-
pressing machines left in the entire Almaty region in the southeast of Kazakhstan 
(Interview 05/08/2005).27 This mechanic used to work at the former Republican Farm 
Machinery Testing Station, which tested all sorts of farm machinery on trial fields before 
being mass manufactured or imported.  Owners of hay pressing machines nowadays always 
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look for him to fix their machines.28 The Chairman of the Association of Kazakhstani 
Farmers commented on the critical lack of agricultural professionals as follows 
(14/09/2005): 
 
We have lost our agricultural cadres.  There is an acute need for specialists.  
There are hardly any agricultural specialists available.  My friend from 
Germany is running a project and looking for an agronomist but cannot find 
one.  They bought new farm machinery but cannot find people to operate it.  
You see how big the problem is.  Now young people study to become 
bankers, lawyers and so on.  But we need agronomists, vets and other agro-
technicians.  For the time being farming is run by the old cadres, but they 
will not last forever.  
 
Why is there a lack of agro-technicians?  No survey to answer this question has been 
conducted, but several factors emerged from the interviews.  Migrating or retiring agro-
technicians were not replaced with newly trained people.  A former brigadier of the former 
Republican Farm Machinery Testing Station emphasized the closure of training facilities; a 
consequence of the transition (Interview 05/09/2005): 
 
There are few mechanisators [operators of farm machinery] from the Soviet 
time left.  I mean real mechanisators, not only those who can drive a 
tractor.  Those who know how to plough, the types of plough and the depth 
of ploughing; those who follow all rules of soil cultivation and those who 
know how to operate all the farm machinery from A to Z.  Many 
mechanisators from the Soviet time emigrated to Germany, Russia have 
retired or are at the cemetery.  After the collapse of the Soviet system 
nobody trains and prepares such mechanisators for agriculture.  The 
vocational schools were shut down.  Now there is a deficit of these 
specialists. 
 
Another interviewee, an agronomist in the Agricultural Department of the district 
administration for the Almaty region, related the lack of young agro-technicians to a 
general lack of interest in the agricultural sector and a shift of attention to other economic 
sectors, in particular the booming oil economy and new business activities (Interview 
11/06/2004):  
 
In the near future we will have big problems with agro-technicians, even 
now there is a big demand for agro-technicians, but they are not available.  
The graduates of the Agricultural University after graduation go to the 
army, the police or go to business, not to agriculture. Or every young person 
wants to become an economist, an accountant and to sit in the office and 
make money.  There is lack of technical school graduates, such as 
mechanics, operators of agro-machinery, zoo-technicians, agronomists, 
welders, electricians, metal turners and so on.  Because many technical 
schools that trained these specialists were shut down.  Soon the old 
generation will be gone; then there will a big problem with [the lack of] 
those specialists.  
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A number of processes seem to contribute to the scarcity of agro-technicians. First, the 
emigration of ethnic Germans, Russians, Ukrainians and other ethnic groups who supplied 
many of the agro-technicians to Soviet agriculture.29 Second, the migration of agro-
technicians from rural settlements to cities. Third, the ageing, retirement or death of agro-
technicians who are not being replaced by the younger generation. Fourth, the 
unattractiveness of agriculture to younger generations (even to those who have studied at 
agricultural universities). Fifth, the vocational schools that previously produced mechanics, 
welders, operators of farm machinery, agronomists or veterinaries did not last long after 
collapse of the Soviet farming system (today there is hardly any school in Kazakhstan that 
provides training at this level). Finally, a substantial increase in supply is unlikely, as most 
agricultural producers who need their services cannot pay enough for their services.  The 
remaining agro-technicians (mostly former Soviet agro-technicians) are employed by the 
most successful large farm enterprises. 
The alarming scarcity of agricultural professionals in the farming sector limits 
agricultural development in Kazakhstan.  A large number of farms are experiencing the 
consequences in the form of sub-optimal agricultural practices.  In the transition period, the 
accumulated knowledge and skills of the Soviet agro-technicians have not been transmitted 
to the next generation.  This substantial loss of knowledge and skills is one element of a 
broader and multifaceted process of knowledge loss, which also includes a depleted 
research infrastructure and capacity for innovation (Chapter 4, Toleubayev et al. 2007).30 
 
 
2.6  Continuity and discontinuity in knowledge configurations 
 
2.6.1  Large-scale production in transition: Continuity in technology 
and knowledge 
 
A previous section described how former farm managers played a key role in the 
distribution of the assets of collective farms (often through a form of accumulation by 
dispossession).  Paradoxically, the continued survival of the ‘successful’ farms was also 
highly dependent on the attitude of farm managers to their work rather than on a bottom up 
process managed by shareholders (former sovkhoz members with shares in land and 
property).  As an example we can look at the recent history of Prirechnoe, a former 
sovkhoz located in the Semey region in the northeast of Kazakhstan, now established as a 
Partnership with Limited Liability.  Many people in the Semey region refer to this farm as 
an ‘oasis of welfare’ compared to the surrounding deteriorated and collapsed farms.  This 
farm continues to practice mixed production on 12,476 ha land of which 9,000 ha is grazing 
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land used to rear 1,700 oxen for meat production.  There is some 3,000 ha of arable land, 
1,644 ha of it under irrigation; the remaining part is under fallow.  While some observers 
have related farm viability to optimal production conditions (cf. Gray 2000, Kitching 1998) 
this farm shows that the relationship between two is not so simple.  The farm is located in a 
region with an extremely harsh climate for agriculture, with long cold winters and short hot 
summers, which limits the cropping period to one short season from May to September.  A 
low annual precipitation of about 280 mm and the very poor quality of the soil further 
constrain agriculture.31 The poor soils of the area require a high input of chemical 
fertilizers, manure and a well-planned crop rotation scheme. In the Soviet era the land here 
received up to 100 tons of manure per ha of arable land.  The collapse of livestock farms in 
the region means there is shortage of manure and currently between 50-60 tons manure is 
applied per ha, often collected from distant places.  While the farm is located 10 km from 
Semey city, the proximity of a large market also does not guarantee continued survival.  
Other nearby sovkhozes (60 Let Octiyabrya, Zhana-Semeisky and Semipalatinsky) all 
collapsed even though they had similar, if not better, infrastructures and resources.  
Moreover, the farm nowadays markets its output to cities such as Pavlodar and Oskemen 
350 km and 240 km away respectively. 
 The crucial factors in the survival of this farm, identified from interview data, are 
defending the existing infrastructure against dismantling, the continued use of the 
traditional ‘technological map’ and the existing division of labour and efforts made to 
retain knowledge and skills on the farm.  The manager was able to maintain the old 
collective farm structure intact while, at the external level, new networks were built up in 
order to barter and market products, building on political ties from the Soviet era. 
The preservation of the irrigation infrastructure was exceptional; almost all other 
farms in the region had used the same irrigation technology (a Soviet made mobile 
sprinkling devices called Fregat) but could not preserve it.  Prirechnoe guarded its 
equipment day and night with armed guards and protected the network of pipes and the 
pumping-station (built in the early 1980s) that pumps water 4 km uphill from the Irtysh 
River and stores it in a reservoir, from where smaller pumps deliver water to the irrigation 
devices.   
The ‘technological map’ as engineering tool, developed in Soviet time, was 
maintained as management saw it as being of critical importance.  The agro-technician in 
charge of farm operations composes this map and says that the farm’s technological 
practices and crop choices (potatoes 300 ha, alfalfa 300 ha, oats or barley 400 ha, corn 150 
ha, carrots 60 ha, white cabbage 40 ha, onions 20 ha, red beet 10 ha) have not changed 
much since Soviet times.  They still follow the Soviet style 7-field crop rotation scheme 
(year 1 – cereals, year 2 and 3 - alfalfa, year 4 - cereals, year 5 - perennial grasses, year 6 - 
potato, and year 7 – corn). 
The management of Prirechnoe was able to keep sufficient expertise and skilled 
workers on the farm in contrast to other nearby farms, where people, especially the younger 
ones, left in search of employment in the cities.  The managing agro-technician, now 
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responsible for the entire range of crop production activities, was an agricultural engineer 
on this farm during Soviet times.  The brigadiers of the production brigades are also 
experienced workers and have been employed on this farm for 20 to 40 years.  The 
importance of accumulated knowledge and skill and of passing experience on to younger 
generations is illustrated in the following quote from the managing agro-technician 
(Interview 05/04/2006): 
 
We have mechanisators from the past. The old ones convey their 
knowledge and skills to younger specialists. Experience comes from the old 
cadres and develops through practice. We [the managing agro-technician 
and brigadiers] instruct the mechanisators about what to do in the field, but 
they do not need much supervision. They usually operate and fix the 
machinery independently, because they are experienced and know all the 
peculiarities of the farm machinery. All the field cultivation operations 
remain the same as in the past, so they have already mastered all of that.   
 
The management had to make special efforts to fill expert positions.  To find a replacement 
for their emigrated agronomist, they approached students close to graduation in agronomy 
at the Agricultural University in Almaty and found a female student who wanted to do her 
internship at this farm. 
The farm management was also able to keep the agricultural workers, many of 
whom were also shareholders of property or land, attached to the farm.  The continuation of 
the Soviet farm structure was important, as expressed by the deputy manager (Interview 
05/04/2006):  
 
The only difference with the sovkhoz is that we are now a private 
independent enterprise. We were able to preserve our farm structure! We 
did not disintegrate, we did not split up, and that is why we did not collapse.  
Nowadays President Nazarbayev [President of the Republic of Kazakhstan] 
calls for agricultural producers to merge, to consolidate, but we are working 
as we worked in the past: as a large farm.  Everything in our farm structure 
remains the same as in the past, farm management, the accounting unit, the 
farm machinery unit, the crop production unit, the livestock unit, housing 
and the communal services unit.  Everything functions as it was, every unit 
has its own responsibility.    
 
Most of the 250 people who work in the farm were employees of the sovkhoz.  The 
farm hires an additional 150 people during the cropping season.  In interviews, farm 
workers expressed appreciation for their employment on the farm and pointed out that they 
did not feel the hardship of post-Soviet agrarian transition in the same way as collapsed 
neighbouring sovkhozes, which faced high levels of unemployment.  Here, we see the 
crucial role of the manager in preserving a farm from collapse.  However surviving the 
transition has been imbued with ambivalence and contradictions.  For the large-scale farm 
to continue, the former sovkhoz members had to keep their land and property shares in a 
common pool or pass their shares over to the management.  At the same time, they 
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depended on employment by the farm and were wage labourers (in the 1990s often paid in 
kind instead of cash; often with enormous delays in payment due to farm debts).  The 
management controls all the technical as well as marketing decision making and, in most 
cases, shareholders or workers do not participate in this.  Under such conditions, the 
organization of labour and keeping labourers satisfied (with low wages) required special 
skills from managers, which were not inherited from Soviet times.  Moreover, farms had to 
cope with the challenge of maintaining the social infrastructure.  Prirechnoe continues to 
support the social infrastructure of the settlement and spends some of its profits on the local 
school and the clinic, on maintaining the fresh water supply, streetlights roads, cleaning the 
streets and collecting garbage. 
Successful farm managers had not only the skills to keep their labour force satisfied 
but also to build networks, by tapping into old political ties and by establishing new 
contractual relationships in the market arena.  The farm manager of Prirechnoe uses the ties 
he already established in the Soviet era.  Since 1994, he has served as a district delegate to 
the regional government.  This has allowed him to further extend his socio-economic and 
political network.  More recently, he registered the farm as a member of the Association of 
Potato Growers of Kazakhstan and in 2004 he signed a contract with Syngenta for pesticide 
supply.  He also engaged the farm in business contracts, setting up a mini-factory for 
vegetable processing and producing potato crisps. 
This case highlights the core role of farm management in continuing to exert control 
over the farm’s technological infrastructure, both material (e.g. farm machinery) as well as 
the expertise and skills, to maintain control over labour and land and to make strategic use 
of political and economic networks.  Only through the combination of these factors has it 
been possible to keep a large-scale farm viable. 
In many ways, this analysis also seems to apply equally to the Cooperatives of 
Agricultural Producers (CAP) that have been set up since 1997.  These emerged out of 
brigades and divisions of the former large collective farms, whose members decided to 
continue with collective farming (Box 2.1).  This group of farms lie somewhere between 
continuing large-scale production (either privately or collectively owned) and small-scale 
private farmers.  Members of the cooperative get a salary and/or payment in kind, 
according to the property and land share they contributed and their labour input.  The 
chairperson of a cooperative plays a similar role to the farm manager of the enterprises 
discussed above.  He or she often held a senior position in a sovkhoz.  Keeping the land and 
the machinery together within the collective was once again a very challenging but essential 
task (particularly as the chairperson often has his/her own privatized property).  When 
interviewed, the cooperative leaders stressed that they continued to follow the technological 
approach of the conventional Soviet farming style, although they face a number of different 
concerns: the high prices for inputs, low prices for produce and outdated machinery.  Many 
of the cooperatives loan or exchange machinery with neighbouring farms. 
The size of cooperatives has tended to decline, particularly since the Land Code of 
2003, which made it possible to own and sell agricultural land as commodity.  Crop 
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rotation becomes more difficult to practise as the size of the cooperative land holding 
declines.  Leaders of cooperatives used to emphasize that small farms are not viable 
because the impossibility of mechanization and of marketing the produce (the market 
infrastructure is built around large quantities).  Many individual farms that have split off 
from the cooperatives still depend on the services of the cooperative (e.g. mechanized 
ploughing, harvesting, pesticide spraying, and so on) for their survival, but the paradox is 
that their splitting off endangers the viability of the same cooperative on which they 
depend. 
 
 
Box 2.1 Two case histories of cooperatives of producers: Azat and Eldar  
 
According to Article 96 of the Civil Code, ‘A Cooperative of Producers – is a voluntary 
union of citizens for a joint entrepreneurial activity, based on members own labour and 
a property stock built from the contributed shares of its members’.  By the decision 
made at the founding meeting of cooperative members, every member receives a 
document stating the type and size of the contributed share.  The contributions of 
property and labour determine the size of a salary or in-kind payment that members of a 
cooperative will receive.  Two CAPs (Cooperative of Agricultural Producers) in Almaty 
region were studied. CAP Eldar was formed by a brigade from sovkhoz Leninski and 
CAP Azat was based around a former division of the kolkhoz Ilicha.  The chairpersons 
of these cooperatives are key figures who mobilized the workers in 1996-1997 to start 
joint farming by bringing together their land and property shares into the cooperative 
stock.  Apart from the technicalities of farming, the chairpersons also have to deal with 
marketing issues, accounting, tax payments and labour management.  As former agro-
technicians from Soviet farms they claim to have no problem with farming technicalities 
such as ploughing the soil, rotating crops, calibrating the seeding machinery or spraying 
equipment, maintaining soil fertility, managing pests, controlling safety issues and 
assigning tasks to cooperative members.  These technical aspects have not changed 
much from the Soviet era, except for the downsizing of the plots due to the loss of land 
that has been privatized.  The exchange of machinery between farm entities is 
indispensable, since none of them have a complete set of necessary machinery: one has a 
harvesting combine and another has a seeding-machine, one has a hay-pressing machine, 
one a plough, one a spraying equipment and another a cultivator and so on. 
 
CAP Azat  
 
CAP Azat is a former division of a kolkhoz.  Its joint assets consist of 8 tractors, 1 
harvesting combine and 5 trucks; most of which are from the Soviet period.  Each 
member of the cooperative owns about 2 ha of land.  Only 80 of the 235 members who 
contributed their land titles and property shares to the cooperative in 1997 are employed 
by the cooperative; with others retired or engaged in non-farm activities, although they 
still receive payment for their shares.  In 2005, CAP Azat had 410 ha, with cereals 
cultivated on 150 ha, potatoes on 70 ha, alfalfa on 70 ha, corn on 50 ha, sugar beet on 15 
ha, soybean on 7 ha, onion on 3 ha, and the remaining area under fallow.  Water for 
irrigation comes from a sophisticated irrigation scheme, called the Big Almaty Channel, 
built in the Soviet era (although half of this irrigation infrastructure has deteriorated 
because the collective farms that used to use and maintain it no longer exist).   
Between 2003 and 2007 this cooperative lost half of its land (from 520 ha to 
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260ha), as a result of members selling off the land under the Land Code of 2003. The 
chairperson  thought that the cooperative members, who sold their land, were short 
sighted (Interview 10/08/2007): 
 
Members who withdrew their land and sold it to land-dealers at low prices do not 
understand that land prices will increase.  Moreover, farming is becoming a 
profitable business again because prices for farm products are increasing.  
Imagine, 1 ton of wheat today is worth 180 US$; that used to be 60 US$ a couple 
of years ago.  Those who sold their land and wanted to be rich in one day now 
regret it because they have already spent their money, and have no other income. 
 
He was also sceptical about the survival chances of individual small-scale farming 
business (interview 07/09/2005): 
 
Each member of cooperative owns around 2 ha.  Who can individually run 
farming business on such plot? Nobody!  
 
According to him, the cooperative survives thanks to its size, the volume of produce, the 
shared stock of machinery and the availability of labour (Interview 07/09/2005).  He 
also pointed at the importance of his informal ties with officials in the District 
Agricultural Department (which date from the Soviet past) and his business network 
with pesticide and seed suppliers, processors and traders of agricultural commodities.  
Apart from the salary for their labour and payment for their shares, the members of this 
cooperative also receive, at the end of the cropping season, a share of the farm’s outputs 
such as potatoes, alfalfa hay for livestock, grain, flour and sugar. 
In 2007, many more people left the co-operative selling their land shares to 
outsiders, although about 60 members decided to stay and keep their land in its stock, 
which means that the cooperative will have about 120 ha of land to farm in 2008. The 
chairperson said it will be difficult to make profit on such an area but he is optimistic of 
generating some income for cooperative members (Interview 10/08/2007). 
 
CAP Eldar   
 
The chairperson of CAP Eldar was discouraged by the way that his cooperative had 
disintegrated following the introduction of the new Land Code in 2003 (Interview 
02/09/2005): 
 
The President [of the Republic of Kazakhstan] calls farmers to consolidate, to 
farm jointly, but here on the contrary we are falling apart.  Our cooperative land 
stock had 200 ha of 85 shareholders in 1997.  Now I have only my 9 ha left and 
from next year [2006] I will farm individually.  Legally I will run my farm as a 
peasant farmer.  Most of the cooperative members sold their land to outsiders 
from the city.  Have you seen the fields along the road covered with weeds?  
These used to be cooperative fields until last year; now these plots belong to 
outsiders.  They have a lot of money, so they invested in land.  Cooperative 
members, who sold their land titles, could not resist when ready cash was 
offered.  Several members did not sell their plots, but what can they do 
individually on 2-3 ha? 
 
Like the chairperson of CAP Azat, he was also sceptical about the ability of cooperative 
members to individually run a small-scale farming business.  He thinks he can farm his 
9 ha individually because he has the professional background as a horticulturist and 
knows all the farming technicalities.  In 1998, he planted a 2 ha orchard with apples, 
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pears, peaches and vines and is now marketing its output.  In 2006, he used 5 ha of his 
land to grow alfalfa for his livestock and 2 ha to grow strawberries as a cash crop.  
According to him, he gets sufficient income from farming 9 ha.  He bought a tractor, a 
hay-pressing machine and a lorry from the cooperative members during its 
disintegration.  He was concerned about those who had not sold their 2-3 ha, but farmed 
individually.  Their plots are now spatially scattered and cannot be cultivated jointly 
with other former cooperative members who still own land.  When they came to him 
and asked what to grow, he advised them to grow alfalfa, because this crop is easier to 
manage and will produce hay for their livestock.  He lends them his machinery.  Now 
they also have to live on their plots during the cropping season to protect their crops 
from thieves and grazing livestock.  When a cooperative, its members could take turns 
guarding the cooperative fields. 
He recognizes that he is in an advantageous position as he bought a house with a 
barn from the sovkhoz when it was privatized. This infrastructure, which was used by 
brigade, is close to his land and he and his two hired workers stay there from early 
spring to late autumn. He was a member of the communist party and represented it in 
the sovkhoz party unit and also was the chairman of the trade union of the sovkhoz.  He 
does not hide that through these positions in the past he came to know many people in 
the district administration and he used this to get subsidies for the cooperative, updated 
information, as well as personal privileges when the assets of the sovkhoz were 
privatized. 
 
 
2.6.2  Making up for knowledge loss: Technical expertise and 
building networks   
 
A focus on knowledge and skills, as key elements in the agricultural labour process, can 
increase our insight into why farms have failed in the transition process in Kazakhstan.  It is 
clear that the transition from large-scale mechanized farming to small-scale manual 
farming, which requires a much higher level of integrative knowledge, has been 
unsuccessful for the smaller, individual farms.  Constraints identified in the literature are 
inexperience, lack of finance and machinery, bureaucratic obstacles and the unfair 
redistribution of land and farm assets at privatization (Gray 2000, Peabody et al. 2000, 
Shreeves 2002).  Many smaller properties face disadvantages, or cannot be used at all, 
because of their location (too far away from the village or scattered plots).  Marketing 
channels for small-scale agriculture are limited and the supporting services do not function 
well.  Some of our informants tried and gave up commercial farming because they did not 
have the necessary resources.  They returned to subsistence household farming, became 
wageworkers at commercial farms or shifted to non-farming activities (cf. Spoor and Visser 
2004, Sutherland 2008, Wegren 2008 for similar processes in Russia).  Sixty nine percent 
of the respondents in a survey conducted among rural households in Kazakhstan (Peabody 
et al. 2000:205) did not want to be independent farmers.  Neoliberal assumptions that 
Soviet farm workers would strive for land ownership and that individual, family-based, 
farming would become more efficient and produce more than the Soviet farm have proved 
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to be erroneous (Kaliev 2003, Small 2007, Spoor and Visser 2001).  It is argued here that 
the gloomy outlook for many small farmers is only partly explained by the processes of 
‘accumulation by dispossession’ and the almost completely collapse of markets and service 
infrastructure.  Another reason is the problem experienced by small farmers in using their 
existing knowledge and skills (which is both essential, yet not always appropriate given its 
roots in large-scale mechanized farming) and the difficulty acquiring or developing new 
knowledge and skills adapted to small-scale, manual farming (Box 2.2). 
A comparison between the more successful small to medium size farmers and 
farmers who consider their situation as fragile or hopeless highlights this issue of technical 
expertise.  The most dynamic post-Soviet commercial farms in Kazakhstan tend to be run 
by farmers with a professional farming background gained in the past, i.e. former agro-
technicians (agronomists, vets, agricultural engineers) from Soviet farms.  Why do these 
agro-technicians predominate in the farming business, and not farm workers, rural teachers, 
doctors or other rural dwellers, who also received land and property shares?  These agro-
technicians were able to bring together farm workers/shareholders for joint farming, to 
utilize their farming expertise to deal with farming technicalities and their socio-economic 
networks to support the farm enterprise.  When they decided to run smaller scale individual 
farms, they could combine their technical knowledge and skills with insights generated by 
having access to a wide network of contacts and tapping into the knowledge available in 
this network (nodes of information and skilled knowledge).  These networks largely 
originate from the Soviet time.  Some examples may illustrate this.  During an interview 
with a farmer, who was also a chairperson of a producer cooperative (Interview 30/05/2006 
about pest control in his potato production) he used his mobile telephone to dial the pre-
programmed phone number of the District plant protection officer to ask for the names of a 
particular pesticide and an insect-pest.  The two knew each other from the 1980s and 
frequently met when she worked at the District Plant Protection Station and he as an 
agronomist of the kolkhoz.  His manner of talking with her on the mobile phone was that of 
old friends.  Another example of the importance of such Soviet camaraderie in shaping 
post-Soviet knowledge flows appeared during a visit to a horticulturist-farmer in the 
Almaty region in 2005.  This former horticultural agronomist of a sovkhoz combines 
farming with a pesticide spraying business.  He was involved in a long chat with a friend 
who was a former sovkhoz manager and who is now a peasant farmer with 55 ha of arable 
land.  They were discussing an insect-pest that was severely damaging potato fields and the 
difficulties of controlling it.  While it may seem obvious that these people exchange their 
knowledge, the point is that such interactions play a key role in explaining differences in 
farm survival.  We encountered many occasions of such interactions between former agro-
technicians, but no parallel interactions among most of the newcomer farmers.  The former 
agro-technicians share their problems and engage their personal ties and business networks 
in the search for solutions.  This puts farmers, who were agro-technicians, in an 
advantageous position when running a farm (whether as an individual or in a leadership 
position in a collective farm).  For individual newcomer farmers (even if they may initially 
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control a similar amount of material resources such as land, livestock and machinery) it is 
difficult to access such knowledge interactions, information exchange and the business 
networks enjoyed by former agro-technicians.32   
This argument is reflected in some of the storylines from conversations.  For 
example a former Soviet agro-technician, who is now a head of the successful peasant farm 
with mixed production in the Almaty region, commented (Interview 01/12/2004):  
 
Initially many rural dwellers thought farming would be a simple and 
profitable business.  You just sow, harvest, sell yield and gain profit, but 
later they realized it is not that simple.  If you did not study agriculture and 
have no professional background in farming then it is better not to engage 
in farming. As an agronomist, I am not going to teach children in a school 
or to treat patients in a hospital. 
 
In addition, one amateur peasant farmer in Almaty region, a former economist in a sovkhoz, 
said (Interview 29/11/2004): 
 
We [newcomers into farming] are as just like newly born blind kittens. We 
are trying out and struggling with farming technicalities and this jeopardizes 
our ability to remain in farming business.   
 
Doing fieldwork in Kazakhstan we encountered many inexperienced agricultural producers 
who lost their yields and money because of lack of farming expertise.   
 
 
Box 2.2  Knowledge and networks make a difference in small farms 
 
This case study illustrates how, in some situations, access to knowledge has more 
influence on the viability of a farm than access to land. This case is about two producers, 
one of whom owns 14 ha of land, and the other who rents 2 ha of land from the first one. 
The land of the first farm is located about 4 km away from the village of the owner 
and 20 km from Almaty city.  In the Soviet past, the owner used to work in a vegetable 
growers brigade of the kolkhoz where her husband worked as an agronomist.  He started 
the 14 ha farm in 1997.  When he died from a heart-attack in 2004 she took over the farm.  
She uses 1 ha to grow potatoes and vegetables for her own consumption and for in-kind 
payment to 2 or 3 seasonal workers; another 3 ha to grow alfalfa to feed her livestock; and 
7 ha to grow white cabbage, the main cash crop.  She sells it directly from the field to 
retailers at wholesale prices.  In common with many interviewed producers, she complains 
about the low prices she gets for her cabbages.  During harvest time, retailers sell them to 
urban consumers at 3 to 4 times the price paid and, in the winter season at a price 7 to 10 
times higher.  When asked why she does not sell directly to consumers, she mentioned the 
following obstacles: lack of transport, the high costs of hiring a car, the fees to be paid to 
the bazaar (market) administration and for storage facilities and the time to be spent on 
marketing.  Therefore, she prefers to sell her cabbage from the field at a lower price.  For 
her, cabbage is easier to manage than other vegetables.  During the cropping season, 
someone has to stay round the clock on the field to guard the crops against thieves and 
livestock.  She owns no machinery and cultivates everything manually except for 
ploughing, which is done with a hired tractor.  Regarding profitability she remarked: ‘By 
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working on land you will not get rich, but you will not starve’.   
She has learnt what she knows about agronomic practices from reading the Soviet 
agronomic handbooks of her deceased husband, together with the knowledge and skills 
accumulated by working on a Soviet farm as vegetable grower for more than two decades.  
She experiments with new cabbage varieties on small plots before planting them on a 
larger scale.  Her neighbour farmer, who rents 2 ha from her, gives her advice about the 
selection of new seeds, fertilizers and pesticides.  
In contrast to the landlady, the tenant farmer makes a very profitable business on 
his 2 ha.  By education a horticulturist, and now a lecturer at the Agricultural University in 
Almaty, he started to farm in 1999, in the midst an overall economic slump, to supplement 
his low lecturer’s salary.  He approached his old friend [deceased husband of landlady] 
and asked him to rent some land for farming.  The business-minded university lecturer 
became a commercial farmer on 2 ha.  Lecturing on vegetable crops, he had monitored 
new vegetable varieties appearing on the post-1991 agricultural market in Russia and 
Kazakhstan.  He decided to grow spicy herbs (basilica, fennel, parsley, celery and so on) 
and ‘exotic’ vegetables (tomato, eggplant, marrow, pattypan squash, and so on, but of 
unusual sizes, shapes and colours).  He figured out that there is a real market for exotic 
vegetables in Almaty – the largest city in Kazakhstan – and approached managers of 
expensive restaurants and supermarkets.  They contracted him to deliver exotic vegetables 
and spicy herbs and paid prices 4 to 5 times higher than for ordinary vegetables.  He is 
able to grow from March until October (using early, middle and late season varieties) by 
using plastic cover to protect seedlings from frost.  He hires 3-5 seasonal workers who 
spend the season living on site in a small summerhouse he constructed. In this way, they 
can protect the crops against livestock and thieves.  He visits the farm almost every day 
and takes part in crucial farming activities such as sowing, transplanting and fertilizer or 
pesticide application.  He shows and instructs the workers what to do and how to take care 
of a particular plot and pays them in cash.  He has made good contacts with foreign seed 
companies based in Almaty and his plots are used as demonstration plots for their 
potential clients, to personally see how certain varieties grow.  Seed companies pay him 
for promoting their seeds.  He did not disclose his profits, but he drives a 4WD Mitsubishi 
and his son a 4WD Chevrolet, suggesting that this combination creates a profitable 
business.  Although this may be an exceptional case, it still is instructive.  It shows that his 
professional expertise, the constant search for updated information about new varieties and 
the technicalities of their growth, establishing advantageous marketing channels and his 
entrepreneurial spirit are all key factors for establishing a successful small-scale farming 
business.  Knowledge and networks do make a difference. 
 
 
2.7  Conclusions 
 
This chapter described the elements that contributed to the deep agrarian crisis in 
Kazakhstan after the collapse of the Soviet Union, which involved a large decrease in the 
cultivated area and in agricultural output.  It argued that the crisis was not so much a crisis 
of collective farming per se but rather a result of inadequate transition policies, a weak state 
and a collapsed market.  This created the conditions for two processes of ‘accumulation by 
dispossession’.  Firstly, many resources used within agriculture were appropriated, 
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dismantled and sold (buildings, irrigation systems, machinery and so on).  Secondly, de-
collectivization and de-statization took place in an uneven way and led to an unequal 
distribution of the resources that did remain within the agricultural sector (land and some 
assets).  This ‘accumulation by dispossession’ was accompanied by a decline in livelihoods, 
a decrease in social security and a collapse of the social infrastructure. Most new (and 
continuing) farm businesses are struggling for their economic survival. Together these 
factors have evoked feelings of nostalgia about the communist past among rural people; not 
only among the poor and former farmer workers but also among the former management 
and agro-technicians.  
The study of these nostalgic storylines reveals another element that is crucial for 
explaining the nature of the agrarian crisis: the loss of knowledge and the lack of 
knowledge relevant to the new way of farming. Not only was the material and economic 
infrastructure of farming destroyed and depleted.  The transition also transformed large-
scale, knowledge intensive farming systems into small-scale, simplified farming. This 
involved a shift from highly mechanized farming to manually performed operations and a 
shift from a high degree of labour division in collective farming to one where individual 
farmers face the challenge of generating the multidimensional knowledge and skills needed 
to run a farming business.  In this process, a large part of the knowledge and skills from 
former times was lost, since it was not passed to a new generation of agriculturalists.  
Equally many of the newcomer farmers lacked the knowledge and skills needed to survive 
in the harsh economic environment.  The importance of access to and control over 
knowledge is highlighted by the key role that former agro-technicians play within the more 
dynamic farms.  Their networks, largely rooted in the knowledge networks of the Soviet 
past, were also important in adapting their production systems to the new situation.  This 
access to and control over knowledge and the circulation of knowledge in wider networks 
seems to be more important than the stock of land and machinery in influencing the success 
or survival of new farming arrangements.  This study therefore suggests that knowledge is 
not an epiphenomenal element of the agricultural labour process but has to be 
conceptualized theoretically as a structuring component, equal to control over land (and 
other material means of production) and labour. 
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2.8  Notes 
 
 
                                                 
1
 Kitching also points at the absence of a mass of small farmers who would drive a massive 
redistributive land reform and benefit from it. 
 
2
 This 1995 shift in land policy took place at a time when the power of the president was growing in 
relation to the legislature and judiciary (Cummings 2005). 
  
3
 ‘Krutikh’ – ‘krutim’ [conjugation of word ‘krutoi’] - here, she means ‘rich and powerful 
outsiders’. 
 
4
 Neither can one speak of post-communist peasants who opposed the privatization of land; an 
argument that some commentators have used to explain why full commoditization took so long (cf. 
Wegren (2006) for a critical discussion).  Wegren (2004) argues that the lack of adaptive behaviour 
amongst former collective farm workers in Russia towards the new conditions should not be 
conceptualized as resistance.  Likewise, the criticisms within this quote cannot really be referred to 
as a ‘weapon of the weak’ (cf. Jansen and Roquas 2002). 
 
5
 This farmer himself is a Russian and does not intend to leave Kazakhstan.  Officially, before 2003, 
it was not permitted to sell or buy land as physical asset.  ‘Concession right’ officially meant that a 
person could give up his land entitlements to another individual farmer, farm enterprise or District 
Land Stock, on free-will, i.e. without receiving payment.  This manager unofficially paid about 100 
Euros per ha of land to the people leaving Kazakhstan.  He also acquired a tractor and a plough 
from the farm property stock in a similar way.  In 1998, he legally registered his 55 ha as a peasant 
farm under the new law ‘On the Peasant Farm’. 
 
6
 Neoliberal reforms targeted removal of the state control over prices, withdrawal of state subsidies, 
trade liberalization and extensive privatization of publicly/collectively owned assets. 
 
7
 The results of this programme are contested.  Some Kazakhstani authors (e.g. Omarbakiev and 
Momynbaev 2006, Sabirova et al. 2005) and official reports claim its success but some members of 
parliament have questioned this [e.g. Abdrakhmanov on 28.03.2007: “I must say that discontent in 
rural areas is growing, where market reforms and ‘Years of Village’ initiated by the government did 
not reach its objectives.”]. 
 
8
 Many of these crop production farms are relatively new, especially in the northern wheat belt.  
The ‘Virgin Land’ programme turned large areas of Kazakhstan’s pasturelands into one of the 
major grain-producing regions of the Soviet Union.  From 1954 to 1964, about 25 million ha of 
virgin lands were ploughed for cereal production, mostly by migrants from Russia, Ukraine and 
other parts of the Soviet Union.  The programme also drew in a sizable population of Germans and 
other ethnic groups, officially labelled as ‘unreliable’, who were exiled to Kazakhstan during the 
Second World War. 
 
9
 The remaining 65 state-owned farms are experimental farms belonging to public agricultural 
research institutes, farms breeding and multiplying local livestock and crop varieties and farms 
producing crop and livestock products for the government elite. 
 
10
 This farm employs up to 70 workers, half of whom are employed permanently, even in the off-
season partly to motivate them but also to maintain the farm infrastructure and the machinery and to 
prepare fields for the next cropping season.  These hired workers are partly paid in cash, but mainly 
receive in-kind payment at the end of the season in the form of vegetables (carrots, red beet, 
cabbage and potatoes) and processed farm outputs (flour, sunflower oil and sugar). 
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11
 Cooperatives pay land tax and income tax.  The employees of a cooperative receive a monthly 
salary, 10% of which is deducted for their pension fund.  They may also receive an in-kind payment 
at the end of the cropping season.  Collective work and relations within the cooperative still largely 
resemble the structure of Soviet farms (cf. Sutherland 2008 for similar cases in Russia). 
 
12
 Ironically, since 2005 the Kazakhstan government has extolled the advantages of large-scale 
collective farming, in its dealings with farmers and its propaganda. It has been urging small-scale 
farmers to cooperate and merge their properties into larger entities in order to deal with market 
forces, to be competitive, and to contribute to national food security. 
 
13
 Kazakhstan is among the top-ten wheat exporters in the world; the others being the USA, 
Australia, Canada, France, Argentina, Russia, Germany, the United Kingdom and India. 
 
14
 A comparison of yields obtained in each farm type category is very difficult, if not impossible to 
obtain.  Existing statistics and the data used in several studies, mainly within the discipline of 
economics, do not, for example differentiate between winter and summer wheat (with different 
yields) or take into account the heterogeneity of environmental conditions and the enormous 
variation in input use within each farm category.  Moreover, private agricultural producers may 
submit figures to the District Statistics Office that seriously underestimate the yields obtained, to 
avoid paying tax on the profits from farm output. We have refrained here from presenting such 
misleading aggregations. 
 
15
 Even access to consumer goods not supplied through the Soviet system (but through the ‘grey-
market’) was mediated by kinship ties and patrimonial relationships and not purely through (grey) 
market mechanisms (Schatz 2004). 
 
16
 ‘Mechanisator’ is a category of farm workers who operate, maintain and repair farm machinery. 
 
17
 Unemployment in the farm community did not exist in the Soviet past. 
 
18
 The experimental stations of the agricultural research institutes used to develop model crop 
rotation schemes and recommend them to crop production farms. 
 
19
 Data about the specialization and daily activities of Soviet farm agro-technicians were collected 
through interviews with agro-technicians, agricultural researchers and practitioners from 
experimental research stations and from reviewing professional journals and archival documents.  
The following summarizes the activities of some other key agro-technicians. 
The agro-chemistry agronomist would develop a ‘soil fertility map’ and would regularly 
send soil samples from farm fields to a specialized laboratory to test the quality and quantity of 
available nutrients in the soil.  Based on the results of the soil analysis the agro-chemist specified 
the type of fertilizers required for a particular crop on a particular field.  Interviewed agro-
technicians mentioned an annual application of up to 100 tons of manure per ha of arable land.  The 
agro-chemist also would develop an optimal crop rotation scheme based on the nutrient uptake of a 
particular crop.  The soil fertility map and the crop rotation scheme were then incorporated into the 
master technological map. 
An agricultural engineer was responsible for the maintenance and efficient use of farm 
machinery.  He led a team of mechanisators, i.e. tractor and truck drivers, field machinery operators 
and mechanics and coordinated their actions.  These people were trained at vocational schools and 
followed special short courses if they were required to operate new machinery. 
A seed agronomist was responsible for seed quality during storage and when seeding. He 
collaborated with the regional research institutes and experimental stations specialized in seed-
breeding and with seed-multiplication farms to bring the best cultivars to his own farm. 
 
20
 Verdery (2005) identifies a major difference between capitalism and Soviet communism, with the 
former being concerned about making profit by selling things, and the latter about procuring things.  
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In this sense it was rational for farm managers to procure adequate supplies (which included 
elements of padding and hoarding) in order to make production possible instead of focussing on 
reducing costs.  She argues that this maximization of given capacity included maintaining a pool of 
labour (even though labour was often not employed ‘profitably’ in capitalist terms).  We argue that 
this accumulation of resources also included maintaining the access to a pool of expert knowledge 
and skills. 
 
21
 The photographs we made of ruins of buildings of former social and farming infrastructures 
provide material evidence of this (See appendix 2.2 and 2.3). 
  
22
  The first author grew up in this village. 
  
23
 The first author eye-witnessed the irrigation devices and the water-pumping station in operation 
throughout the 1980s. 
 
24
 A similar collapse and deterioration happened in the next village Chekoman which used to be a 
dairy farm.  The description of two cases, however, should be enough to support the argument. 
 
25
 To our knowledge no inventory exists of the loss of farm infrastructure.  These cases are 
therefore only a preliminary indication of the magnitude of the problem and the size of the task of 
rebuilding the agricultural sector.  A recent study on rural-urban migration identified the agrarian 
crisis as the main reason why people migrate: yet in the city these people are mostly belittled as 
second class citizens (Yessenova 2005, see also Nazpary 2002). 
 
26
 Whereas in communist Cuba ingenious mechanics keep old American cars from the capitalist 
past running, in Kazakhstan ingenious mechanics keep tractors and machinery of the communist 
past running in a capitalist economy.  One informant delivered services to farmers (e.g. ploughing) 
and proudly showed the authors various new machines he had invented and built out of Soviet 
period materials. 
 
27
 Almaty region covers 224,000 square km (8% of the total territory of Kazakhstan), with about 12 
million ha of pastures and 1 million ha of arable land. As of 2006, there were 51,085 farm 
enterprises, 97% of which were peasant farms. 
 
28
 Another example about the lack of agro-technicians with specialized technical knowledge was 
given in an interview with a brigadier from Prirechnoe, a large farm enterprise in the northeast of 
Kazakhstan (Interview 05/06/2006).  This was the only farm enterprise in the whole region that 
maintained its (sprinkler-based) irrigation scheme.  The previous irrigation engineer on this farm 
emigrated to Germany (he was an ethnic German, born in Kazakhstan who had worked for many 
years on this farm) and the farm manager had to spend a lot of time searching the entire Semey 
region to find another irrigation engineer.  Finally, he found one who had used the same irrigation 
infrastructure and who had lost his job after the collapse of the sovkhoz where he worked. At time 
the job offer was made this engineer was engaged in other activities not involving his expertise.  
Now the farm manager pays him good salary to keep him working in this farm. 
 
29
 The Kazakhstan population reduced from 16,463,000 people in 1998 (State Committee for 
Statistics of Kazakh SSR, 1989) to 14,819,700 people in 2002 (Agency for Statistics of the 
Republic of Kazakhstan, 2002b). Over 40% are rural dwellers.  This reduction of about 10% of the 
total population is a result of mass emigration of ethnic Germans, Russians, Ukrainians and others. 
 
30
 A similar process of knowledge loss resulting from post-Soviet transition is described in 
Uzbekistan by Evers and Wall (2006) and Wall (2006), who focus at the very local level. 
 
31
 The soil bonitet across the farm fields scores 10-12 out of a 100 possible points, i.e. the soil is 
close to unfertile.  This is a measure of soil quality based on a comparative assessment of several 
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indicators: humus horizon thickness, the concentration of nutrients and elements, pH, chemical 
composition, salinity.  Land with a bonitet of less than 10 points is considered unfertile. 
 
32
 This does not mean that all newcomer farmers fail.  Some are very keen to learn the intricacies of 
farming and seek out former Soviet agro-technicians for advice; ask for farming literature from 
them; participate at farmers’ gatherings and learn from their own and others’ mistakes.  This 
difference is not fixed and there is some mobility.  But rather than contradicting our argument it 
supports the argument that gaining access to the networks through which technical knowledge flows 
is a crucial element of survival in the transition period. 
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From integrated pest management  
to indiscriminate pesticide use  
in Kazakhstan 
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3.1  Introduction 
  
The fall of the Soviet system in 1991 and the subsequent process of neoliberalization in 
Kazakhstan had severe consequences for the public institutions involved in plant protection 
(Toleubayev et al. 2007, Toleubayev 2008) and, as we will show below, for the use of 
Integrated Pest Management (IPM). This chapter examines the impact of the shift to 
market-driven institutions on IPM practices in Kazakhstan. The term IPM is broadly used 
in English publications and the Russian equivalent - Integrirovannaya Zashita Rastenii- 
literally Integrated Plant Protection (IPP) has a similar meaning. This study uses these two 
terms synonymously. The IPM approach emerged in the 1960s as a response to the severe 
problems caused by the overuse of pesticides in northern America (Morse and Buhler 1997, 
Palladino 1996, Perkins 1982) and has since been continuously developed and promoted in 
many countries (e.g. Bruin and Meerman 2001, Morse and Buhler 1997, Sorby et al. 2003). 
Similarly, the Soviet Union prioritised, developed and practised the IPP-based pest-control 
approach throughout the 1970 and the 1980s to avoid environmental and health hazards 
(Fadeev and Novozhilov 1981, Shumakov et al. 1974).1   
Since the collapse of the Soviet system pesticide spraying has become the main 
approach to pest control in post-1991 Kazakhstan (Sagitov 2002). At the same time, 
inspection of pesticide residues in produce disappeared or stopped being enforced and the 
use of environmentally benign pest-control methods ceased. This chapter asks the question: 
Why did the pesticide perspective become dominant both in pest-control practices and in 
setting the research agenda and why is IPM not in use anymore in post-1991 Kazakhstan?  
It takes an IPM-based pest control in the Alma-Ata oblast2 of the Kazakh SSR3 in the 1970 
and the 1980s as a case study and examines the role of institutional support from the state 
in creating the conditions for implementing IPM. In doing so it argues that the IPM 
approach is knowledge-intensive and needs an institutional backup and concerted action for 
its implementation, conditions which are in short supply in contemporary Kazakhstan. 
We start by presenting the methodology, defining the IPM approach and examining 
plant protection practices in Soviet collectivized agriculture. We then illustrate how pest-
control practices changed after 1991 and conclude with a discussion of the problems 
involved in implementing IPM in the context of the fragmented agriculture that emerged 
after 1991.  
 
 
3.2  Methodology and definition of Integrated Pest Management  
 
Plant protection is a complex technological domain, where the interests of many 
stakeholders meet.  To examine this domain we use a technographic approach (Richards 
2001, Sigaut 1994) to position the technical facts related to pest control within a socio-
economic context. According to Richards (2001:26,30), ‘technography’ is a useful label to 
emphasise the importance of describing social and biological worlds in their full 
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complexity and to achieve a contextual understanding of sustainable agro-ecosystem 
development. Data were obtained through in-depth interviews with (former and current) 
plant protection practitioners, researchers, farmers, policymakers and pesticide dealers. 
These actors provided information about the technicalities of pest control and their 
professional experiences and interpretations of the nature and cause of pest problems 
(Jansen 2008). We conducted participant observation of meetings involving policymakers, 
practitioners, researchers, farmers and representatives of the pesticide industry and also 
observed pesticide application in practice on several occasions. Literature, archival 
documents, scientific reports and press coverage on plant protection issues were reviewed 
and the data from these different sources were cross-checked.   
 
A major contribution of the IPM approach to agriculture has been to demonstrate the need 
to base all phases of crop production on sound ecological principles, with the ultimate goal 
of creating agro-ecosystems that are economically and ecologically sustainable. IPM 
emerged as a reaction to an overwhelming reliance on pesticides, which came to be 
recognized as a short-term solution that had far reaching negative consequences. Over the 
last four decades IPM evolved from a technical approach into a paradigm of long-term 
sustainability in agricultural production that incorporates environmental, economic and 
social aspects (Flint and Gouveia 2001, Kogan 1998, 1999, Morse and Buhler 1997, Norton 
et al. 1999, Struik and Kropff 2003, Van den Berg 2004, Van den Berg and Jiggins 2007, 
Van Huis and Meerman 1997).  
The Soviet Integrated Plant Protection (IPP) system can be best characterised by the 
following definition chosen from a list of IPM definitions collected by Bajwa and Kogan 
(2002:14):   
 
Integrated Pest Management (IPM) for agriculture is the application of an 
interconnected set of principles and methods to problems caused by insects, 
diseases, weeds and other agricultural pests. IPM includes pest prevention 
techniques, pest monitoring methods, biological control, pest-resistant 
plants varieties, pest attractants and repellents, biopesticides, and synthetic 
organic pesticides. It also involves the use of weather data to predict the 
onset of pest attack, and cultural practices such as rotation, mulching, raised 
planting beds, narrow plant rows, and interseeding. 
 
This rather technical definition of IPM captures the broad range of an interconnected set of 
principles and methods that were utilized in the Soviet crop protection system. The Soviet 
literature (e.g. Fadeev and Novozhilov 1981), recognised IPP as a complex approach 
incorporating biological, agronomic, physical and other methods to reduce pesticide 
applications while still effectively controlling agricultural pests.4 Continuous monitoring 
and forecasting of the population dynamics of pest organisms and the application of 
pesticides based on economic thresholds5 were at the core of pest-control activities in the 
IPP schemes. As illustrated below, the ultimate aim of the IPP approach in the Soviet crop 
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production system was to integrate all the possible environmentally friendly and safe pest-
control measures. 
 
 
3.3  Plant protection practices in Soviet collective agriculture 
 
In the Soviet past, the Plant Protection Service (PPS) was responsible for all crop protection 
issues nationwide (Toleubayev 2008). The unified PPS was set up in 1961 (after the decree 
of the Council of Ministers of the USSR №152, February 20, 1961). It emerged as a 
network of plant protection stations, including monitoring and forecasting units, spread 
across the Soviet Union and coordinated from Moscow. In the Kazakh SSR the Ministry of 
Agriculture hosted the Republican Plant Protection Station which then operated plant 
protection stations at the regional (oblast) and district (raion) level.  By 1978, there were 15 
oblast PPSs in Kazakhstan coordinating 206 raion PPSs. Overall there were 29 biological 
laboratories, 16 toxicological ones, 72 monitoring units and numerous specialised spraying 
teams (Kospanov 1978). The network of raion and oblast plant protection stations was 
closely linked to crop producing farms, the agricultural research institutes and the 
experimental stations within each region. Plant protection specialists fulfilled the role of 
extension agents in the Western sense. On November 2, 1970 the Ministry of Agriculture of 
the USSR issued a decree entitled ‘State control of the crop protection activities in the 
USSR’. This empowered the specialists of PPS with inspection authority to control all 
activities concerning plant protection, including pesticide use. They assisted researchers to 
introduce research recommendations on farms, discussed pest-control issues with farm 
agro-technicians and managed pesticide use. Plant protectionists, including researchers, 
promoted the principles of Integrated Plant Protection. 
 
3.3.1  The principles of Integrated Plant Protection  
 
The Integrated Plant Protection approach was widely used in the crop production system of 
the Soviet Union, including Kazakhstan (e.g. Shumakov et al. 1974, Fadeev and 
Novozhilov 1981, Beglyarov 1983, Chenkin et al. 1990; our review of the research 
compendiums of the Kazakh Research Institute for Plant Protection and archival documents 
of the Alma-Ata Oblast Plant Protection Station and the All-Union Journal of Plant 
Protection6 1935-1991). Some books by Soviet authors, e.g. Integrated Plant Protection 
(Fadeev and Novozhilov 1981) and Biological Agents for Plant Protection (Shumakov et 
al. 1974), promoting the IPP approach, have been translated from Russian into English by 
western publishers. This suggests that the western world had an interest in the IPM work of 
Soviet scientists. However, western authors barely acknowledge that Soviet researchers and 
practitioners widely promoted IPM in the countries of the Soviet bloc. For example, 
Oppenheim (2001) reviews the use of alternatives to chemical control, especially biological 
control,7 in Cuban agriculture but makes no reference to the significant role of Soviet 
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researchers and practitioners who promoted IPM in Cuba – even though Cuban plant 
protectionists acknowledge Soviet assistance in pest management issues (e.g. Perez and 
Spodarik 1982). Some of our interviewees from Kazakhstan worked for many years 
promoting Integrated Plant Protection in Cuba as well as in African countries aligned to the 
Soviet bloc.     
     Our in-depth interviews with a number of plant protectionists from the Soviet era 
reveal that IPP was an important part of the farming system in Kazakhstan. For instance, 
the following interview fragment with a senior researcher from the Research Institute for 
Arable Farming, who used to work at a raion plant protection station illustrates the 
organization of pest monitoring (Interview 21/10/2005):  
  
In the past, I managed the Monitoring and Forecasting Unit of a Raion Plant 
Protection Station. From early spring onwards we surveyed farm fields, 
estimated pest populations, monitored disease development and so on. Such 
monitoring was conducted on the fields in all the raions. Every week we 
sampled, observed changes and recorded what was happening. Then we 
submitted our data to the Oblast Plant Protection Station (OPPS). 
Afterwards the OPPS processed the information from all the districts and 
made a forecast on pest and disease development within the region. They 
sent this report to The Central Republican Plant Protection Station. Farms 
were notified to be ready to undertake control measures. …The specialists 
of the Plant Protection Service thoroughly knew how to survey, to calculate 
economic thresholds and when and how to control.  
 
The quote shows how the unified plant protection service provided information for timely 
control measures against pest and diseases, despite the administrative borders between the 
collective farms and across districts and regions. Pest-control operations were based on data 
derived from the regular monitoring of pest population dynamics and resulted in concerted 
action of raion PPS specialists and farm plant protection agronomists.  The case study 
below shows that the IPP approach, including biological control was widely practiced in 
Soviet collective agriculture and that this required an extensive knowledge base and 
institutional backup.     
 
3.3.2  Case study: Integrated Plant Protection in Alma-Ata oblast, 
Kazakh SSR  
 
The Alma-Ata Oblast Plant Protection Station (AOPPS) was one of 15 oblast stations of the 
Plant Protection Service in the Kazakh SSR. It was established in 1960 (under decree № 
1126 of the Council of Ministers of the Kazakh SSR issued December 17, 1959), and was 
built on the facilities of and using staff from the former Pest-Control Unit of the Alma-Ata 
Oblast Department of Agriculture. By 1969, the AOPPS coordinated and was responsible 
for the activities of six raion PPSs, the Anti-Locust Unit, the Monitoring and Forecasting 
Unit, spraying teams and 47 plant protection agronomists based in the kolkhozes and 
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sovkhozes within the Alma-Ata oblast. By 1983, the AOPPS was enlarged, with another 
four raion PPSs and with toxicological and biological laboratories to carry out the IPP-
based pest-control activities. This structure continued to exist until the collapse of Soviet 
system. 
The following sub-sections introduce the principles of Integrated Plant Protection 
employed in the Alma-Ata oblast, and how IPP was implemented through biological 
control, monitoring and forecasting, toxicological control of pesticide use and the concerted 
activities of plant protection specialists.      
 
Biological control 
 
The use of biological pest control8 in the USSR started in the beginning of the 1930s 
although Russian entomologists had already experimented with it in 1911 in the Tsarist 
period (Dysart 1973:165). Experiments carried out in 1933-1934 using the egg-parasitoid 
wasp Trichogramma evanescens to control the European Corn Borer Ostrinia nubilalis in 
the southeast of Russia proved the efficiency of biological control whereas the results 
obtained from chemical dusting were questioned (Zimin 1935). By that time researchers of 
the All-Union Institute for Plant Protection had already suggested broader use of 
Trichogramma spp. against lepidopterous pests of fruits and vegetables (Zimin 1935:70). 
Subsequently, a trial of Trichogramma on 22 ha of apple orchard in the Crimea reduced 
fruit damage by the Codling moth Cydia pomonella by 42% (Dirsh 1937).    
In Kazakhstan, biological control became widely used in orchards, cotton and 
vegetable fields and greenhouses from the beginning of the 1970s onwards. Before that 
date, the chemical control approach dominated, and biological pest control was only present 
at an initial stage of development. In the Alma-Ata oblast, the first biological laboratory9 
was set up in AOPPS in 1972. By 1980, there were seven bio-laboratories in the oblast, 
including the bio-laboratory of the Kazakh Research Institute for Plant Protection (KRIPP). 
In the same year, there were 723 bio-laboratories throughout the USSR, which increased to 
1,500 in 1985 (Figure 3.2).  
Archival reports show that in 1973 Trichogramma embryophagum was released on 
605 ha of apple orchards in the Alma-Ata oblast. In 1980, Trichogramma spp. were 
released on an area of 10,484 ha (Figure 3.1), including 1,539 ha of orchards (T. 
embryophagum, 5-7 releases per season) and 8,945 ha of field crops10 (T. evanescens, 2-4 
releases). With the installation of two automated new production lines in the AOPPS bio-
laboratory in 1982 for mass rearing of Trichogramma and its laboratory-host the 
Angoumois grain moth (Sitotroga cerealella), production of Trichogramma spp. increased. 
This allowed the release of Trichogramma spp. on a crop production area of 16,517 ha on 
26 farms in Alma-Ata oblast in 1983; an increase of 37% compared to 1980.  After two to 
four releases during the 1983 cropping season, on crops such as cabbage, red beet, tomato, 
alfalfa, potato, maize, tobacco, soybean, carrot, onion, egg-plant and pepper, 
Trichogramma spp. parasitized 70-86% of the eggs of the polyphagous moths Pieris 
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brassicae, Agrotis segetum and Chloridea dipsacea.  The area treated with Trichogramma 
spp. continued to increase to 25,500 ha in 1987 (Figure 3.1). This increase was made 
possible because of extensive research, improved rearing and releasing technology and the 
installation of new automated production lines for Sitotroga and Trichogramma.  The 
rearing process of Trichogramma was thoroughly recorded, i.e. how much was produced, 
used and exchanged; its quality under laboratory conditions was monitored and the 
economic and biological efficiency under real crop production conditions was evaluated.  
An American entomologist Richard Dysart concluded from his 2-month trip to the 
Soviet Union in 1970 about Trichogramma use in the USSR (Dysart 1973:170,173):  
  
 …the system apparently functions well and it certainly demonstrates that 
Trichogramma production need not entail costly and elaborate equipment. 
Furthermore, no one can ignore the fact that the system is producing 
enough Trichogramma to treat over 6 million acres of crops, without a trace 
of chemical residue or of “ecological backlash.” … It seems rather likely 
that the Soviets are going to use these little [parasitoids]11 on an even larger 
scale in the years to come.  
 
In 1985, Trichogramma in the USSR was used on 15.3 million ha of cropland (Nikonov 
1986:3). Calculations by Dysart (1973:169) suggest Trichogramma was much cheaper then 
treatment with pesticides. Also Van Lenteren (1997) argues that the development, 
application and cost-benefits of biological control are many times cheaper than that of 
chemical control.  
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Figure 3.1 Crop production area under biological control in the Alma-Ata oblast 
from 1975 to 1987.  
Source: Compiled by authors from annual reports of Alma-Ata Oblast Plant Protection 
Station produced in 1980 and 1987. 
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Apart from Trichogramma, bio-pesticides12 were also an essential part of biological pest 
control. By 1977, bio-pesticides were applied on 5,960 ha of croplands in the Alma-Ata 
oblast (Figure 3.1).13 In the same year, the USSR treated 4,200,000 ha of its croplands with 
bio-pesticides (Beglyarov et al. 1978:16).  
Release of Trichogramma was combined with application of bio-pesticides based on 
viruses (e.g. Virin-X), bacteria (e.g. Bacillus thuringiensis) or fungi (e.g. Beauveria 
bassiana). The combined use of these bio-agents was estimated to kill 64-84% of the 
targeted pests (Annual reports of AOPPS 1973, 1980, 1983, 1988). Their use either 
eliminated or considerably reduced the need to apply synthetic insecticides. Releases of 
Trichogramma and applications of bio-pesticides were based on pest population dynamics 
data provided by the Forecasting and Monitoring Unit of AOPPS. Researchers of the 
biological laboratory of KRIPP and the specialists from the biological laboratories in the 
Alma-Ata oblast assisted farm agro-technicians to carry out biological control on the 
sovkhozes and kolkhozes.  
Archival material shows that the fly Phytomyza orobanchia was used against the 
parasitic weed Orobanche sp. on 703 ha of tobacco plantations on two sovkhozes: Alma-
Atinski and Baltabaiski in 1973. Orobanche sp. was one of the most difficult weeds to 
control and neither chemical nor agronomic measures were sufficient to control it. 
Although the biological and economic efficiency of Ph. orobanchia was not high, it formed 
part of an integrated scheme to control Orobanche sp. in the Alma-Ata oblast throughout 
the 1970s and the 1980s. Orobanche sp. is also diseased by a Fusarium fungus. Phytomyza 
orobanchia is able to carry Fusarium spores on its body while emerging from the pupae 
which develop inside the infested Orobanche sp. shoots. In this way the fly is not only a 
biological control agent itself but also transmits one, the Fusarium spores which infest 
Orobanche sp.. One plant protectionist indicated that this double effect in controlling 
Orobanche was purposely used in the Alma-Ata oblast (Interview 03/06/2006). In the 
USSR, Ph. orobanchia was applied annually up to 130,000 ha of cropland infested by 
Orobanche sp. (Kravtsov 1978:3).    
Biological control was also widely used in greenhouses of the USSR, including 
those located in Alma-Ata oblast. In 1977, the predatory mite Phytoseiulus persimilis was 
used in greenhouses against the spider mite Tetranychus urticae on 1,550 ha in the USSR 
(Kravtsov 1978:2); and in 1980 it was used on 42 ha in the Alma-Ata oblast. The predatory 
mite eliminated up to 90% of spider mites and the application of chemical acaricides was 
no longer required (Annual report of AOPPS in 1980). In the Alma-Ata oblast, the bio-
laboratory of the greenhouse complex Alma-Atinskii reared the parasitoid Encarsia formosa 
to control the whitefly Lisiphlebus testaceipes, the parasitoid Cicloneda limbifer to control 
aphids and the predatory mite Amblyseius mckenziei to control thrips. This bio-laboratory 
also produced a bio-pesticide based on an entomopathogenic fungus of the genus 
Verticillium. Integrated use of these bio-agents significantly reduced or eliminated the need 
to apply pesticides in greenhouses (Annual reports of AOPPS 1973, 1980, 1983, 1988).     
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In the whole of the USSR, the area treated with predators, parasitoids and bio-
pesticides increased from 400,000 ha in 1965 to 33,100,000 ha in 1985 (Figure 3.2).14  
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Figure 3.2 Area treated with biological control agents (predators, parasitoids and bio-
pesticides) and number of bio-laboratories in the USSR between 1965 and 
1985.  
Source: Adapted from Nikonov (1986:3). 
 
Archival reports of the biological laboratories and interviews with plant protectionists 
reveal that the economic or biological efficiency of bio-agents were sometimes lower than 
expected. This was due to unfavourable climatic factors in some years, differences in agro-
ecological conditions and deficiencies in the mass production. Nevertheless, before 1991, 
up to 400,000 ha of crop production area in Kazakhstan were annually treated with 
biological control agents (Sagitov and Ismukhambetov 2005:6).  There were continuous 
efforts by researchers and practitioners to make these biological controls more efficient. 
They formed an integral part of the integrated crop protection scheme to keep pest 
populations at manageable levels and to reduce pesticide use. 
 
Activities of the Monitoring and Forecasting Unit 
 
Our review of archival documents and interviews shows that throughout the cropping 
season the specialists of the Monitoring and Forecasting Unit of AOPPS carried out 
phenological monitoring of crops and pest organisms. They composed distribution maps of 
pest organisms and calendars of the development of crops and their main pest organisms 
per season and area. They diagnosed crop diseases by monitoring early symptoms so as to 
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conduct timely control. They alerted farm agronomists when the populations of pest 
organisms were about to exceed economic thresholds and indicated the optimal time for 
undertaking control measures. Data on pest occurrence and population dynamics collected 
throughout Alma-Ata oblast was sent to the Republican Plant Protection Station, which 
worked together with the Monitoring and Forecasting Department of KRIPP and analysed 
data across the whole of Kazakhstan, composing an annual review of pest occurrence and a 
forecast for the next season (see Appendix 3.1 for an example). Such reviews were issued 
every year from 1965 until the collapse of the centralized Plant Protection Service in 1991. 
The forecast data in these reports allowed plant protectionists to plan pest-control activities 
for the next season at the farm, raion, oblast, republic and even at the All-Union level for 
migratory pests. It included calculations of the expected demand for pesticides and/or bio-
agents, machinery and labour and outlined areas, where control measures should to be first 
carried out. These annual forecast data were adjusted with actual data on development of 
pest organisms during the season and control measures were adapted to this situation. The 
Republican Monitoring and Forecasting Unit also accumulated data over many years to 
assess the patterns of population dynamics of the most harmful pests and to provide long-
term forecasts.   
 
Work of the toxicological laboratories 
 
Our review of annual reports of AOPPS and interviews with the plant protectionists of that 
period suggest that pesticide use was strictly controlled and crops, soils and water were 
subject to analysis for pesticide residues. These activities were carried out by the 
toxicological laboratories of the sanitary-epidemiological stations of the Ministry of 
Healthcare and the plant protection stations of the Ministry of Agriculture. A toxicological 
laboratory at AOPPS was set up in 1972.   
Specialists from this laboratory collected samples of crops, particularly fresh 
vegetables and fruits, just before or after harvest, from sovkhozes and kolkhozes in the 
Alma-Ata region, and tested these for pesticide residues. For example, in 1980, 
toxicologists tested 675 samples of various crops collected from an area of 5,416 ha and 
from the bulk output of 53,460 tons produced by 25 farms in the Alma-Ata region. Of 675 
samples, 15 had a concentration of pesticide residues above the maximum permitted level. 
As a result, this produce was withdrawn from the market and destroyed as unfit for human 
or animal consumption (Annual report of AOPPS in 1980). When excessive levels of 
pesticides were found among cereals, the seeds could be retained as planting material for 
the next growing season. In 1987, toxicologists analysed 1,066 samples of various crops, of 
which 23 samples contained pesticide residues above the norm. The managers of the farms 
concerned were heavily fined. These farms were unable to make their contribution to the 
state plan, as their harvests with pesticide residues above the permitted maximum were 
destroyed. Given the Soviet system of control and the mode of operation of the Communist 
Party, it was possible that these farm managers would be deprived of their Party-
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membership cards or that they would be dismissed for such a failure. This enforced farm 
managers to be personally engaged in ensuring that pesticides were judiciously used.  
The staff of the Toxicological Laboratory also controlled the quality of seed 
treatments, tested the concentration of pesticide mixtures before application and monitored 
the quality of pesticides in stock. Plant protection inspectors supervised pesticide 
application activities at the farms and, together with farm agronomists, carried out training 
on safety issues for workers dealing with pesticides. In 1980, 257 farm workers in the 
Alma-Ata oblast were trained and instructed and received a certificate. Every person 
engaged in pesticide application also had to undergo an annual medical examination. The 
pesticide flow was strictly controlled. The farm plant protection agronomist was obliged to 
keep records on pesticides, i.e. how much was delivered, stored and used. Plant protection 
inspectors regularly visited farms and cross-checked records on pesticide flows. If plant 
protection inspectors discovered a discrepancy in records or violations of rules for pesticide 
storage, handling and use, then the responsible farm agro-technicians were sanctioned. All 
these strict pesticide control activities were intended to encourage the safe and sound use of 
pesticides at the farm level.  
 
Farm plant protection specialists 
 
All crop producing farms were strongly recommended to have plant protection specialists 
(decree № 453 of the Council of Ministers of the Kazakh SSR issued in July 4, 1966). By 
1973, there were 2,368 plant protection agronomists in Kazakhstan’s sovkhozes and 
kolkhozes. In 1983, the Alma-Ata oblast had 55 plant protection agronomists employed on 
crop producing farms. In addition, more than 2,000 farm workers in the oblast were trained 
and engaged in crop protection activities. A farm plant protection agronomist collaborated 
closely with specialists at the raion plant protection stations in tackling routine crop 
protection issues. This organization of pest-control activities provided the crop production 
sector with necessary knowledgeable personnel to deal with agricultural pests in a 
concerted way. 
 
 
The crop protection system described was not unique to Alma-Ata oblast, but was 
replicated across the other regions of Kazakhstan and the Soviet Union through the unified 
plant protection system. The IPM-based pest control was supported by the state through 
large investments in plant protection research and extension. Specialists were trained and 
bio-laboratories and technological lines for rearing beneficial arthropods and producing 
bio-pesticides were built. Above shows that IPM was widely used in Soviet collective 
agriculture and involved a high level of organization and coordination of pest-control 
activities above the farm level. The unified Plant Protection Service was involved in 
monitoring and forecasting and practised a wide range of pest-control methods, in which 
biological control played an important role and also strictly controlled the use of pesticides. 
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This illustrates the knowledge-intensiveness of the IPM-based pest-control approach which 
was intensively supported by state-facilitated institutional backup and collective action.    
 
 
3.4  Pesticide use in Kazakhstan after 1991 
 
After Kazakhstan became independent in 1991, the collective farming sector was 
individualized. By 2006, some 173,132 farm enterprises emerged from 2,500 Soviet 
collective farms (Chapter 2). These new farms differ from each other in terms of their legal 
status, size, socio-economic network, technological practices, labour regime and the access 
they have to inputs and machinery. Most of these farms are currently run by former 
employees of the Soviet collective farms: tractor or truck drivers, machinery operators, 
mechanics, milkmaids, teachers or accountants. They received a piece of land to farm, with 
some using it for subsistence and others for commercial farming. Only a small proportion 
of these farms are managed by former agro-technicians with an agronomic background (and 
occasionally by one with a background in plant protection). As a result many of these new 
farmers are unfamiliar with pest-control issues.  
The post-1991 changes in farming structure and ownership, and neglect by the state, 
have severely affected the plant protection service and plant protection research in 
Kazakhstan (Khasenov 1999, Migmanov 1997, Sagitov 1997, Toleubayev 2008, Uakhitov 
1999). The infrastructures of the plant protection stations and agricultural research institutes 
collapsed. Many plant protection stations and their biological and toxicological laboratories 
have ceased to exist. Pests were no longer monitored, and recommendations about pest 
control were no longer delivered. The buildings that hosted these stations were sold off, 
used for other purposes or dismantled (see Appendix 3.2 for an illustrative photograph). 
The number of personnel in plant protection service fell significantly from 3,000 in 1990 to 
1,200 in 1997 and currently PPS has limited functions (Toleubayev 2008:165).15 Today, 
farmers lack institutional support in the field of plant protection and have to deal 
individually with pest problems. In this situation using pesticides has become the dominant 
solution. 
 
3.4.1  Pesticide use  
 
Our observations and interviews reveal that many of Kazakhstan’s new farmers consider 
pesticides as the only means to control pests and that they are unaware of the negative 
effects of injudicious and indiscriminate use of pesticides.16 Pesticide use and residues in 
farm produce are no longer controlled by public authorities. New farmers still have little 
knowledge of their agro-ecosystem and the peculiarities of crop protection practices, e.g. 
the presence of beneficial insects, the concept of economic threshold, the phenology of pest 
organisms linked to crop development or climatic factors. Equally, most farmers have little 
or no access to information about crop protection. They mostly just follow the instructions 
  
 67 
given to them by pesticide retailers or contained in leaflets about pesticides. Only a few 
farmers have access to the informal knowledge networks of the Soviet agro-technicians 
who have some knowledge about how to deal with a particular pest problem (Chapter 2).   
Our interviewees, who used to work in the Soviet plant protection system, were 
concerned about this bias and the resulting indiscriminate use of pesticides. One senior 
researcher from KRIPP was very passionate about this issue (Interview 17/09/2005):  
 
Farmers buy pesticides whenever possible! When I visited one farmer he 
said to me: ‘I bought a pesticide against the Colorado potato beetle on the 
local market’, and showed me a small bag with Chinese characters on it. 
He said with happiness in his voice: ‘Very good pesticide! I sprayed only 
once and all the beetles died’. I asked him: ‘How do you know what it is 
and how to use it since all the information is in Chinese? Maybe this is 
Mouse poison, and you sprayed it on eggplant, potato and tomato to 
control the Colorado potato beetle; people will be unaware of the dangers, 
when they will consume these crops’!  
It is very foolish that nowadays farmers focus only on pesticide use! 
Because pest organisms develop resistance and pesticides pollute the 
environment and pose a health risk. We should not allow farmers to be 
easily carried away by chemical control methods. 
 
Another senior researcher from this institute summarized the situation in a few words: 
(Interview 07/12/2004): ‘Nowadays crop protection for farmers means only pesticide 
application’. 
Other plant protection practitioners whom we interviewed also commented on the 
increased risk of pesticide poisoning after weakening of the state control over pesticide use 
in Kazakhstan:  
 
There are people selling pesticides without any permission, precaution, at 
any place and without taking any safety precautions … On vegetables 
there is an increased pesticide use. Nowadays, nobody monitors pesticide 
residues in crops. That is why I do not risk buying vegetables and potatoes 
from the market. I grow my own without using pesticides...We are arriving 
at the point when all these pesticide matters must be controlled again 
(Interview 21/10/2005). 
 
You know what one farmer told me: ‘I sprayed my potato field, and I 
became so sick that I was in bed for 5 days’. I asked: ‘What did you use 
for spray?’ He said: ‘those in the Chinese bags’ (Interview 26/08/2005). 
  
These passages describe how the state-controlled pesticide use has given way to 
unrestricted pesticide use. People who worked as plant protectionists during the Soviet era 
are concerned about the side-effects of pesticides: development of resistance, pest 
resurgence, secondary pest outbreaks and accumulation of pesticide residues in crops and 
the environment, affecting the health of people. However, these concerns are restricted to 
the circle of these plant protectionists and a few other groups, such as environmentalists17 
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and the medical profession. These issues have not been taken up by the farming 
community, government or media. Farmers tend to neglect these concerns and opt for 
pesticides as the readily available, ‘fast-fix’ solution that supposedly helps them to protect 
their crops from pests and to stay in business. The government has done little to intervene. 
Plant protectionists, environmentalists and the medical profession do not have sufficient 
political clout to bring these issues onto the political agenda. In addition, many plant 
protectionists are themselves involved in promoting pesticides in the farming community in 
order to earn some money. Thus, it is unlikely that concerns about the injudicious use and 
negative effects of pesticides will become a major political issue in the near future.      
The narratives of plant protectionists quoted above concur with our own 
observations during extensive fieldwork undertaken between 2005 and 2007 and previous 
experiences of the first author.  Pesticides of an unknown nature are freely sold at village 
markets (see Appendix 3.3 for an illustrative photograph) and farmers frequently apply 
pesticides without protective clothing, sometimes sprinkling them on crops with a broom. 
Well-illustrated, colourful posters advertising pesticides, magazines or leaflets all present 
pesticides as the only remedy against pests and farmers tend to take this information for 
granted. Some literally follow the calendar spraying prescriptions provided; others start to 
apply pesticides when the crop damage by diseases or insects becomes highly visible. If the 
pesticide does not control the insects, diseases or weeds they immediately suspect the 
retailer of fraud (e.g. dilution of concentration, selling something different instead of 
supposed pesticide or outdated ones). They swear never to buy pesticides from this retailer 
or to purchase this particular brand of pesticide again. They hardly ever consider other 
causes: that the pesticide might have been applied too late (e.g. when the pest organism is at 
an unsusceptible phase of development); that the pest has become resistant to this particular 
group of pesticides; or that the application method was inappropriate. In many occasions 
they asked us if there are pesticides on the market that would ‘kill all insects immediately’. 
In several interviews, plant protection officers and agro-technicians mentioned that 
pesticides (such as Dichloro-Diphenyl-Trichloroethane and Hexachlorocyclohexane) that 
were banned in the 1970s in the USSR are currently widely used in Kazakhstan. They think 
these banned pesticides have been retrieved from abandoned pesticide storehouses within 
Kazakhstan or smuggled in from neighbouring countries and distributed via black market 
channels.  
We do not argue that pesticides must never be used, but our observations and 
interviews show that many farmers are unaware of the potential harm of the pesticides and 
this is why they are using them injudiciously and indiscriminately. Since 1991 hardly any 
study has systematically addressed the negative side effects of pesticide use by farmers in 
Kazakhstan, such as the development of resistance, pesticide residues in harvested and 
marketed produce and other health and environmental effects.  
The following case study illustrates how indiscriminate pesticide use can potentially 
lead to the development of resistance in a pest organism and a secondary outbreak of 
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previously insignificant pests. The case of the Colorado potato beetle shows the complexity 
of pest control and the high level of knowledge specificity required.        
 
3.4.2  The case of the Colorado potato beetle  
 
During our fieldwork we visited one former collective farm agronomist several times, who 
is now head of a cooperative of agricultural producers in the Almaty region (Visits 
07/09/2005, 30/05/2006, 10/08/2007). This agronomist was confident about the agronomic 
technicalities of crop production because of his professional background from the Soviet 
past. We could see that the fields of the cooperative, with various crops, looked well-
managed. But he told us about a serious outbreak of some worm severely damaging the 
potatoes and did not know what the cause of the problem was. When we asked for the 
specific name of this worm, he referred to the district plant protectionist, who identified it as 
cutworm Agrotis segetum (Interview 30/05/2006). In 2005, this farmer estimated that 
cutworm caused a 50% loss of his potato yield.   
This farmer was using heavy applications of insecticides against the Colorado potato 
beetle18 (CPB) Leptinotarsa decemlineata on his potato fields. For last three years he had 
been using Fipronil19 to control CPB, although use of this insecticide on potato and 
vegetables is forbidden by the pesticide use regulations in Kazakhstan. He had previously 
used insecticides from the pyrethroid group but gave these up as they were inefficient and 
he knew that CPB had developed resistance to them. He was happy to use Fipronil because 
of its immediate effect in killing the larvae and imagos of CPB, and the beetle has not yet 
developed resistance during three seasons of its application. 
When we suggested to him that indiscriminate pesticide use against CPB could have 
caused the outbreak of the previously insignificant cutworm he replied that he never heard 
or encountered such phenomenon in the 30 years of his background in crop production. It is 
possible that this farmer had encountered a secondary outbreak of A. segetum, because of 
the elimination of its natural enemies by three years application of Fipronil. Interestingly, 
this farmer could not control the cutworm by applying insecticides from different groups,20 
including Fipronil. As a result, for two years in a row he estimated losses up to 70% of 
potato yield from cutworm (Interview 10/08/2007).     
This case shows that even a farmer with 30-years practical experience in crop 
production may not have sufficient knowledge about pest-control issues. It is likely that the 
level of knowledge of newcomers into farming is much lower than that of this farmer. This 
brings us back to the structure of the Soviet agricultural knowledge establishment discussed 
in Chapter 2. This farmer was specialised in field agronomy, while another agronomist in 
his kolkhoz specialized in crop protection and was responsible for pest control and pesticide 
use. This agronomist had not encountered the phenomenon of a secondary pest outbreak 
during 30 years of crop production, suggesting that pesticides were previously used more 
judiciously and problems of resistance and secondary pest outbreaks were not encountered.  
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3.4.3  The intervention by the pesticide industry  
 
Today in Kazakhstan, the pesticide industry is actively promoting its products to the 
farming sector. In the Soviet past, pesticides were centrally supplied by the state to the 
collective farms. Pesticide companies (mostly foreign multinationals) had no direct 
involvement with agricultural producers and researchers in the USSR. Foreign pesticides21 
were purchased centrally and then distributed to the regions under strict control. After the 
disintegration of the USSR, the pesticide companies occupied the empty niches in the 
agricultural input markets of the newly established independent states (Moore 2008). Since 
then Kazakhstan’s pesticide imports have grown almost every year (Figure 3.3).22 
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Figure 3.3 Pesticide imports (tons) in Kazakhstan: 1999 to 2006.  
Source: Ministry of Agriculture of Kazakhstan. 
 
The annual imports of pesticides into Kazakhstan has increased from 2,076 tons in 1999 to 
16,600 tons in 2006, although this only takes into account those imported and sold through 
official channels (Figure 3.3).      
Much of the market is occupied by well-known pesticide-producing multinationals, 
such as Syngenta and Bayer (Dinham 2005). They compete and promote their products by 
distributing colourful leaflets and posters and making presentations at farmers’ gatherings. 
Since 2006 ‘Syngenta Kazakhstan’ has issued a monthly magazine, the ‘World of Syngenta’ 
(‘Mir Syngenta’), with colourful illustrations and glowing reports about company’s products 
provided by Kazakhstani researchers or farmers. Syngenta provides pesticide packages to 
farmers, which include a range of the company’s products for crop protection, backed up 
with advice and extension.    
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These large companies mainly target the large-scale farm enterprises, e.g. wheat 
producers. They also sell their products to the state, which is responsible for controlling 
quarantine and highly harmful and migratory pests.23 In 2002, the state purchased 570,700 
litres of pesticides (Khasenov 2003) and in 2004 it spent 1480.4 million KZT (about 11.3 
million US$) on pesticides (Khasenov 2005). Some local retailers buy pesticides from these 
large companies at wholesale prices, repackage them in smaller containers and then sell 
them to farmers. 
There are also many illegal dealers selling generic and surrogate pesticides of 
unknown provenance (e.g. from China as mentioned above) at cheaper prices. The 
approximate volume of pesticides smuggled into the country is not known. These chemicals 
are sold without registration or proper labelling, in violation of the existing regulations 
which specify that all imported products have to be registered, have clear instructions in the 
Kazakh and Russian languages, should be properly labelled and have a certificate of origin. 
These regulations were introduced only recently under the 2005 rules on the ‘Certification 
of pesticide manufacturing, retailing and use’. As with many other regulations, this is barely 
implemented in practice, and is effectively a dead letter. One reason for this failure is that 
there are not enough plant protectionists to monitor the thousands of pesticide users and the 
numerous retailers and service providers. Moreover, plant protection officers lack any 
officially assigned transport, so can barely cover their allotted, and often vast, areas of 
responsibility or fulfil their professional duties. Moreover, there is a weak enforcement 
mechanism to punish those who do violate pesticide use and retailing regulations.  
 
In many ways pesticides have become the only option for the new individual farmers. They 
indiscriminately spray pesticides because of their ignorance of their negative effects on 
human health and environment. We also met several more experienced farmers who are 
aware of side-effects of pesticides, but who put their economic survival ahead of health and 
environmental concerns. They are being drawn into the pesticide treadmill. While some 
plant protectionists are concerned about the shift towards widespread and indiscriminate 
pesticide use their voices remain unheard. Controlling pests requires knowledge and an 
understanding of the complex ecological processes that occur in agro-ecosystems, and an 
awareness that indiscriminate pesticide use can lead to pest resurgence and secondary 
outbreaks. Farmers however want the ‘quick-fix’ solutions to pest problems and are readily 
supported by pesticide dealers.   
 
 
3.5  Shifts in the knowledge network and the research agenda  
for pest control: The case of the KRIPP 
 
Research into plant protection played a significant role in the development of IPM/ecology-
based pest-control knowledge in the USSR (see Chapter 4). The Soviet government began 
to intensively support IPM research in the late 1960s and this may be another example of 
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intellectual rivalry with the USA, which launched several IPM projects at this time 
(Palladino 1996, Perkins 1982). The Soviet state established two specialized research 
institutes to undertake research on biological control methods: the All-Union Research 
Institute of Microbiological Remedies for Plant Protection in Moscow (opened in 1968) and 
the All-Union Research Institute of Biological Methods for Plant Protection in Kishinev 
(opened in 1969). There were also numerous departments and laboratories for developing 
biological control methods located at research institutes throughout the USSR, including 
one at the Kazakh Research Institute for Plant Protection (KRIPP). Specialists from these 
organizations met annually at All-Union meetings dedicated to problems and perspectives 
of biological control. For example, in January 1970, a five-day seminar was organized in 
Moscow for 260 biological control specialists from all the republics of the Soviet Union; in 
1972 a similar meeting was organized in Kishinev for 386 specialists. Researchers from 
KRIPP participated at these gatherings, and visited these two institutes and other research 
institutes in the USSR throughout the 1970s and the 1980s to gain and exchange experience 
in biological control methods.   
 Our interviews with plant protection researchers and practitioners and our reviews 
of the Soviet plant protection literature and archival sources show that, since the early 
1970s, the IPM/ecology-based approach to pest control was at the core of all plant 
protection research and practice. A characteristic example is the development of an 
integrated protection scheme for apple orchards against their most damaging insect-pest, 
the Codling Moth (Cydia pomonella), by researchers of KRIPP. This was based on the 
results of experiments carried out between 1977 and 1979 in southern Kazakhstan (Lukin 
1982). This scheme incorporated 4-7 releases of a local strain of the egg-parasitoid 
Trichogramma embryophagum and application of a bio-pesticide based on Bacillus 
thuringiensis, which minimized the use of synthetic insecticides to one application per 
season. Another example is the development of an integrated scheme for the protection of 
cabbage against the most damaging moths (Pieris brassicae, Plutella xylostella and 
Barathra brassicae) and the aphid Brevicoryne brassicae, which reduced insecticide use 
from 5-7 to 2-3 applications per season. In this scheme, economic thresholds were used for 
both the moths and the aphid. Against the moths only viral and bacterial bio-pesticides 
were used. Synthetic insecticides were only used against aphids when their population rose 
above the economic threshold. In addition, populations of predators were closely monitored 
(Aphidoletes aphidimyza, Coccinellidae spp., Chrysopidae spp., Syrphidae spp. and 
predatory bugs), and when they achieved a ratio of predators to aphid numbers of 1 to 10 or 
more, the insecticide application was cancelled. In 1977, following these kind of IPM 
schemes more than 5 million ha of crops being cultivated in the Soviet Union without the 
use of pesticides (Beglyarov et. al 1978:16). Chemical control was just one of the 
components of the IPM strategy and pesticide use did not dominate in the plant protection 
agenda during the 1970s and the 1980s, as it does today.    
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The disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991 disrupted the contacts that existed between 
research institutes across the former USSR. The transformation of Kazakhstan to a 
neoliberal market economy severely affected public research institutes, including the 
Kazakh Research Institute for Plant Protection (Chapter 4). Public funding of science 
dropped significantly in the 1990s and IPM/ecology-based programmes stopped. KRIPP 
had to look for alternative sources of income. The foreign pesticide industry, which settled 
in the newly established agricultural input market, became one source of funding for 
KRIPP which was invited to test and promote its products. Pesticide testing has now 
become the most important part of plant protection research programmes.  
      A passage from Rachel Carson’s book ‘Silent Spring’ (1962:211) colourfully 
describes a similar shift that occurred decades earlier in the USA:   
 
Most of those best fitted to develop natural controls and assist in putting 
them into effect have been too busy labouring in the more exciting 
vineyards of chemical control. It was reported in 1960 that only 2 per cent 
of all the economic entomologists in the country were then working in the 
field of biological controls. A substantial number of the remaining 98 per 
cent were engaged in research on chemical insecticides. 
   Why should this be? The major chemical companies are pouring money 
into the universities to support research on insecticides. This creates 
attractive fellowships for graduate students and attractive staff positions. 
Biological-control studies, on the other hand, are never so endowed – for 
the simple reason that they do not promise anyone the fortunes that are to be 
made in the chemical industry.  
 
Carson’s view on plant protection research in the USA in the 1950 and the 1960s reflects 
what has happened to plant protection research in Kazakhstan since 1991. Carson’s quote 
resembles a fragment of an interview with one senior researcher of KRIPP (Field notes, 
Interview 17/09/2005):  
 
Q: In your opinion, why are pesticide tests included almost in all research 
programmes? 
А: Because of financial interests! [angry and passionate]. There are many 
pesticide firms that promote their own products and they are sponsoring 
pesticide testing. Why X [for ethical considerations the name of the person 
is not disclosed] said on the scientific council that he has a good income of 
700-800 dollars per month, because researchers of his group are engaged in 
pesticide testing. He is not interested in other research directions. Of course 
I do not want to blacken his reputation, he is a good specialist, but has 
chosen another research priority. His group should also monitor population 
dynamics and do research on some biological and ecological aspects. But 
they only test pesticides, or evaluate various cultivation technologies in 
combination with pesticide use. I understand there should be some 
evaluation of different technologies including pesticides, but in the past this 
kind of ‘research’ was conducted by agro-technicians. This is technical and 
not scientific work!  
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This quotation shows an increase in the influence of the pesticide industry over the pest-
control research agenda in post-Soviet Kazakhstan, as happened in the USA half a century 
earlier. Although one may argue that developments in the USA took place in a different 
historical and socio-economic context, some parallels can still be drawn. Comparison of 
these quotations shows that the pesticide industry has a strategy of influencing the research 
agenda of public research organizations for their own interests, which has not changed over 
time. Engagement in the pesticide testing business became one of the main survival 
strategies for the plant protection researchers in Kazakhstan after the collapse of the Soviet 
scientific establishment (Chapter 4). The quoted researcher remains an adherent of IPM 
type research and does not want to be involved into pesticide testing and promotion. As a 
consequence she has to live on a very low salary.       
An agricultural researcher, who worked for some time for one of the pesticide 
companies, commented on their activities in Kazakhstan (Interview 29/11/2005): 
   
 Q: Maybe it is better that well known pesticide companies are operating in 
our market as their products will be of a better quality than pesticides of an 
unknown nature?  
A: No, they are stealthily approaching [agrarian] science. I mean stealthily 
because they do not invest money in our science but they use it. They are 
just using the difficult financial situation in the research institutes and give 
only small incentives for testing their products.   
If Kazakhstan would start investing in agrarian science again, then these 
pesticide companies would have difficult times, because pesticides will not 
be prioritized in the research agenda. People’s awareness about the toxicity 
of pesticides should be increased. You know in Europe there are 
movements promoting ecologically safe and organic products. When will 
we reach that level? Only then will these companies such as Syngenta and 
Bayer see their market share in our territory diminished. At present, these 
pesticide companies have a strong position on our market; they manipulate 
the situation and significantly influence the research agenda. As I said, they 
have occupied a niche and it will be quite difficult to reverse this situation. 
What can we do, every country has gone through this. Scientists in 
Kazakhstan keep silent because they are not organized to speak up.  
 
This quotation illustrates that multinational pesticide companies have come to occupy solid 
niches in the agricultural input market in Kazakhstan, and reoriented agricultural research 
towards their own interests. It confirms once more that under-financing of public research 
institutes (Chapter 4) pushes researchers to accept the incentives provided by the pesticide 
industry in order to keep the last bits of research potential alive. This interview quote also 
points out that public awareness about pesticide hazards is low in Kazakhstan and that the 
voices of researchers are hardly heard.     
Pesticide testing and promotion has become a normal routine in post-Soviet academic 
research.  Our content analysis of ‘Candidate of Sciences’ (C.Sc.)24 dissertations related to 
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crop protection since 1991 shows that they are full of the experimental results obtained 
from testing pesticides of certain companies. For example, one written in 1995 concludes:    
 
Data collected for insecticides A, B and C [real names not revealed] have 
been submitted to the State Pesticide Registration Commission for their 
inclusion into the ‘List of allowed pesticides on the territory of 
Kazakhstan.’   
 
Another C.Sc. dissertation written in 1994 concludes:  
 
Fungicides A, B, C, D and E have been tested.… It has been shown that 
most effective fungicides are A (0.25 l/ha) and B (2.0 kg/ha).  
 
This pesticide testing for companies has became a pattern in practically all C.Sc. 
dissertations related to plant protection, which test and compare the efficacy of different 
pesticides against the target pest and against each other. Normally the efficacy of the 
dosages proposed by pesticide manufacturer is confirmed. The scientific value of such 
research is normally justified in the following way ‘the following pesticides have not been 
tested before on a particular crop/pest in the specific conditions of Kazakhstan’. However, 
this type of research is very technical and does not embody a real level of scientific inquiry 
appropriate for dissertations at this level.     
 In the Soviet past, researchers received royalties when they published scientific 
articles, books, monographs or recommendations for agricultural producers. Today, they 
have to pay out of their own pockets or look for sponsors to publish this kind of literature. 
Pesticide companies offer to pay the publishing costs of researchers whose findings contain 
positive assessments of their products. A typical example is Syngneta’s sponsoring of the 
research recommendation from KRIPP ‘Protection of apple and pear orchards against 
arthropod pests and diseases in Kazakhstan’ (issued in 2003) in exchange for the 
promotion and advertisement of its pesticides in this recommendation.   
 This analysis of the shift in research at KRIPP reveals a sharp contrast between the 
pest-control research agenda in Soviet and post-1991 Kazakhstan. The partnership with the 
pesticide industry became one of the main survival strategies for plant protection 
researchers after 1991, at the expense of IPM/ecology-based research.  
 
 
3.6  Conclusions  
 
This chapter has illustrated that the IPM approach widely used within the USSR in the 
1970s and the 1980s required detailed knowledge of complex agro-ecosystems. It also 
required specific institutional support in the form of a strong research base, plant protection 
extension network and concerted action from involved actors. IPM was backed up by 
significant investments into plant protection research and extension, training of specialists, 
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building bio-laboratories and technological lines for producing bio-agents. Pesticide use 
was kept at low levels by monitoring pest organisms, forecasting their population dynamics 
and using appropriate biological and agronomic control methods based on economic 
thresholds and predator/prey ratios. IPM was promoted and implemented under the 
institutionalised guidance of plant protection professionals, including researchers. Morse 
and Buhler (1997) note that IPM is a model of what crop protection should look like and 
represents an ideal that many more would follow if they could. This study showed that the 
Soviet system made substantial efforts in creating conditions conducive for IPM to work.  
In post-1991 Kazakhstan, hardly any of these conditions have been available.  
With the end of collective farming (Chapter 2) and the budget cuts, plant protection 
research and extension was severely weakened (Chapter 4, Toleubayev 2008). Numerous 
individual farmers emerged, most of them newcomers, who did not have adequate 
knowledge and lacked the institutional backup to organize pest-control activities. This 
vacuum created an opportunity for the pesticide industry to make farmers think about crop 
protection solely in terms of pesticide spraying. The pesticide industry has succeeded in 
setting up an infrastructure to deliver information and pesticides to farmers, while 
knowledge and information on IPM has diminished or vanished altogether. The plant 
protectionists we interviewed referred to the non-agronomic background of the majority of 
current farmers as a main reason for poorly managed fields and inadequate pest-control 
activities. However, as was illustrated with the case of the secondary pest outbreak that 
ensued from indiscriminate pesticide spraying against the Colorado potato beetle, even 
those with a professional agronomic background may not always be able to grasp the 
complexity of pest control.  
Advanced farmers (mainly former collective farm agro-technicians) do their best to 
control pests on their own fields by using pesticides or combining it with other agronomic 
practices. However, very often their attempts to control pests do not succeed because of 
poorly managed neighbouring fields, which serve as a source of pests. The problem of 
controlling pests on separate and individual farm fields is a consequence of the break up of 
the collective crop production system. In the past, the centralized public plant protection 
service monitored and controlled pest organisms across the country, irrespective of 
administrative borders between farms, districts or regions. Nowadays individual farmers 
have to deal with pest problems themselves at the level of their own fields and to rely on 
own resources. The majority of them do not possess sufficient intellectual, technical and 
financial resources to use the IPM approach. For this reason, Van Huis and Meerman 
(1997) suggest that renewing the practical value of IPM for resource-poor farmers implies 
focusing more on IPM as a methodology and less as a technology and on developing 
appropriate pest management strategies through self-discovery learning processes and 
participatory programmes. However the new farmers in post-1991 Kazakhstan are not 
engaged in participatory programmes and are struggling individually. The conditions for 
running such programmes and triggering learning process and concerted action for pest 
control among individual farmers have not been created. The more advanced farmers in 
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Kazakhstan recognize the importance and necessity of collective action for inter-farm pest 
control, but they lack institutional support to promote such initiatives. The type of 
institutional backup that existed in the past to serve the collective farms has collapsed, and 
a new institutional framework to support individual farmers (except for pesticide market) 
has not yet been established. Moreover, it is very difficult to establish such an institutional 
base for concerted pest control since public initiatives and collective action have been 
marginalised in post-1991 Kazakhstan.   
This study also implies that there is an increased risk that the IPM knowledge 
developed locally before 1991 will be lost. IPM schemes need to be developed locally, 
taking the dynamics of particular agro-ecosystems into account. At the same time, however, 
the principles of IPM are universal and an institutional backup is needed to reintroduce IPM 
principles into practices of the new individualised farmers. This chapter shows that this 
reintroduction depends not only on developing and communicating appropriate knowledge 
but also on the socio-economic situation that is conducive to IPM approach. Kazakhstan’s 
society would benefit if the government would create favourable conditions for fostering 
the required institutional changes that can challenge the dominance of the networks 
promoting pesticides. 
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3.7  Notes 
 
                                                 
1
 Another implicit reason for the wide-scale use of the IPM approach in the Soviet Union apart from 
the explicit claims about health and environmental concerns was to reduce dependence on pesticides 
imported from Western countries. 
 
2
 Oblast - the English equivalent is province or region. Alma-Ata oblast occupied 105,210 square 
kilometres before 1991. It consisted of 11 administrative districts with 39 kolkhozes and 97 
sovkhozes. The total cropping area was 839,556 ha. 
 
3
 The Kazakh SSR (Soviet Socialist Republic) (Kazakhstan) was one of the 15 republics of the 
former USSR. 
 
4
 In this thesis, an agricultural pest is defined broadly, as a living organism (rodent, insect, mite, 
nematode, fungus, bacterium, virus or weed) that damages crops, affects crop development or 
reduces quantity and quality of yield before or after harvest. The terms ‘agricultural pest’, ‘pest 
organism’ and ‘pest’ will be used interchangeably.  
 
5
 The economic threshold is the density of pests at which control measures are required to prevent 
economic losses.  
 
6
 This journal was a forum for discussion of plant protection issues of interest to plant protection 
practitioners, researchers and policymakers.  
 
7
 Cuba still has 280 centres for producing entomophages and entomopathogens and some 700,000 
ha of crops are biologically treated (Van Lenteren and Bueno 2003:132) 
 
8
 Here ‘biological control’ refers to the control of agricultural pests by living organisms (insects, 
mites, nematodes, fungi, bacteria, viruses) or with products of their metabolism.   
 
9
 Biological laboratory reared beneficial arthropods and produced bio-pesticides based on 
entomopathogenic microorganisms.  
 
10
 Field crops: cabbages, red beets, alfalfa, maize, soybeans, tobacco, potatoes, tomatoes, carrots 
and peppers.  
 
11
 In the original paper Dysart (1973:173) used the term ‘parasites’. Since Trichogramma is an egg-
parasitoid the term ‘parasites’ has been changed to ‘parasitoids’ in the quotation to avoid confusion.  
 
12
 Here ‘bio-pesticide’ is a preparation made from entomopathogenic microorganisms or products of 
their metabolism.  
 
13
 In Chapter 1, it was mentioned that the archive of the Republican Plant Protection Station of the 
Kazakh SSR has been lost. For this reason, we were not able to compare data presented in Figure 
3.1 for the Alma-Ata oblast with Trichogramma and bio-pesticides use for the whole of the Kazakh 
SSR.  
 
14
 As the archive of the Republican Plant Protection Station of the Kazakh SSR has been lost, we 
are not able to give a ratio on biologically treated area and number of bio-laboratories in the Kazakh 
SSR against data presented in Figure 3.2 for the whole of the USSR. 
 
15
 Many plant protectionists in 1990s were dismissed because of budget cuts. This led to emigration, 
retirement, going into private business (many were recruited by the pesticide industry), employment 
by large farm enterprises (those that survived the crises) and many remained jobless. A slight 
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increase in number of PPS staff by 2006 (up to 1,700 people) was linked to the post-1999 revival of 
PPS after a severe locust plague and the re-establishment of the Republican Centre for 
Phytosanitary Monitoring and Forecasting. However, there is now an acute shortage of qualified 
plant protection specialists in Kazakhstan. The PPS is still far from recovered because the majority 
of the newly recruited people do not have a background in plant protection. In the worst cases they 
do not have an agronomic or agricultural education at all. Of the 1,700 people employed in the PPS 
nowadays only 9% have a plant protection background. There are no educational organizations 
training plant protection specialists in Kazakhstan. In the words of a plant protection officer at the 
Department of Phytosanitary Safety of the Ministry of Agriculture of Kazakhstan: ‘The plant 
protection domain experiences shortage of the staff / kadrovi golod [in Russian]’ (Interview 
04/06/2007). 
 
16
 In preparing this chapter it was startling to find that there has been hardly any published research 
on pesticide use by farmers in post-1991 Kazakhstan in either Kazakh, Russian or English.    
 
17
 Terra Zher Ana: Special issue. 2002. (www.greenwomen.freenet.kz/pdf/terra-3.pdf ) [in Russian, 
access date 22/02/2009]. 
 
18
 In the 1980s, CPB used to be a quarantine insect pest in Kazakhstan and its distribution was 
limited. However, it has widely spread throughout the country in the 1990s (probably partly a result 
of the post-1991 collapse of the plant protection and quarantine service) and today it severely 
damages potato (and other host) crops all over the country. More recently it was taken off of the list 
of quarantine pests.       
 
19
 Fipronil – a hazardous pesticide (Class II) according to the WHO Pesticide Classification List. It 
is legally only allowed to be used in Kazakhstan as a measure against locusts in non-cropping areas.    
 
20
 This farmer even mentioned that he used the banned DDT (Dichloro-Diphenyl-Trichloroethane) 
obtained from a black market.  
 
21
 The USSR imported up to 50% of the pesticides it required with the other half being domestically 
produced.    
 
22
 Since the archive of the Republican Plant Protection Station of the Kazakh SSR has been lost, it 
was not possible to compare the amount of pesticides imported into the Kazakh SSR with data 
presented in Figure 3.3. Alternative sources of data on the amount of pesticides imported into 
Kazakhstan before 1999 could not be found.  
 
23
 In 1993 the government issued a decree (№ 697, August 13) limiting the state’s responsibility for 
crop protection to just those crops which were strategically important– in practice, wheat – against a 
defined list of highly destructive pest organisms, viz.: Apamea anceps, Eurygaster integriceps, 
gregarious locust species and diseases (Puccinia spp., Septoria spp.). However, poor financing of 
control activities in 1990s meant the state did not even keep these destructive pests at manageable 
levels. Since 2000 there has been an improvement in the financing of these activities (Toleubayev et 
al. 2007, Toleubayev 2008). 
 
24
 ‘Candidate of Sciences’ – scientific degree in the former USSR, which is still in use in Russia and 
Kazakhstan and can be placed between M.Sc. and Ph.D. of western academia. Some equate this 
degree to western Ph.D., but after pursuing Candidate of Sciences degree one need another 4-5 or 
more years to pursue ‘Doctor of Sciences’ degree that equal to Ph.D. degree of western academia.           
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Chapter 4 
 
Plant protection research in Kazakhstan:          
The commodification of science and the loss of 
ecological thinking as a public good 
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4.1  Introduction 
 
Many of the contemporary debates on research policy discuss the public – private 
relationships required to foster research and development (R&D). The study of the 
transition of the former Soviet Union republics from planned to market economies offers 
useful insights for reassessing the role of the public sector. Most of the existing studies in 
the transition period examine the case of Russia and focus on military and industrial R&D 
(e.g. Kontorovich 1994, Radosevic 2003). This study takes another entry point: a formerly 
more peripheral area of the USSR, Kazakhstan, and a sector that has received little 
attention: plant protection research. Plant protection research is a domain of agrarian 
science that aims to develop preventive and/or protective approaches to control pest 
organisms.  Through this study we are able to discuss the consequences of the 
commodification of research on the delivery of what can well be considered as a public 
good: ecologically sound pest control. 
 The following sections discuss the public good characteristics of plant protection 
research and the extent to which plant protection research in the Soviet era met these public 
good characteristics. Then we will use the typology of Radosevic (2003) – developed for 
characterizing the post-Soviet R&D model in Russia – to analyse the transitions in 
Kazakhstan, using the concepts of ‘preservation’, ‘diverse restructuring’ and ‘the survival 
strategies of R&D actors’. ‘Preservation’ refers to policies that aim to preserve the old form 
and capacity of science despite a reduction in funding. ‘Restructuring’ refers to reforms that 
introduce market-based economic principles into the R&D system. ‘Survival’ refers to the 
micro-strategies that institutes and researchers develop to cope with shrinking public R&D 
budgets. Finally we will discuss how the transformation of R&D from a state-led to a 
market-based model not only implied a change in the organization of research, but that it 
had a deeper effect on the content of the research itself. We argue that the shift in research 
organization contributed to the breakdown of research into ecologically sound pest control 
and supported a shift towards thinking about pest control solely in terms of pesticides. 
 
 
4.2  Public good characteristics of plant protection research   
 
The transformation from a planned economy to a neoliberal system affected the delivery of 
many public goods in Kazakhstan after 1991. A public good is any good that, when 
supplied to anybody, is necessarily supplied to everybody, and from whose benefits it is 
impossible or impracticable to exclude anybody (McLean and McMillan 2003). In other 
words, public goods are non-exclusive and non-rivalled (Kaul and Mendoza 2003, Scott 
and Marshall 2005). To understand the significance of the shifts in plant protection research 
policy we first address the extent to which plant protection research is, or produces, a public 
good. 
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While many forms of plant protection exist, in general one can distinguish between 
pesticide spraying based on industries’ recommendations to farmers and the theory and 
practice of Integrated Pest Management (IPM), which is more knowledge intensive.  The 
latter targets ecologically sound and environmentally safe approaches to controlling 
agricultural pests, which in turn, contributes to more sustainable agricultural production and 
benefits society as a whole (Bale et al. 2008, Van Lenteren 1997). In this sense IPM 
embodies many characteristics of a public good. The development of sustainable pest-
control methods and technologies resolves several problems, including the reduction of 
pesticides in the environment, of poisoning incidents during application and pesticide 
residues in food, which affect people’s health (Kishi 2005, Perkins 1982, Pretty and Waibel 
2005). Moreover, the control of highly destructive pests (such as locusts) that can spread 
across large areas of agricultural land and potentially threaten national food security can 
also be seen as a public good. Plant protection research plays a crucial role here, as it is 
only through continuous studies of pest organisms that ecologically sound preventive 
and/or protective measures can be developed. Commitment from the state and resources 
from public funds are necessary to finance these socially beneficial interventions. In 
addition, the development of ecologically sustainable forms of pest control is relatively 
complex, knowledge-intensive and contingent upon a free exchange of knowledge (cf. 
Leeuwis 2004:347). 
Some people view all research as a public good. Callon (1994:418), for example, 
states that all science should be considered as a public good and for this reason it should be 
protected from market forces:  
 
Science is a public good, which must be preserved at all costs because it is a 
source of variety. It causes new states of the world to proliferate. And this 
diversity depends on the diversity of interests and projects that are included 
in those collectives that reconfigure nature and society. Without it, without 
this source of diversity, the market – with its natural propensity to transform 
science into a commodity – would be ever more doomed to convergence 
and irreversibility. In the end, it would negate itself. 
 
This reflects the global scientific community’s reaction to the increased 
commodification of scientific knowledge and the privatization of science by market forces, 
which has occurred since the 1970s and which many scientists see as deleterious to public 
interest (Richards 2004). In many countries market oriented R&D and science and 
technology policies are transforming scientific knowledge into a commodity (e.g. Byerlee 
and Echeverria 2002, Owen-Smith 2003, Tijssen and Korevaar 1997) with an increasing 
emphasis on commercial application and profit, as opposed to discovery. This produces a 
short-termism in research agendas and a demand for immediate results that have a 
commercial potential. It also inhibits the free exchange of knowledge. This often occurs at 
the cost of sustaining long-term research with less immediately visible commercial spin-
offs (Buhler et al. 2002). Clearly, research into sustainable pest-control approaches does not 
flourish in these conditions, since such approaches necessarily have to be applied to agro-
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ecosystems which are by nature open and complex and require careful long-term analysis 
(cf. Jansen 2009). The historical review of plant protection research in Kazakhstan during 
the Soviet era, contained in the next section, illustrates these points in a more concrete way. 
 
 
 
4.3  Plant protection research in the Soviet era  
 
Just two years after the revolution in 1917, the Bolsheviks founded the first entomological 
office within contemporary Kazakhstan’s borders, in the city of Verny1, in southeast 
Kazakhstan. This can be considered as the start of plant protection research in Kazakhstan. 
In the same year the Syr-Darya pest-control bureau was set up in the south of Kazakhstan, 
mainly to monitor and organize control activities against locusts. In time, a network of 
plant protection stations was established across the whole country. Plant protectionists in 
these stations were not only responsible for pest control, but also conducted studies dealing 
with the population dynamics, ecology, biology and taxonomy of pest organisms. Scientists 
from Russia assisted in this work.    
In 1929, the agricultural research system in the Soviet Union was structured around 
the All-Union Academy of Agricultural Sciences Named after Lenin (VASKhNIL), an 
association of agricultural research institutes. The All-Union Institute for Plant Protection 
(VIZR), established in Leningrad as part of VASKhNIL in the same year came to lead plant 
protection research in the USSR. 
The early Soviet period saw the publication of numerous scientific articles and 
reports on plant protection. From 1931-1934 these were published by VIZR in its scientific 
compendiums called Sborniki VIZRa (Compendiums of VIZR), and from 1935 onwards in 
compendiums called Zashita Rastenii (Plant Protection). Each year the number of 
publications on plant protection increased. In the first half of 1934 a total of 78 
publications, in the format of methodological handbooks, monographs and 
recommendations related to plant protection were published in the USSR (list of 
publications in VIZR 1935:164-166) - a significant research effort. In the following year 
plant protection research by VIZR dealt with: (1) the spatial distribution of insect-pests and 
crop diseases in the Soviet Union and their ecological and economic importance; (2) the 
biotic and abiotic factors affecting the mass reproduction and outbreaks of pest organisms; 
(3) the composition and dynamics of biocenoses2 in virgin and idle lands, so as to improve 
predictions of likely outbreaks of insect-pests and diseases; (4) economic thresholds and the 
development of pest management schemes for cereals in the Chernozem3 belt; (5) yield loss 
assessment methods; and (6) biological methods for controlling insect-pests. For instance, 
research on biological methods carried out in southeast Russia focused on the control of the 
European corn borer moth Ostrinia nubilalis, using the egg parasitoid Trichogramma 
evanescens and this led to a questioning of the efficacy of chemical dusting in controlling 
this pest (Zimin 1935).4 At that time researchers from VIZR had already proposed making 
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wider use of Trichogramma spp. against lepidopterous pests of fruits and vegetables (Zimin 
1935:70). This illustrates the extent to which ecologically sustainable pest-control methods 
were being developed and promoted early in the Soviet era. 
This intensive research on ecologically sound pest management contrasts with a 
widespread opinion among Western observers that Soviet agricultural science was stagnant 
during the 1930s. Research in plant protection was carried out despite the control that 
Stalin’s regime tried to exert over agricultural science as, exemplified by Lysenko. He 
theorized that the immediate environment directly influences the genetic characteristics of 
species and argued that the environment is more influential than genes, an argument that 
contradicted the theories of classical genetics. He managed to reformulate his biological 
theories in terms of dialectical-materialist philosophy and these theories were embraced by 
Stalin, as the theories of a ‘barefoot scientist’ – the epitome of the mythical Soviet peasant 
genius, and the only biological theories consistent with Stalinist-Marxist ideology. Lysenko 
contributions to ‘advancing’ agrarian science led him to be put in charge of the VASKhNIL 
in 19385 where he suppressed plant breeding research led by Nikolai Vavilov which ran 
counter to his theories. Lysenko’s name has become synonymous with the adaptation and 
manipulation of science for ideological purposes (Harman 2003, Joravsky 1970, Medvedev 
1969, Roll-Hansen 2008). However, Soviet science should not be evaluated solely on this 
one example.  Plant protection research continued to develop at that time. Roll-Hansen 
(2008) shows that the practical needs of improving agricultural performance eventually 
sidelined ideology-driven theorizations. Moreover, at this time there was much research on 
conservation ecology, lead by botanists, zoologists and geographers in Russia (Weiner 
1988, 1999). Hence, despite the theories of Lysenko and the subordination of science to 
ideology under Stalinism, much research that took place then is still of value today. 
Plant protection research evolved in Kazakhstan throughout the Stalin era. 
Recognizing the need for a specialized research unit dealing with pest issues the Kazakh 
Research Institute for Arable Farming (KRIAF)6 opened a Department of Plant Protection 
in 1935. The research staff consisted of entomologists, zoologists and phytopathologists, 
who mainly studied pest organisms damaging cereals (strategic crops), such as the Owlet 
moth (Apamea anceps), the Asiatic Migratory Locust (Locusta migratoria migratoria), 
rodent-pests (Citellus pygmaeus and Lagurus lagurus) and the diseases caused by smut 
fungi (Ustilago spp.). Plant protection research in Kazakhstan was part of the Soviet 
agricultural research system, since KRIAF belonged to the network of VASKhNIL.  
Between 1941 and 1945 these research activities were suspended because of the war 
against Nazi Germany but continued after the war when pest-control research was put under 
the umbrella of the newly established Kazakh Republican Plant Protection Station (KRPPS) 
with a staff of 25 researchers and with departments of entomology, phytopathology and 
zoology. Content analysis of the research articles and reports produced by KRPPS during 
this time (1945-1953) shows that, from the outset, the research was driven by demands 
from the farming sector to deal with pest organisms damaging crops. Persistent problems 
with controlling certain agricultural pests in a particular region were brought to the 
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attention of the researchers by the regional agricultural departments. Researchers were 
expedited to these regions to study the problem. Researchers monitored population 
dynamics of the pest, identified the core of the problem, developed new control strategies 
or improved existing control methods and produced recommendations in simple language 
for farm workers and agro-technicians. By this time, researchers had already started shifting 
their focus towards developing integrated schemes to protect particular crops against pest 
organisms (Dzhiembaev 1953).    
A new era of plant protection research in Kazakhstan started in 1958 with the 
opening of the Kazakh Research Institute for Plant Protection (KRIPP) based on the former 
KRPPS. It initially consisted of eight departments: Entomology, Phytopathology, 
Agricultural Zoology, Forest Insect-Pests and Diseases, Toxicology, Taxonomy of Crop 
Insect-Pests and Diseases, Pests of Cereals and Cereal Products and Monitoring and 
Forecasting of Crop Insect-Pest and Disease Development. The number of departments at 
KRIPP changed during its 50-year existence: some were renamed or merged, others 
emerged and some were shut down. It varied from 12 departments with 89 researchers in 
1973 to 5 departments with 34 researchers in 1999. Newly opened departments in the 1960s 
and 1970s were Weed Control, Biological Methods, Immunity, Isotopes, Bio-Physics and 
Locust Ecology. In the 1980s, the departments were reorganised so that they focused more 
on protecting particular crops, e.g. the Department for Protection of Cereals or the 
Department for Protection of Fruits and Vegetables. These departments were charged with 
developing and improving elements of the integrated crop protection schemes, which 
incorporated biological, agronomic and physical methods that would reduce the use of 
pesticides while controlling agricultural pests. The researchers of KRIPP produced 
numerous publications in the form of monographs, textbooks, scientific articles, handbooks 
and recommendations for the farming sector. Between 1971 and 1990 they issued 98 
recommendations for agricultural producers (Figure 4.1) on how to protect a crop(s) against 
a particular or complex set of agricultural pests. Such recommendations were always a 
result of several years of experimentation (based on continuous monitoring and 
observation) and took the specific agro-ecological and climatic conditions of different 
regions in Kazakhstan into account.   
KRIPP subsequently became the main coordinating centre of all plant protection 
research in Kazakhstan. Its researchers closely collaborated with regional plant protection 
stations to assist in monitoring and forecasting the population dynamics of pest organisms 
and defining economic thresholds. It formed liaisons with other agricultural research 
institutes, focused on specific crops, to conduct joint research related to pest-control issues, 
including the breeding of resistant crop varieties. KRIPP also collaborated with the plant 
research institutes of other Soviet republics and research institutes of All-Union 
significance, such as the All-Union Institute for Plant Protection, the All-Union Research 
Institute for Phytopathology, the All-Union Research Institute of Microbiological Remedies 
for Plant Protection and the All-Union Research Institute of Biological Methods for Plant 
Protection. Networking with, and exchange visits to, these research organizations located in 
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Moscow, Leningrad and other parts of the USSR, strongly stimulated the performance of 
KRIPP’s researchers (interviews for this study).          
 The Soviet science was in principle not designed to advance global knowledge, but 
to help in solving domestic problems, i.e. political and economic pressures were always 
present (Graham 1975). The responsibility for the agricultural research institutes in the 
Soviet Union shifted several times from VASKhNIL to the Ministry of Agriculture and 
vice versa. These switches in management from one structure to another occurred because 
of different views about the applicability of agricultural research. The Ministry of 
Agriculture required agrarian science to be responsive to the needs of the farming sector. 
VASKhNIL favoured a more fundamental orientation of agricultural research. For these 
reasons, the Kazakh regional branch of VASKhNIL, set up in 1941 and transformed into 
the Kazakh Academy of Agricultural Sciences (KAAS) in 1957, was closed in 1962 and its 
research institutes were put under the Kazakh Ministry of Agriculture. In 1971, VASKhNIL 
regained its political independence and re-established its eastern regional branch in 
Kazakhstan and most of the agricultural research institutes (including KRIPP) were 
transferred back from the Ministry of Agriculture to the eastern branch of VASKhNIL. 
These shifts certainly influenced the research agenda and priorities in agrarian science, but 
plant protection research under both these management structures remained focusing on 
development and promotion of ecologically sound pest-control approaches and was 
adequately funded (interviews for this study). In 1990, just before the collapse of the 
USSR, the Eastern branch of VASKhNIL was transformed into the Kazakh Academy of 
Agricultural Sciences (KAAS). At this time KAAS had six departments with 32 research 
institutes, 28 experimental stations and 45 experimental farms. This network of research 
and extension units provided the farming sector with up-to-date information and 
technologies (Morgounov and Zuidema 2001, Pray and Anderson 1997).  
 This overview of the Soviet plant protection research shows a series of dynamic 
developments in this field of science. Considerable investments and improvements in the 
governance of scientific establishment made ecology-based pest-control research possible. 
This formed a sound basis for the IPM practices that were adapted in the farming system 
(Chapter 3) and for management of locust populations (Chapter 5). The question can now 
be raised what remained of this IPM/ecology supporting research infrastructure and 
research agenda after the disintegration of the USSR in 1991. 
 
 
4.4  Science and technology policy in the post-Soviet era  
 
On the 16th of December 1991 Kazakhstan became an independent state. The following 
month the ‘Law on science and technology policy of the Republic of Kazakhstan’ was 
issued setting forth the Republic’s science and technology (S&T) policy and the 
organizational structure for research. The main principles of this were: the selection and 
development of research priorities in accordance with public demand; the incorporation of 
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international scientific knowledge; tax privileges for R&D projects; support for innovation 
activities; and the protection of intellectual property rights. However, the enactment of 
these principles was thwarted by the economic downturn that the country experienced in the 
1990s. In 1992, the Ministry of Science and New Technologies was established to preserve 
the S&T potential of research enterprises and to assist them in developing market oriented 
research outputs (Kembaev and Komlev 2004). But with the severe budget cuts and a crisis 
in all sectors of the economy, these initiatives amounted to little.     
The government looked for other ways to manage the scientific establishment. In 
1996, the Presidential Decree ‘On the improvement of state management of science in the 
Republic of Kazakhstan’, merged the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) and the 
Ministry of Science and New Technologies (MSNT) into one executive body, the Ministry 
of Science/Academy of Sciences of the Republic of Kazakhstan. This body became 
responsible for leading the state’s S&T policy and financing R&D. It developed the 
‘Conception of national science and technology policy in the Republic of Kazakhstan’ by 
the end of 1996, together with a number of policy initiatives to optimise S&T policy. A 
lack of funds meant that none of these initiatives was implemented and this together with 
the lack of cooperation between scientists from NAS and the government bureaucrats from 
the former MSNT led to this executive body being disbanded in 1998, with its 
responsibilities being transferred to a newly founded Ministry of Education and Science. 
This change marginalized the scientific community and government bureaucrats became 
the managers of science. This conflict was not widely publicised and the new ministry was 
presented as a means of integrating academic science with higher education.   
With the improvement in the Kazakhstan economy since 2000, the Ministry of 
Education and Science developed a new ‘Conception of science and technology policy in 
the Republic of Kazakhstan’. This served as a basis for the ‘Law on science’ issued in July 
9, 2001. The law aimed to provide a legal basis for funding projects from the state budget 
based on: open calls and competition; the integration of science, education and industry; the 
protection of intellectual property rights; and the accreditation of R&D enterprises. This 
law was followed by the Presidential Decree of May 17, 2003 on ‘Strategy for industrial 
and innovative development within the Republic in Kazakhstan in 2003-2015’. A 
Committee of Science was set up to coordinate public finance to R&D through the Science 
Fund and the National Innovation Fund. In June 20, 2007, the President of the Republic of 
Kazakhstan signed a National Programme ‘the Development of science in the Republic of 
Kazakhstan in 2007-2012’. The government assigned a budget of 43 billion KZT (about 
361 million US$) to implement this programme, which aims to increase international 
competitiveness of science in Kazakhstan. This suggests that the government has good 
intentions to manage the national R&D domain, to develop effective S&T policies and to 
provide science with sufficient public funds. However, these numerous upper layer 
restructurings and policies have done little to improve the situation for grassroots 
researchers, particularly in agrarian science, as will be illustrated below.        
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4.4.1  A niche for agricultural research?  
  
What happened to agricultural research in the course of this period of good intentions but 
few resources? Johnson (1993) discusses the restructuring of agricultural research in the 
former Soviet Union and outlines several strategies that could be adopted by agrarian 
research institutes as way of preserving research capacity in the former Soviet republics. 
The concepts of ‘preservation’, ‘diverse restructuring’ and ‘the survival strategies of R&D 
actors’ developed by Radosevic (2003) for characterizing the post-Soviet R&D model in 
Russia are very similar to those discussed by Johnson (1993). The concepts of Johnson 
(1993) ‘preservation’, ‘facilitating adaptation’ and the ‘import of technology’ will be 
discussed here to analyse the changing trends in agrarian science in Kazakhstan.  
The first path for sustaining agrarian science in Kazakhstan was ‘preservation’, this 
involved attempting to maintain the pre-1991 agricultural research base with a much 
smaller budget. In 1996, the Kazakh Academy of Agricultural Sciences became the 
National Academic Centre for Agricultural Research (NACAR), part of the Ministry of 
Science/Academy of Sciences. NACAR contained 29 research institutes (including 
KRIPP), with a further 8 regional branches, 2 experimental forestry stations, 4 veterinary 
research stations, 12 field experimental stations, 31 experimental farms and the National 
Agricultural Library (KazGosINTI 2002:11). Initially it seemed worthwhile to try to 
preserve the agricultural research base in Kazakhstan through a period of uncertainty, with 
a serious shortfall in funding. This response continued for almost a decade after the collapse 
of the Soviet Union, but after this time it became evident that the approach was not feasible, 
as the research base was rapidly deteriorating and many researchers had left public research 
institutes due to a lack of funding.   
The second path for sustaining and developing agrarian science was to ‘facilitate 
adaptation’, and re-allocate the available resources so they more closely matched the 
prevailing economic, structural and agricultural realities (Chapter 2). This strategy implied 
reorganizing the research institutes so that they were more aligned to the needs of the new 
types of agricultural producers. As a result all the research institutes (including KRIPP), 
experimental stations and experimental farms of NACAR were transferred to the Ministry 
of Agriculture at the end of 2002. NACAR ceased to exist as an organization. Ten regional 
agricultural research centres were established, merging the existing research institutes, their 
regional branches and the experimental stations. The research institutes within these new 
regional centres sought to maintain their independence. They had to compete for scarce 
budgetary funds and struggle with bureaucratic obstacles and excessive ministerial control. 
The Ministry of Agriculture required agricultural researchers to be responsive to the 
demands of new farmers and to be market-oriented. By contrast the researchers were still 
focused on the type of research that fitted with the large-scale, knowledge-intensive, 
highly-mechanized collective farming of the past, which was of little relevance to the 
reality of the post-1991 farming sector with numerous small-scale, individual and resource-
poor farmers. Foreign companies were already actively recommending their packages of 
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agricultural inputs (e.g. seeds, fertilizers and pesticides) which were widely available. In 
response policymakers abandoned the path of sustaining and developing a knowledge-
intensive model of agrarian science.        
The third stage in the development of agrarian science, ‘technology import’, was 
adopted in 2007 when the Ministry of Agriculture announced that future agricultural 
research in Kazakhstan would mainly focus on adapting imported technologies.7 To this 
end a wholly state owned Joint Stock Company (JSC) KazAgroInnovation was established 
under auspices of the Ministry of Agriculture. Its purpose was to import foreign agricultural 
technologies, coordinate the activities of all the agricultural research centres, evaluate the 
quality of research outputs, increase the efficacy of agrarian science and control the finance 
of agricultural research. The agricultural research institutes were transformed from state 
enterprises, which had the right to engage in economic activities, into Partnerships with 
Limited Liability. These initiatives represented a semi-privatization of the agricultural 
research enterprises, as all their assets still belonged to the state and a significant part of 
their finances came from the state budget.    
  In August 2007, JSC KazAgroInnovation presented ambitious plans to build two 
Agricultural Research-Education Cities, one in the north and one in the south of the country 
by 2011-12 and to concentrate all the agricultural research and educational organizations in 
these Cities.8 As a prelude to such concentration, JSC KazAgroInnovation reduced the 10 
existing regional agricultural research centres into three regional research institutes for 
agriculture and four specialised research institutes (livestock breeding and veterinary, food 
and biofuels, forestry and wheat farming).  
According to our interviewees from the research community, these initiatives were 
carried out in a top-down fashion, with little attempt made to solicit the views of the 
scientific community. Researchers complained that all these bureaucratic restructurings 
have constrained their activities and made it impossible for them to take independent 
decisions. The restructuring of research institutions added extra layers of bureaucracy to the 
research system (cf. Busch and Lacy 1983). According to Schweitzer9 (2008), government 
bureaucracy is the major obstacle to the development of science and technology in 
Kazakhstan. Our evidence suggests that the bureaucratization of scientific management is 
one of the factors that has hindered the development of agrarian science in Kazakhstan in 
the post-Soviet era.  
 
4.4.2  Science under siege  
 
Science and the research community in post-Soviet Kazakhstan have faced many problems 
besides bureaucratization. To identify the key problems we used a critical review of the 
literature and media sources, field observations and the data of our interviews.  The 
collected data point at the following key problems: low salaries, run-down and outdated 
research facilities, difficulties with recruiting young researchers and retaining the 
intermediate generation, weak state support and the poor quality of research outputs. These 
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findings coincide with the results of a more general study carried out by Gurevich and 
Suleimenov (2006), among 701 researchers from 71 various research organizations located 
in 17 cities of Kazakhstan (Table 4.1). 
 
Table 4.1 Indication of the weakest aspects of (all) sciences in Kazakhstan  
by researchers (n=701). 
 
Factor Respondents, 100 % 
Wage/income of researchers 30.2 
Material and technical supply of research enterprises 12.8 
Introduction of research outputs into practice 11.4 
Inflow of young researchers 10.4 
State support and regulation  8.3 
Staff qualification of research enterprises 6.0 
Staff training for research enterprises 4.3 
Organization/management of science 3.1 
Intellectual property rights 2.7 
Expertise of researchers  2.1 
International collaboration 2.1 
Evaluation of researchers’ qualifications 1.9 
Integration of science and higher education 1.6 
Competition in research community 2.1 
Information support 1.0 
Source: Gurevich and Suleimenov (2006).  
 
The following short section from an in-depth interview with a former researcher (a 
man of 71 years)10, who has dedicated all his life to plant protection research, identifies 
many of the issues facing agrarian science and echoes the views of many other agricultural 
researchers11 (Field notes, Interview 24/03/2006): 
 
Today, there are many problems [very upset]. The research potential has 
become very weak. The research institutes cannot work at full gear because 
of a lack of finances [exclaiming]! For instance, this winter [December 
2005 – February 2006] most of the research staff of KRIPP were sent on 
unpaid vacation [otpusk bez soderzhaniya] for 3 months, because there was 
no money to pay their salaries [this has been ‘normal’ practice since 1992]. 
But these 3 months are necessary to analyse what was done last season, 
write methodological handbooks, prepare a research programme for the 
next season, and so on [he reflects what they did as researchers in the 
Soviet past during the winter months]. Now it is [spring], time for fieldtrips, 
but they [researchers] cannot go because there is no money for this. A plant 
protection researcher without fieldtrips is not a real researcher [exclaiming]! 
There is no transport to visit the fields. In the past, if you visited a sovkhoz, 
you got a car, assistants… the farm administration or the regional plant 
protection stations provided everything you needed for your research. 
Nowadays you are alone, nobody cares. Plant protection research is entirely 
based on field observations. Without data from the field you cannot do 
much in the laboratory. It is nonsense [exclaiming]! Without trials in real 
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field conditions your laboratory results are incomplete. For this you need to 
set up field experiments and to do observations. For example, locusts fly 
hundreds of kilometres, you have to follow and monitor the population 
dynamics, where they land, lay eggs, under what conditions they take off, 
which direction they go and so on… 
The financing of science became so horrible that... [does not finish this 
sentence; pause; he cannot find words to express his frustration]. Can you 
imagine the allocated budget for the research programme for developing the 
integrated protection schemes for all vegetables is 400,000 tenge [about 
3,140 US$]. In total! This is mockery! [getting excited and upset] 
Moreover, you have to do it in one season [a requirement of the Ministry of 
Agriculture which finances the research]! You never can do that in one 
year! You need at least three years! But some researchers somehow manage 
to produce reports after one year. The principle is: ‘you get what you pay’ 
[this expression is often used in the research community]. After this they 
[policymakers] claim that they allocated money for the research. Both sides 
are engaged in ‘eye-washing’ [ochkovtiratelstvo]. Researchers have to write 
that they developed these integrated measures in order to get paid. Next 
year money will be allocated for new research and the Ministry of 
Agriculture will ask for immediate results.  At the end, all these research 
recommendations have a one-day lifespan and of no value. Today, in fact, 
everybody uses research recommendations developed in the Soviet time. 
Researchers just take the old ones and rewrite them as new. Nobody 
develops anything new anymore.  
 
This quotation highlights that the current low quality of plant protection research conducted 
in Kazakhstan is because of the severe underfunding of research activities. Researchers are 
adapting their activities and outputs to meet unrealistic demands from the Ministry of 
Agriculture. Short-termism is undermining the long-term nature of plant protection research 
and practice. The quotation expresses the views and the frustrations of practically all the 
researchers we interviewed, all of whom were nostalgic for the way research activities were 
carried out in the Soviet past.  
The new situation has dramatically changed the farming and agricultural research 
sector, but scientists have difficulties in overcoming nostalgia about the way things used to 
be. They have difficulties in taking the needs of the numerous new farmers into account. 
The following quotations from our interviews suggest that they have not yet recognised the 
need for change:  
 
Farmers must follow our recommendations, if they want to control pests on 
their fields. We cannot immediately tune up to their demands... [Interview 
07/12/2004]  
 
… it is possible to implement research outputs on large farms because they 
have machinery and the necessary equipment… [Interview 14/12/2004] 
 
…small farmers are concerned about 2, 5, 7 hectares of fields. But our 
research recommendations cannot be applied on these small plots… 
[Interview 12/12/2004] 
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Following on from this, Figure 4.1 shows that only 12 recommendations were 
developed in the first ten years after the collapse of the Soviet agricultural research 
establishment. Analysis of their content shows that they are all reprints of Soviet 
recommendations that have been slightly altered. Thus, little or no new research is being 
conducted. At the same time research recommendations are still oriented towards large-
scale, highly-mechanized and knowledge-intensive crop production systems, ignoring the 
heterogeneity of farm types, sizes and farming practices that now exist (Chapter 2, 
Toleubayev 2005).   
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Figure 4.1 Number of recommendations for agricultural producers issued by KRIPP    
in the Soviet and Transition periods. 
Source: Compiled by authors from source material in the KRIPP archives.  
 
Figure 4.1 illustrates the relatively high output of KRIPP researchers during the Soviet time 
and the significant drop in their performance after 1991. This is a combined result of a 
decrease in the number of researchers at KRIPP (Figure 4.2), the collapse of the Soviet 
agricultural research and production systems, a lack of incentives and significant budget 
cuts. Table 4.2 shows the extent to which (state) funding for R&D (in all sectors) has 
declined since 1991.  
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Table 4.2 Gross domestic expenditure on all R&D in Kazakhstan. 
 
Year 1991 1996 1998 1999 2001 2002 
Expenditures for 
R&D from GDP, % 0.80 0.30 0.22 0.18 0.22 0.26 
Source: Adapted from Kembaev and Komlev (2004:134). 
 
The economic crisis in Kazakhstan in the 1990s led to the funding of all science activities 
in Kazakhstan dropping by a factor of four after the collapse of the Soviet Union (Table 
4.2). Since the economy started to pick, from 2000 onwards, there has been some 
improvement in the funding of science (Table 4.2 and Table 4.3).   
 
Table 4.3 Financing of agrarian science from the national budget in Kazakhstan.  
 
Year 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Expenditure on agricultural 
R&D from the national budget, 
million KZT12, 
634 810 853 1,568 2,004 2,123 2,660 
including purchase of research 
equipment - - - 417 850 662 360 
Source: Ministry of Agriculture of the Republic of Kazakhstan.  
 
Table 4.3 shows that funding of agrarian science increased four fold between 2001 and 
2007. This money was divided between 10 agricultural research centres and used to pay 
salaries, taxes, the expenses of research activities, maintain research facilities and 
infrastructure and to catch up with inflation. Official data from the Ministry of Agriculture 
shows that the average monthly salary of an agricultural researcher in 2002 was 12,196 
KZT (about 80 US$) and rose to 34,500 KZT (about 290 US$) in 2007. While this seems a 
considerable increase in percentage terms, living costs (e.g. food, housing and services) 
increased significantly in Kazakhstan during this time. While the average salary of a 
researcher in Kazakhstan is far below that of a researcher in a developed country, their 
living costs are very similar.  
 Researchers express frustration about low wages and working in run-down research 
facilities. In one interview, a 29 year old plant protection researcher at KRIPP revealed the 
real situation on the ground (Field notes, Interview 27/10/2005):  
 
Q: You said that researchers do not make any headway. In what sense? 
A: We are doing, doing, doing, doing something, and even not knowing 
what we are doing, without a clear purpose [upset and frustrated]. We are 
copying reports written in the Soviet past, the research we are doing now 
was really done a long time ago. Every year we are doing and reporting the 
same things, only changing the wording in order to satisfy the authorities in 
the ministries. In fact we only do paper work.  But the core of the problem 
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is the same, we do not discover anything new and we are absorbed by 
routine. What is ‘new’ in our science actually comes from the distant past. 
‘New’ Candidate of Sciences dissertations are defended and claim to have 
scientific novelty, but all these discoveries were made a long time ago [in 
the Soviet past]. We do not have the conditions to discover anything new 
because we do not have the infrastructure or the facilities to do the 
experiments which we would like to do. Our salaries are very low, and so is 
our motivation. We are not supported morally or materially. For example I 
do not even have an ordinary preparation needle or laboratory glassware to 
do simple experiments with. When I arrived from abroad after a 3-month 
research project at a laboratory at a foreign university, I was really 
enthusiastic to continue my experiments. But after a couple of weeks of 
experiencing that we have nothing to conduct experiments, I just dropped 
the idea. You know why young people are leaving science? Because of the 
poor working conditions and the low salaries. What is 20,000 tenge [about 
150 US$] per month for a young researcher with a family? Of course they 
will go to private business where they can earn a lot more. I do not blame 
the young people who leave. I am thinking of leaving the institute myself to 
go to work for the private sector.  
 
This quotation strengthens elements of the earlier quote: underfunding of research 
activities, low salaries, a drop in the quality of research outputs and how researchers are 
driven by bureaucratic requirements. But this is from a young researcher, who never 
worked in Soviet academia who just produces reports to please officials in the ministries as 
there are no opportunities or facilities to develop something new. The enthusiasm of young 
researchers rapidly declines in such situations. The main factor that holds young 
researchers, who have recently defended their dissertations at KRIPP, is a kind of 
obligation: personal ties and gratitude to the director of KRIPP and the supervisors who 
helped them attain their ‘Candidate of Sciences’ (C.Sc.) degrees.13 But this gratitude cannot 
sustain them indefinitely and many leave the institute for higher paid jobs in the private 
sector after a few months or couple of years. The C.Sc. degree considerably enhances their 
employability.     
 The low wages, run-down research facilities and lack of goals in public research 
enterprises makes it difficult to recruit young researchers and the intermediate generation 
researchers are trying to find other jobs. The old generation of scientists continue to work 
after retirement14 with some researchers of 75 years continuing to be involved in research 
activities. The younger generation (between 25 and 50) are readily employed by agri-
business companies, selling pesticides, fertilizers, seeds and farm machinery. The President 
of the Republic of Kazakhstan raised these issues in a recent address to young Kazakhstani 
researchers (April 27, 2007) and outlined plans to increase R&D expenditure to 2% of GDP 
by 2010 and to bring the salaries of Kazakhstani researchers and research facilities up to 
average world standards. Following this address, policymakers responsible for R&D and 
S&T policies have made numerous claims in the media, about how science will again 
become prestigious, scientists will again become highly paid labour, how expenditure on 
science will increase dramatically and how the scientific domain will again become 
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attractive for young people. These future-oriented expressions underline the point that 
underfinanced public science has lost prestige and become unattractive for young 
researchers.  
 
 
4.5  Staffing and research infrastructure    
 
4.5.1  Staffing 
  
The main supplier of young researchers to KRIPP was the Plant Protection Faculty of the 
Kazakh Agricultural Institute in Alma-Ata. Before the collapse of the Soviet agricultural 
research and production system this faculty annually produced up to 75 highly qualified 
graduates in plant protection. They then went on to be employed as either researchers, 
agronomists for crop producing farms or employees with the Plant Protection Service. In 
1996, after the Kazakh Agricultural Institute merged with the Kazakh Veterinary Institute, 
the Kazakh State Agrarian University (later renamed the Kazakh National Agrarian 
University – KazNAU – in 2001) was established, but the Plant Protection Faculty was 
closed. Only a few lecturers were employed to introduce plant protection, involving a few 
hours of teaching, to students of agronomy. The long list of specialized courses in plant 
protection was removed from the curriculum. Later on ‘plant protection’ was removed from 
the Ministry of Education and Science’s list of specialities for higher and vocational 
education. As a result, the number of professionals in plant protection has decreased and the 
expertise is disappearing.             
In the Soviet past, the typical pattern of a scientific career in the agrarian research 
system was graduation from the agricultural educational institution, post-graduate 
(aspirant) study at one of the research institutes, followed by employment in a junior 
position at the same or another institute. However, it was not easy to get employed at the 
research institutes because of a thorough selection process. Scientific careers advanced 
slowly but steadily and it was common for scientists to only have been associated with one 
research organization in their lifetime. Scientists enjoyed higher salaries than people in 
most other occupations and had a high status, which also motivated them.15 
The prestige of being a researcher faded rapidly after the collapse of the Soviet 
scientific establishment. Severe budget cuts and policy reforms forced a reduction of staff 
and the shutting down of complete programmes, departments and entire institutes. Many 
researchers emigrated or left the scientific world in search of better paid jobs in the private 
sector. The number of scientific researchers in Kazakhstan dropped from 31,250 in 1990 to 
9,000 in 2000 (Kembaev and Komlev 2004:137). A similar pattern can be seen in the 
number of research staff employed at KRIPP – see Figure 4.2.      
 97 
 
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
19
58
19
60
19
62
19
64
19
66
19
68
19
70
19
72
19
74
19
76
19
78
19
80
19
82
19
84
19
86
19
88
19
90
19
92
19
94
19
96
19
98
20
00
20
02
20
04
20
06
Year
 
N
u
m
be
r 
o
f t
he
 
re
se
ar
c
h 
st
af
f
 
Figure 4.2 Number of research staff at KRIPP since its foundation in 1958 till 2007.  
Source: Compiled by the authors from archive source material at KRIPP.16  
 
When originally founded KRIPP had just over 30 research personnel, a figure that doubled 
by 1965. From 1966 to 1988, KRIPP had a more or less stable number of researchers, 
fluctuating between 80 and 90. Our interviewees from KRIPP considered this period as one 
of stability, when most of the scientific plant protection knowledge was developed in 
Kazakhstan. The number of research staff dropped significantly during the post-Soviet 
period, from 73 in 1990 to 34 in 1999.  Apart from the reduction in number of the research 
staff, the age of research personnel rose dramatically during this period (Figure 4.3).  
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Figure 4.3 Distribution of age categories of researchers in KRIPP over the period    
1958-2007. 
Source: Compiled by authors from archive source material at KRIPP.   
 
Figure 4.3 illustrates the number of researchers at KRIPP by age category: 20-39, 40-59 
and 60-79. From 1996 onwards, there has been a steady increase in the proportion of 
researchers older than 60. By 2005, 38% of the researchers fell into this age category, 
compared to a maximum of 9% during the Soviet time in 1967. The next age category (40-
59) accounted for the majority of researchers from 1977 until 2002. Its share dropped to an 
all time low of 17% in 2007, the lowest in the history of KRIPP, as many left KRIPP for 
better paid jobs in the private sector. Before 1991, younger researchers in age category 20-
39 gradually aged into the intermediate category. One would expect retired researchers to 
leave their positions and be replaced by the intermediate generation, who would in turn be 
replaced by young generation and so on. However, the post-1991 collapse of the Soviet 
system affected this trend, with many researchers, especially from the intermediate age 
category leaving KRIPP. There were also problems with recruitment of young research 
staff, but the recruitment of young graduates from KazNAU by the fourth director of 
KRIPP played a role in rejuvenating research staff as explained below. 
The major factors determining the composition of the workforce have been funding, 
S&T policies and organizational reforms. However, the managerial and leadership skills of 
directors of KRIPP also have played a role. Throughout its life KRIPP has been managed 
by just four directors: the first from 1958-1976, the second 1976-1980, the third 1980-2000 
and the fourth from 2000 until now. Our interviewees characterised the first director as a 
founder of plant protection research in Kazakhstan, he was a leader in this scientific domain 
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for more than thirty years from 1945 until 1976 and before 1958 was the head of the 
Republican Plant Protection Station. KRIPP prospered under his directorship. The 
interviewees were more balanced in their opinion of the second director, who was neither 
highly praised nor criticized. The third director received much criticism for bad 
management and ill treatment of his subordinates. During his directorship the number of 
researchers declined (Figure 4.2). While the decline after 1991 can be explained by the 
overall economic depression within the country and the severe budget cuts, there was also a 
21% decline in the number of research staff during the first ten years of his directorship, in 
the Soviet period, when the funding of science was not so much an issue. Senior 
researchers, who left KRIPP during his directorship in the 1980s, said that they found his 
jealous and hostile attitude towards them intolerable. They believed that he was insecure 
that he might be replaced by better performing senior researchers, so he strategically 
undermined them or sought to get rid of them.        
The fourth director was characterized as a saviour. He was appointed in 2000 at a 
time when authorities were attempting to close KRIPP. This coincided with a severe locust 
plague that lasted for three years from 1998 to 2001 (Toleubayev et al. 2007) and he argued 
the need for maintaining plant protection capability. KRIPP escaped closure but problems 
of resources persisted, with inadequate staffing levels (Figure 4.2). The new director made 
it a priority to bring back senior researchers, who used to work at KRIPP, although most of 
them were already retired. He also retained intermediate generation researchers, who were 
planning to leave the institute; and recruited young researchers, who were reluctant to work 
at public research institutes. He recognised the importance of maintaining senior and 
intermediate researchers who could pass their expertise and knowledge onto the young 
generation and the importance of attracting a younger generation to rejuvenate the research 
community. The new director personally recruited students from KazNAU at a time when 
other agricultural research institutes had problems with recruiting young graduates.17 He 
was well positioned to do so as used to be the Chairman of the Plant Protection Group at 
KazNAU before he assumed the directorship of KRIPP. He was able to recruit some of his 
former students, provide them with accommodation (an attractive term of employment) and 
create conditions for them to earn additional income (to supplement their low salaries) by 
engaging them in various activities, such as pesticide testing for the private sector. His 
success in bringing retired researchers back to KRIPP was because his relationship with 
these colleagues went back to when he began his scientific career at KRIPP as a research 
assistant in 1968. He became senior researcher in 1976, was head of the Department for the 
Protection of Fruit and Vegetables at KRIPP until 1989, and then went to work at the 
Kazakh Agricultural Institute. The turnaround in KRIPP’s fortunes since 2000 is largely 
due to the specific networking activities of the current director.18 The number of the 
researchers has increased from 36 in 2000 to 57 in 2006, an increase of 37% (Figure 4.2). 
Moreover, KRIPP has attracted new funds for conducting some research activities and to 
purchase new equipment. Thus recent years have been a period of revival for KRIPP, 
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although external factors, such as structural reorganizations led by policymaker in the 
ministries, have limited the extent of this revival.      
The success of the current director in strengthening human resources was later 
overruled by policymakers. In July 2007, JSC KazAgroInnovation, the ‘privatized’ branch 
of the Ministry of Agriculture, ordered all agricultural research institutes to cut staff by 
30% by the end of the year, arguing that the percentage of technical personnel in 
agricultural research institutes was too high (on average 58%).19 They categorized research 
assistants (which made up 31% of the research personnel in KRIPP in 2006) as technical 
personnel.  If they were counted as research personnel, essential to carry out the research, a 
different picture of the ratio between research personnel and technical personnel would 
emerge. Obeying orders, the Director of KRIPP cut research staff by 26%, notwithstanding 
the scarcity of research personnel. This step by JSC KazAgroInnovation appeared to be part 
of a longer term policy, as in August 3, 2007 they presented further plans to the Ministry of 
Agriculture to reduce personnel involved in agricultural research from 3,054 people in 2007 
to 2,000 in 2012 (Ministry of Agriculture 2007).   
This review of the changes in staffing at KRIPP illustrates the discrepancies 
between reforms carried out by policymakers and the realities on the ground, particularly 
the shortage of research staff, the difficulties in recruiting young specialists, in retaining the 
intermediate generation and the ageing profile of the research community. 
 
4.5.2  Research infrastructure   
 
In Soviet times agricultural research institutes were designed as academic villages with a 
full research infrastructure - laboratories, greenhouses, a machinery park and experimental 
fields; as well as a complete social infrastructure - kindergarten, school, central-heating, 
housing, post-office, clinic, etc. - all serving the employees of the institute and their family 
members. This was similar to the production and social infrastructures of the Soviet 
farming system (Chapter 2). The Kazakh Research Institute for Plant Protection had all 
these facilities by the end of 1960s except for the school (as there were schools in nearby 
villages and Alma-Ata city). Most adult family members were employed in the institute as 
researchers, research assistants, or maintaining the research and social infrastructure of the 
academic village. The work-force included plumbers, electricians, heating-system 
technicians, drivers, carpenters and field workers. These workers and the kindergarten 
personnel were paid from the institute’s budget and were part of the general staff. For 
example, in 1983 the general staff list of KRIPP consisted of a total of 258 employees: 82 
researchers, 62 research assistants, 28 ‘other’ personnel (accountants, secretaries, librarians, 
guards and cleaners), 64 workers and 22 kindergarten personnel. Housing was provided for 
every employee of KRIPP. The compound of the academic village had ten duplex cottages, 
147 apartments and a dormitory. Housing opportunity was one of the strong attractions of 
employment with KRIPP and kept staff attached to the institute for long periods. When 
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leaving the institute for another job employees had to give up their housing. This may 
partly explain the very low staff turnover at KRIPP during the Soviet era.    
 With the collapse of the Soviet scientific establishment and introduction of 
neoliberal reforms, drastic changes were made in the ownership of these infrastructures. 
The housing facilities and kindergarten were privatized and the institute lost control over 
them. KRIPP lost its experimental fields and the orchards located next to the main building, 
which the state sold to private developers to build houses to meet the expansion of Almaty 
city. The research infrastructure itself rapidly deteriorated because of budget cuts.  
The budget available after 1991 barely covered salaries and tax payments, even 
though the run-down and outdated research facilities required significant investments. It 
was not until 2004, that the Kazakhstani government made any allocation to the agricultural 
research institutes to purchase research equipment (417 million Kazakhstan tenge - about 3 
million US$, see Table 4.3).  Previously KRIPP’s laboratories had been furnished with state 
of the art equipment.20 For example, in 1971 a brand new (made in the USSR) electron 
microscope was installed in KRIPP that was used for many years. In comparison, during 
the 1990s the simplest equipment, e.g. laboratory glassware, could not be acquired, due to 
lack of funds. Today, KRIPP has no advanced research equipment to do scientific research. 
Researchers are still using the equipment supplied decades ago during the Soviet era (see 
Appendix 4.1 for illustrative photographs). The current level of financing (see Table 4.3) is 
insufficient to bring agricultural research to the average world level or increase its 
international profile. For example, in the Netherlands, a country with more or less the same 
population as Kazakhstan, the Ministry of Agriculture, Nature Management and Food 
Quality annually allocates more than €850 million to knowledge and innovation 
programmes (Poppe 2008:15) compared to €8 million in Kazakhstan (Table 4.3).    
 These issues have seriously setback agrarian science in Kazakhstan, which has 
declined in both quality and quantity. Neither the strategies of ‘preservation’ or ‘facilitating 
adaptation’ managed to sustain agrarian science in Kazakhstan. It now has to be seen how 
the recently introduced ‘technology import’ path will unfold and whether it will strengthen 
agricultural research. The current reality is that agrarian science in Kazakhstan has still not 
recovered from the post-1991 crisis.    
 
 
4.6  Plant protection research and the pesticide industry 
 
To survive the shrinking public R&D budget that ensued from the post-1991 economic 
crisis, KRIPP developed a partnership with the pesticide industry (see Chapter 3), with 
pesticide testing providing an additional source of income for low paid researchers. 
Pesticide companies were obliged to test their products in local field conditions in 
Kazakhstan as a prerequisite for registering them in the state pesticide register, so they 
contracted the public agricultural research institutes to do this for them. The Ministry of 
Agriculture sets an annual plan for pesticide registration tests, which must be done by 
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accredited public research institutes. Ties between managers of the research institutes and 
decision-makers in the Ministry and the pesticide industry influence who will be 
commissioned to conduct the tests. We attempted to raise the issue of the pesticide testing 
process with our interviewees but they often were reluctant to talk about it. Content 
analysis of the reports of these trials revealed only positive results and that the pesticides 
tested are always recommended for registration.  
This process expedited the shift from an IPM research agenda to a pesticide focused 
research agenda.  In the Soviet past, KRIPP did no research for the pesticide registration 
process and the pesticide industry had no influence over the setting of research priorities. 
The current research programmes still accept pest-control options without pesticides, but 
testing and recommending pesticides have become the core element. A content analysis of 
the post-1991 plant protection publications reveals that pesticides from particular 
companies are openly promoted by researchers from KRIPP.21 An example is an article 
which bears the name of the company in the title: ‘The efficacy of fungicides of Syngenta 
against diseases of cereals’ published in the journal Plant Protection and Quarantine in 
Kazakhstan (Koishybayev et al. 2004). This article confirms the efficacy of several of 
Syngenta’s fungicides against cereal diseases. Pesticide companies regularly announce calls 
activities that will promote their products. For instance, in 2006, Syngenta announced a 
contest for researchers under the theme ‘Crop production technologies in Kazakhstan that 
make use of Syngenta’s pesticides’. The first three prizes were a laptop, a digital camera 
and a cellular phone. In 2007, Syngenta invited young researchers and students to submit 
research results on their products with prize money of 60,000 KZT (about 520 US$) for the 
best publication from a young researcher and 30,000 KZT (about 260 US$) from an 
undergraduate student (Syngenta Kazakhstan 2007:11). 
These new funding arrangements represent a key survival strategy for the research 
community. They have kept the agricultural research institutes alive, but brought to an end 
the long-term development of ecologically sound plant protection policies, practices and 
research. Short-termism and commercialization have become the dominant drivers of 
today’s agrarian research agenda.  
 
 
4.7  Conclusions   
 
This chapter has examined the shift in plant protection research agenda in the Soviet and 
post-Soviet periods in Kazakhstan. Throughout the Soviet era, even in the middle of the 
difficult period of the 1930s, plant protection research served national interests. This 
research domain aimed to secure crop production against harmful agricultural pests, e.g. 
locusts (Toleubayev et al. 2007) and to develop the integrated pest management schemes 
minimizing pesticide use (Chapter 3). These characteristics of plant protection research 
faded away after 1991. 
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The shifts in research in Kazakhstan fit into the typology of strategies by Radosevic 
(2003): after a period of initial preservation the research organizations were restructured 
and developed a set of micro-strategies to survive. Our analysis shows that the restructuring 
of the agricultural R&D system did not lead to a dynamic system adapted to the new 
economic realities in the farming sector. What remained of the plant protection research 
infrastructure acted more as a buffer against any further erosion (cf. Radosevic 2003) 
exemplified through the adoption of a set of micro-strategies, specifically pesticide testing 
and promotion, as a way to cope with the shrinking research budget. The diminished and 
ageing research community has become pessimistic and sceptical about the top-down 
reforms from the government. Recent plans to increase R&D funding have not yet been 
translated into substantial increases of salaries or improvement of research facilities. 
Policymakers have turned agricultural research institutes, including the Kazakh Research 
Institute for Plant Protection, into research enterprises, which have to commercialize their 
research outputs, market them to end-users and become self-supporting in future. JSC 
KazAgroInnovation supports the importation of foreign agricultural technologies rather 
than strengthening and developing local knowledge.  
Radosevic (2003) looked principally at the national level restructuring of R&D in 
Russia. We have examined a less studied region – Kazakhstan, and a less discussed sector – 
plant protection research. This has allowed us to make a more detailed analysis of the 
impact of restructuring and the emergence of a set of micro-strategies on the research 
agenda and the content of scientific work. The analysis shows that the commodification 
process and the ‘import of technology’ principle all too readily dovetail with a pest-control 
strategy based on using imported pesticides. These changes are incompatible, in their 
current form, with pest control based on IPM schemes or biological control agents, which 
require continuous examination of and adaptation to the specificities and complexities of 
local agro-ecosystems. Many elements of plant protection research before 1991 
corresponded to the public good character of sustainable pest control. In post-1991 
Kazakhstan, research in developing ecologically sound pest-control approaches is not 
recognized as a public good by policymakers. The risk is that further neglect will jeopardise 
the development and promotion of long-term, environmentally safe and ecologically 
balanced pest-control measures, thus threatening national food and health security. 
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4.8  Notes 
 
                                                 
1
 This city has had its name changed on several occasions: Verny (1854-1921), Alma-Ata (1921-
1993) and Almaty (1993-now). 
 
2
 Biocenosis (pl. biocenoses) – is a group of interacting organisms that live in a particular habitat 
and form an ecological community. 
 
3
 Chernozem [in Russian] – is a black-coloured fertile soil containing a very high percentage of 
humus. 
 
4
 Zimin (1935:69) wrote: ‘Until now we have not seen any published results about the efficacy of 
chemical dusting against the European Corn Borer’.  
 
5
 Lysenko was the head of VASKhNIL between 1938 and 1956 and again between 1961and 1962.   
 
6
 KRIAF is located in the Almaty region, in the southeast of Kazakhstan 
 
7
 The importation of technologies was pioneered by private businesses in post-Soviet Kazakhstan 
between 1991 and 2007 and the private farming sector has become largely reliant on imported 
foreign agricultural technologies (seeds, fertilisers, pesticides, farm machinery, etc.). 
 
8
 These plans are unlikely to be implemented as no budgets have been secured and there is no sign 
yet of any construction taking place.  
 
9
 Glenn E. Schweitzer is the Chairman of the International Experts Council on Science and 
Technology established by the government of Kazakhstan in 2007. 
 
10
 He is still working as a consultant for the pesticide retailing firm to earn some money to top up 
his low pension payment. 
 
11
 During the fieldwork for this study we communicated with 47 (former and current) agricultural 
researchers (casual conversations, joint field visits, short interviews and so on) to obtain information 
about the historical changes in agrarian science in Kazakhstan. We conducted longer semi-
structured interviews (with open-ended questions) with 21 of them. These interviewees were 
transcribed and analysed with computer software for qualitative analysis Atlas.ti 5.0. Material out 
this analysis is available from the first author. 
 
12
 Average ratio of KZT to US$ in 2001-2007 was 140 KZT / 1 US$ (min 124 KZT / 1 US$ in 2007 
and max 153 KZT / 1 US$ in 2002) http://www.oanda.com/convert/classic  
 
13
 ‘Candidate of Sciences’ – scientific degree in the former USSR, which is still in use in Russia and 
Kazakhstan and can be placed between M.Sc. and Ph.D. of western academia. Some equate this 
degree to western Ph.D., but after pursuing Candidate of Sciences degree one need another 4-5 or 
more years to pursue ‘Doctor of Sciences’ degree that equal to Ph.D. degree of western academia.           
 
14
 Retirement age for women is 58 and for men 63. Retired researchers willingly participate in 
research activities, as this supplements their meagre pensions.  
 
15
 In the past, researchers were perceived as educated and noble people, doing something 
outstanding for the benefit of the society. When an agricultural researcher visited a Soviet farm 
she/he was welcomed with respect by the farm community.  
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16
 Sorting out the staff statistics from KRIPP archive was a painstaking and long process which took 
about two months. It involved reviewing piles of documents and sorting out inconsistencies in the 
records and crosschecking them on many occasions.  
 
17
 Managers of the Research Institute for Arable Farming and the Research Institute Vegetable and 
Potato Farming revealed in that they faced serious problems in recruiting young graduates. 
 
18
 Apart from networking within the research community (including his contacts with research 
organisations in Russia, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan), this director also has ties with the Ministries 
of Agriculture and of Education and Science of Kazakhstan.   
 
19
 Policy makers were not very careful in their analysis of staff statistics. From the total staff of the 
research institutes (including: researchers, research assistants, drivers, field workers, cleaners, 
plumbers, guards, accountants, secretaries, etc.), they subtracted the number of researchers and the 
others were defined as ‘technical personnel’, including research assistants, which gave the figure of 
58%. But a research assistant is a subject-matter specialist with higher education, who assists 
researchers in their experiments and therefore should be categorized under research personnel.     
 
20
  We photographed the manufacturers’ labels on the research equipment made in 1960s, 1970s and 
1980s as material evidence to support our arguments about the Soviet research establishment. 
 
21
 We analysed content of the post-1991 plant protection publications that were produced by 
researchers from KRIPP and published in various magazines and newspapers, scientific journals, 
internal reports and dissertations.   
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5.1  Introduction  
 
In July 1999, migrating swarms of the Italian Locust (Calliptamus italicus L.) invaded 
Astana, the newly established capital of Kazakhstan. Billions of locusts swarmed along the 
streets of the capital, terrifying citizens and causing traffic accidents. They roosted on the 
brand new governmental buildings and entered the offices of high-ranking officials. 
Locusts also invaded agricultural fields, devastating crops and pastures. The plague that 
occurred between 1998 and 2001 was probably the worst one experienced in Kazakhstan in 
the 20th century and had serious economic and political consequences. As the country did 
not experience such plagues during the Soviet period, it makes sense to ask whether there is 
any relationship between locust plagues and state organization. This paper examines 
whether changes in the locust control system, resulting from the collapse of the Soviet 
Union and the subsequent Transition Period, contributed directly to this locust plague. The 
history of the changes in the locust control system provides grounds for advancing the 
theory of collective action in natural resource management. The paper illustrates the 
importance of the recent discussion about institutional arrangements in collective action 
theory (Acheson 2006). The results of our analysis suggest that local-level participatory 
management and market-driven approaches are both inadequate in solving locust problem. 
In addressing these issues, this paper first examines the impact of land use changes, 
and changes in habitat, on locust populations. It then describes knowledge acquisition 
during the Soviet period and the loss of this knowledge in the Transition Period. The next 
section portrays how the intensive knowledge system in the Soviet era was coupled to an 
extensive monitoring and control system. The Transition Period that followed the collapse 
of the Soviet Union led to an almost complete disintegration of this system. The locust 
plague that gradually built up in the late 1990s illustrates how these institutional changes 
were related to the development of locust populations. When the locusts flew into the 
government offices, high-level policymakers realized the consequences of the almost total 
dismantling of the plant protection service and started to reconsider public intervention in 
locust control. The last part of the paper discusses the public good character of locust 
control and the optimal modes of collective action. 
 
 
5.2  Methodology, definitions and theoretical framework  
 
Data were obtained through semi-structured interviews with people involved in locust 
research and control activities, viz.: plant protection practitioners, researchers, ex-
researchers, research managers, agricultural producers, and policy makers. We collected not 
only hard data on population dynamics and the technical characteristics of control of 
locusts, but also data on the background knowledge of actors involved in locust 
management and their specific interpretations of the nature and cause of pest problems and 
the adequacy of specific solutions (Jansen 2008). We also conducted participant 
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observation of meetings involving policy makers, practitioners, and researchers, and we 
participated in several locust monitoring activities. Literature, documents, scientific reports, 
and press coverage on locust events were reviewed and the data from these different 
sources were cross-checked.  
Locusts and grasshoppers belong to the order of Orthoptera and are members of the 
family Acrididae. Locusts differ from grasshoppers in that they have the ability to change 
their behaviour and physiology in response to changes in population density (FAO 2001). 
Locust populations have two distinct phases: the solitarious phase when population density 
is low; and the gregarious phase when population density is high (Uvarov 1966). Adult 
locusts can form swarms, which may contain thousands of millions of individuals and 
behave as one unit. Locusts in the non-flying nymphal stage are called hoppers, when 
gregarious they form cohesive marching bands (FAO 2001).  
The following definitions, modified from FAO (2001), are used to distinguish the 
different states of locust populations:  
• Outbreak is characterized by an increase in locust numbers through concentration, 
multiplication and gregarisation, which can lead to the formation of hopper bands and 
swarms. 
• Plague is a period of one or more years of widespread and heavy infestation by 
hopper bands and adult swarms.  
• Decline is characterized by the dissociation of swarming populations because of 
natural factors and human intervention.  
• Recession is a period when locusts are normally present at low densities in 
restricted areas and do not cause noticeable crop damage.  
The plague of 1998–2001 in Kazakhstan was caused by locusts and grasshoppers. 
The most destructive of these were the Italian Locust (Calliptamus italicus L.) and the 
Asiatic Migratory Locust (Locusta migratoria migratoria L.). These two species provide 
exemplary cases for examining the co-production of political order and the development of 
scientific knowledge, decision making and technologies dealing with locust control 
(Jasanoff 2004). The analysis of co-production in this paper uses two concepts borrowed 
from social theory: public good and collective action.  
This study explores the extent to which locust control is a public good that requires 
collective action. Perrings et al. (2002) point out that the control of invasive alien species is 
a public good when the benefits from the control are neither rival nor exclusive. If one 
person benefits from such a public good, this does not affect its cost, nor does this reduce 
the benefits to others (Ostrom 1990). If left to the market, the control would be 
undersupplied (Perrings et al. 2002). The supply of public goods requires collective action; 
or in the words of Olson (1992:Foreword), who challenges Adam Smith’s notion of the 
market as an ‘invisible hand’: ‘...only a guiding hand or appropriate institution can bring 
about outcomes that are collectively efficient’.  
If locust control should be considered as a public good, as we argue below, then the 
subsequent question is how it can most effectively be provided through collective action. 
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There are many documented forms of collective action in the fields of agriculture, 
environment and development (e.g. Agrawal 2003). One important theoretical concern is 
the lack of agreement about how to distinguish different forms of collective action (Poteete 
and Ostrom 2004). Much of the current discussion on collective action pays relatively little 
attention to state-centred development of public goods, but primarily deals with concerted 
efforts by individuals or groups (Justino 2006). Major contemporary issues in this field 
include the management of common-pool resources, recently discussed in relation to 
processes of decentralization of central state control over natural resources (Acheson 2006, 
Agrawal and Ostrom 2001) and the large-scale political activism of social movements 
(Edelman 2001).  
Since 1990, the concept of collective action has played a role in the development of 
participatory approaches to integrated pest management in order to improve local-level 
management and learning processes, often through farmer field schools (Norton et al. 1999, 
Van den Berg 2004, Van den Berg and Jiggins 2007, Van Huis and Meerman 1997). This 
approach has proved to be very successful in fostering resilience management (Walker et 
al. 2002) by farmers, who by learning through discovery come to understand better the 
agro-ecological relationships in their fields. The farmer field school approach transforms 
farmers from passive recipients of crop protection instructions to active, self-reliant 
practitioners of integrated pest management. Major successes have been obtained in 
protecting high value crops with a history of resurgence and secondary pest outbreaks 
(Morse and Buhler 1997). 
Farmers have also attempted to combat locusts to protect crops. However, when 
locusts arrive en masse in agricultural fields they have already reached plague proportions 
and it is beyond the capacity of individual farmers to deal with them. Then farmers resort to 
prayer or turn to politicians for solutions (Lockwood 2004). Locusts from plagues originate 
from outbreak areas that are natural habitats in which they multiply and gregarise. When 
fully gregarious, they are capable of migrating in swarms to agricultural areas, where they 
can inflict considerable damage (Van Huis 2007). A preventive control strategy aims to 
control locusts in the restricted, often remote, and not properly monitored outbreak areas 
(Van Huis et al. 2007). Yet monitoring and controlling locusts in these areas is clearly 
beyond the capacity of individual farmers.  
Collective action theory provides a framework to rethink the institutional successes 
or failures of market-driven, private-property regimes, government-controlled resources 
and interventions, and local-level management (Acheson 2006). This study of the 
transformations in Kazakhstan and the impact on locust and locust control illustrates the 
need for collective action theory to go beyond its current focus on decentralization and 
illustrates the need to rethink the role of governments in the delivery of public goods. 
Scott’s review of the literature on Soviet collectivized agriculture pictures it as an 
‘authoritarian’ and ‘high-modernist’ system that failed in all its aims and incurred massive 
costs through stagnation, waste, demoralization and ecological disasters (Scott 1998:201). 
The Soviet system embraced the Baconian ideal of ‘technoscience’ (Busch 2000:34), in 
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which humans are subservient to the findings of science and the innovations of technical 
engineers. This body of literature equates the centralist, authoritarian political order with a 
technoscience that functions to control the citizenry, but is unable to deal with ecology or 
the heterogeneity of environments. This paper does not disagree with the broad thrust of 
this analysis, but identifies that it has one shortcoming: that the scientific and technological 
past was not as homogeneous as portrayed. Our study reveals that a very complex and 
dynamic system of locust management was developed during the Soviet era. By 
understanding the interactions between a political order, scientific knowledge and 
technological practice we intend to contribute to a rethinking of the potential forms of 
collective action in providing public goods, such as locust control. To this end, and to 
identify the critical changes that occurred over time, this study examines how land use 
practices influenced locust habitats and population dynamics, how knowledge about locusts 
developed and how locust control was practiced. 
 
 
5.3  Land use, habitats and locust populations  
 
The effect of the anthropogenic factors, particularly of agricultural practices, on the 
population dynamics of locusts has been widely acknowledged (Chetyrkina 1958, Farrow 
1987, Kopaneva 1987, Popov 1987, Uvarov 1962).  
 
5.3.1  Land use and the Italian Locust  
 
Chetyrkina (1958) carried out comparative quantitative surveys of populations of the Italian 
Locust in many habitat types in areas subject to mass outbreaks in eastern Kazakhstan. 
Although these surveys were conducted in the recession years of locust population they 
revealed striking differences in densities, which are related to land use (Table 5.1).  
 
Table 5.1 Mean adult densities of non-swarming populations of C. italicus in different 
habitat types in eastern Kazakhstan. 
 
Type of habitat Number/m2 
1. Virgin land; dense short grass (Festuca sulcata) 3.5 
2. Patches of Artemisia maritima surrounded by short grass 7.6 
3. Current year’s cultivation, e.g., wheat, etc.     0 
4. Early fallow, with some grass, sparse Artemisia and other herbs; bare patches    20 
5. Older fallow, with tall weeds including Artemisia     26 
6. Very old fallow, with dense grass turf (Festuca sulcata) 0.25 
7. Overgrazed communal pasture, with Festuca, Artemisia, Polygonum aviculare, Alyssum, etc.   20 
Source: adapted from Uvarov (1977). 
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The Italian Locust occurs in low densities in undisturbed habitats and disappears 
completely when the land is ploughed up (Table 5.1: 1, 2 and 3). It occurs in high densities 
when land has been left fallow for four to five years and is invaded by Artemisia, (Table 
5.1: 4 and 5). In the later stages of plant succession, when weeds are gradually replaced by 
secondary grass, densities of locusts are very low (Table 5.1: 6). On overgrazed and 
trampled communal pastures with weeds and much bare ground, the locusts are as 
numerous as they are on fallows (Table 5.1: 7). Thus, human patterns of land use, which 
affect soil structure and plant succession, affect the development of Italian Locust 
populations (Uvarov 1977). 
 
5.3.2  Habitat reconstruction and the Asiatic Migratory Locust  
 
The breeding habitats of the Asiatic Migratory Locust in Kazakhstan are linked to natural 
thickets of reed (Phragmites australis) along sea, lake and river basins (Antonov and 
Kambulin 1997, Sivanpillai et al. 2006), which provide a source of food. Such habitats 
cover an area of about 1,120,000 ha in the country (Tsyplenkov 1970). In plague years, 
swarms migrate an average of 500 km from these breeding habitats, destroying almost all 
the vegetation on the way. As such this species is one of the most harmful agricultural 
pests.   
Natural periodic fluctuations of the water level in lake and river basins influence 
locust population dynamics: when the water level decreases the area for locust breeding 
increases, and vice versa. The mass construction of dams, irrigation channels and artificial 
reservoirs in the 1960–1970s, reduced the water level in the lake and river basins, favouring 
the intensive growth of reed beds and increasing the locust breeding area. For example, 
after the construction of Kapchagai reservoir halfway along the River Ili in 1971, the water 
inflow into Balkhash Lake diminished, and the water level gradually diminished (Kambulin 
1992, Popov 1987), enlarging the locust breeding habitats. At the same time, reclamation of 
lands for rice and cotton production along river basins (e.g., in the lowlands of the Syr-
Darya and the Amu-Darya Rivers) reduced the natural growth of the reed beds and created 
unfavourable conditions for locust breeding (Popov 1987). As soon as significant parts of 
these cultivated lands (including the irrigation infrastructure) were abandoned in the 1990s 
these areas became mass locust breeding habitats, and most likely contributed to the locust 
plague of 1998-2001.  
 
5.3.3  Impact of land use practices on locust population dynamics  
 
The 1998–2001 locust plague in Kazakhstan mostly involved the Italian Locust. A 
historical perspective can help explain why the plague developed. Locust problems started 
in the second half of 19th century onwards when large numbers of Russian settlers began to 
colonize and cultivate the territory of present-day Kazakhstan. From then on the cultivation 
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of virgin lands, i.e., lands that had never been used for crop production, continued under the 
Tsarist regime, after the Bolshevik revolution, during Stalin’s collectivization period and 
during World War II. By the end of 1940s the total area of reclaimed virgin and idle lands 
amounted to about 7,000,000 ha (Gossen 1998).   
In 1953, the Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev initiated the ambitious Tselina/Virgin 
Land programme to turn the traditional pasturelands of Kazakhstan into a major grain-
producing region for the Soviet Union. From 1954 to 1964 about 25,000,000 ha of virgin 
and idle lands were ploughed for wheat production in Kazakhstan. Such extensive changes 
considerably reduced the natural habitats of the Italian Locust. As illustrated in Figure 5.1, 
the implementation of the Virgin Land programme between 1956 and 1965 made these 
cultivated lands unsuitable for the Italian Locust. From 1965 onwards, long fallow-wheat 
rotation systems became prevalent in Kazakhstan, and the large areas under fallow became 
important breeding grounds for the Italian Locust, which repeatedly invaded crop fields. 
This suggests that the recurrent pattern of serious infestations every four or five years might 
be connected with the periods when the fallow fields reached the succession stage (Table 
5.1), which is the most favourable for the insect. Moreover, a reduction of pasturelands 
(now cultivated) increased the number of livestock per unit area, leading to overgrazing and 
land degradation. This created favourable conditions for an increase in the population of the 
Italian Locust (Table 5.1). The relation between plant type cover and occurrence of the 
Italian Locust is not only based on food preferences, but also on the physical properties of 
the soil (Chetyrkina 1958). They prefer moderately compact soils for egg laying, very 
compact (virgin) and very loose (recently broken) soils are less favourable for this. Thus the 
soil structure and vegetation of fallow lands in long fallow-wheat rotation systems 
presumably contributed to an earlier Italian Locust plague in 1970–1971 (Figure 5.1).  
Ploughing up virgin and idle lands led to another agro-ecological problem, that of 
wind erosion. To deal with this problem anti-erosion cultivation systems were implemented 
in the beginning of 1970s, which involved disturbing the soil as little as possible and by 
sowing crops in strips. These new systems of soil cultivation seem to have increased the 
size of the habitats favorable for breeding of the Italian Locust, particularly since these 
areas were located next to the species’ natural breeding habitats. This is likely to have 
contributed to the 1978–1982 plague (Figure 5.1).  
After the break up of the USSR in 1991, vast areas of cultivated land were 
abandoned. Areas under cereals in Kazakhstan decreased from about 25,000,000 to 
12,000,000 ha between 1992 and 1995 (Azhbenov 2000). These idle lands became a perfect 
habitat for the Italian Locust after 4–5 years of vegetation succession (Table 5.1), and may 
have caused a population increase that started in 1996, and led to the plague of 1998–2001.  
Popov (1987) argues that in general, the population dynamics of swarming locusts, 
particularly the Italian Locust and the Asiatic Migratory Locust, depend on periodic 
climatic fluctuations, and that the outbreak periods of both species coincide (Figure 5.1). 
He also indicates that the scale of outbreaks depends on agricultural practices. His study of 
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locust population dynamics in the USSR since 1925 reveals a pattern of a periodic increases 
and decreases in locust numbers. 
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Figure 5.1 Area (%) occupied by the Asiatic Migratory Locust and the Italian Locust, 
and area treated (ha) against all species of locusts in the USSR in 1956-
1985. 
Source: Popov (1987) and Latchininsky et al. (2002). 
 
Figure 5.1 shows that the infested area expanded over the years despite the locust 
campaigns, which only led to a temporary reduction in locust populations. This illustrates 
the influence of ecological and climatic factors, and agricultural practices on population 
fluctuations, but this does not imply that control is useless as it may be effective in 
protecting standing crops. 
 
 
5.4  Locust knowledge and expertise  
 
5.4.1  Knowledge formation  
 
The branch of entomology studying grasshoppers and locusts is called Acridology. Its 
founder was Boris Uvarov (1888–1970), a scientist of Russian origin. After his graduation 
from Saint-Petersburg University in 1910 he worked as the senior entomologist for the 
Trans-Caucasian region and southeast Russia, where he set up one of the first 
entomological bureaus in Russia. In 1920, he emigrated to England and became a senior 
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researcher at The Imperial Bureau of Entomology in London. But his interest in Orthoptera 
fauna of the Soviet Union did not vanish. He continued to keep in touch with colleagues 
from Russia, and published a number of books in the Russian language Locusts and 
Grasshoppers (Moscow 1925), Locusts of the European part of the USSR (Moscow 1925), 
and Locusts of Middle Asia (Tashkent 1927). Uvarov also became involved in research on 
the Desert Locust (Schistocerca gregaria Forsk.) after its plagues in 1929 in Africa and 
southwest Asia. In 1945, he established the Anti-Locust Research Centre in London, and 
managed it for 14 years until his retirement, during which time it developed an international 
reputation. His book Grasshoppers and Locusts: A handbook of general Acridology 
(Volume I 1966, Volume II 1977) became a standard reference book for acridologists 
worldwide. This book includes details about locust and grasshopper species in the Soviet 
Union and particularly Kazakhstan. 
 
5.4.2  Knowledge acquisition during the Soviet period  
 
During the Soviet period the biology, taxonomy, ecology and population dynamics of the 
locust and grasshopper species were the focus of study by many scientists. One 
comprehensive study on the Italian Locust coupled with control campaigns was carried out 
between 1945–1957 in central Kazakhstan by a large team of Soviet researchers and 
practitioners (Vasil’ev 1962). It monitored population recessions and outbreaks of the 
Italian Locust over a territory larger in size than Italy and England put together. The study 
identified the permanent breeding sites of this locust species, thereby contributing to future 
preventive control strategies.  
In 1981, the All-Union Institute for Plant Protection (VIZR) initiated a research 
programme to develop a complex of effective and environmentally benign methods for 
locust control aiming at preventing mass breeding. The programme was based on research 
results obtained by VIZR entomologists, who had spent many years studying the locust 
species in the Soviet Union, and particularly Kazakhstan. Researchers recognized the 
drastic changes in the breeding habitats of the Asiatic Migratory Locust and the Italian 
Locust in Kazakhstan and concluded that this would lead to these locust species growing in 
significance as agricultural pests. The results of this research programme were published in 
the book Locusts: ecology and control methods (Shumakov 1987), which turned out to be 
the last comprehensive publication on locusts and grasshoppers in Soviet history. 
 
5.4.3 Knowledge loss after the collapse of the USSR  
 
In the wake of the collapse of the USSR, the plant protection system in Kazakhstan lost 
much of the knowledge and experience that had been acquired over many years, including 
that about locusts. There was little intergenerational conveyance of knowledge, because the 
older generation of researchers and practitioners retired or passed away, the majority of the 
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mid-generation researchers and practitioners went into the private sector or emigrated, and 
only a few young people were recruited for public service.  
In 1996, the Plant Protection Faculty at the Kazakh State Agrarian University was 
shut down and the intake of students specialized in plant protection was completely 
stopped. Previously the faculty annually produced 50–75 graduates specialized in plant 
protection. As a result the research and applied part of the plant protection domain was left 
without new recruits and continues to suffering from an alarming scarcity of staff.   
The very few locust research projects that were carried out in Kazakhstan after the 
collapse of the Soviet Union were mainly based on the knowledge accumulated in earlier 
publications by Soviet authors. With the collapse of the Soviet Union’s academic networks, 
access to these publications became difficult, for instance, much of the locust literature is 
only available in libraries in Moscow or Saint-Petersburg. Academic libraries in 
Kazakhstan have not been acquiring new stock or modernizing, and possess only a limited 
amount of literature on locusts.  
Modern locust information gathering, monitoring and forecasting technologies are 
all knowledge intensive, which require trained researchers and practitioners, who are 
currently not readily available in Kazakhstan. Although today there is ready access to 
international knowledge via the Internet, there is a significant language barrier, as very few 
researchers master languages other than Kazakh or Russian. Moreover, the differences in 
climatic and ecological conditions and locust species mean that the international knowledge 
is not always applicable to Kazakhstan. 
It is generally assumed that knowledge increases over time, but as this study shows 
the production of knowledge in Kazakhstan was severely affected by the collapse of the 
Soviet system. In the past the science was well developed, and theory and practice were 
both applied in controlling locust populations, as elaborated in the next section. 
 
 
5.5  State-planned science-based locust management systems  
 
Locust plagues were one of the triggers for the Tsarist Government to set up plant 
protection units in Central Asia at the end of the 19th century. The first Entomological 
Station in Central Asia was founded in 1911 in Tashkent. After the Bolshevik revolution in 
1917, massive outbreaks of locusts and other agricultural pests in Kazakhstan and other 
Soviet republics, led the Plant Protection Services to function as entomological units and 
plant protection bureaus, to secure food provision for the newly established Soviet State. 
Thus controlling locusts was recognized as a public good since the early days of the Soviet 
State. In the 1920s teams of Soviet researchers organized scientific expeditions to locust 
affected areas in Kazakhstan. They observed that outbreaks of the Asiatic Migratory Locust 
and the Italian Locust, tended to originate from relatively restricted areas with peculiar 
ecological conditions. This suggested that future plagues might be prevented by closely 
monitoring these outbreak areas. This would allow swarms to be identified while they were 
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forming, and for them to be destroyed before they migrated to agricultural areas. Thus, 
from 1934 onwards, special technical organizations known as Anti-Locust Centres were 
established at Balkhash, Alakol, Syr-Darya and West Kazakhstan, all locust breeding sites. 
These Anti-Locust Centres were called ‘Expeditions’ (Tsyplenkov 1970:5), as in early days 
scientists were expedited to suspect areas. By 1950 there were nine such Centres in 
Kazakhstan (Figure 5.2): Gur’ev (1), West-Kazakhstan (2), Kostanay (3), Central 
Kazakhstan (4), Karatal–Alakol (5), Balkhash–Ili (6), Zhambul (7), South-Kazakhstan (8) 
and Kzyl–Orda (9).  
 
 
 
Figure 5.2 Anti-Locust Centres in Kazakhstan existing in 1950. 
Source: Compiled and drawn by authors from archival sources.  
 
From 1960 onwards, the dynamics of locust populations were investigated by the Anti-
Locust Centres, the Research Institute for Plant Protection, the Monitoring and Forecasting 
Service, and the regional Plant Protection Stations, all working together in a unified plant 
protection system. Scientists and practitioners worked in close collaboration on the anti-
locust campaigns; researchers’ expertise in biology, ecology and population dynamics of 
locust was combined with that of practitioners about local conditions, contributing to the 
success of anti-locust campaigns. The Monitoring and Forecasting Service worked in 
cooperation with the Research Institute for Plant Protection. Locust control operations in 
breeding areas were based on data from the annual monitoring and forecasting. Data on 
locust occurrence in remote areas were obtained from local herders and agro-technicians, 
trained in monitoring locusts. They informed the district plant protection stations. As one 
locust researcher said in an interview: ‘...in the past, information on locust presence was 
collected literally from everywhere’. This implies that information could be cross checked 
to make an evidence-based assessment of the locust situation for forecasting purposes.  
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The anti-locust teams consisted of permanent, regularly trained and skilled staff. 
During anti-locust campaigns they had spraying equipment, insecticides, machinery and 
aircraft at their disposal. Aerial pesticide application was first developed in the USSR in the 
1920s and was applied in combating locusts (Pukhov 1931, Tsyplenkov 1970). In Soviet 
times, aircraft were available within 24 hours to any hot spot in any former republic of the 
Soviet Union during anti-locust campaigns.   
In the 70 years of Soviet history the state provided a collective response to locust 
problems, which according to available data seems to have been successful. The collapse of 
the Soviet Union led to disintegration and abandonment of the locust control system, as 
illustrated below. 
 
 
5.6  Transition period  
 
A set of articles by influential practitioners and researchers in the domain of plant 
protection (Kambulin 1997, Khasenov 1999, Migmanov 1997, Sagitov 1997, Temirgaliev 
1999, Temreshev 1997, Uakhitov 1999) identified the difficulties faced by the Kazakhstan 
Plant Protection Service in the 1990s, including the problem with locusts. Despite these 
expert views, the national agricultural development policy did not give sufficient attention 
to plant protection and quarantine issues. The government was engaged in a process of 
decentralization and liberalization, and prioritized reforms in selected sectors of the 
economy. The Plant Protection Service was abandoned as a state entity. The Central Plant 
Protection Station of the Ministry of Agriculture, responsible for the plant protection 
activities, almost stopped functioning as a result of severe budget cuts in 1990s, which led 
to a significant reduction in employees at both the central and regional level.   
The locust plague of 1998–2001 can be traced back to 1996, when locust densities 
in wheat fields reached 135/m² in north Kazakhstan (Temreshev 1997). The few plant 
protection practitioners and locust researchers still active repeatedly warned the authorities 
about the danger of locust outbreaks throughout Kazakhstan (V. E. Kambulin, personal 
communication). In 1997, the Head of the Central Plant Protection Station, advised by 
regional plant protectionists and locust researchers, wrote to the Ministers of Agriculture 
and of Finance about the increase of locust populations. He stressed the need to purchase 
insecticides and spraying equipment, and to recruit the necessary personnel in order to 
control the incipient outbreaks. However, nobody in the Ministries reacted to those 
concerns, and it then became too late to stop the outbreaks from developing into a plague. 
As a result of this inaction, in 2000, the Government of Kazakhstan had to allocate 
20,100,000 USD for the anti-locust campaign, which involved spraying 947,000 L of 
insecticides over an area of 8,100,000 ha (Figure 5.3) (Khasenov 2001). This was the 
largest and most expensive anti-locust campaign ever carried out in the history of the 
former Soviet Union. 
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Figure 5.3 Total area treated against all species of locusts in Kazakhstan  
                   from 1993 to 2005.  
Source: Compiled by authors from data from the Ministry of Agriculture of 
Kazakhstan. 
 
The spectacular invasion of the capital by locusts in 1999 made the Minister of Agriculture 
lose his position, amid jokes about the Minister being gobbled up by locusts. After the 
large-scale anti-locust campaign conducted in 2000, the newly appointed Minister of 
Agriculture stated that they did not intend to eliminate locust as a species unless it was 
necessary, and he stated that they had the experience to do so. Such an assertion, that the 
problem of locusts could be solved in Kazakhstan was based on the success of the 
campaign that was temporary and only of local significance. Hundred thousands of litres of 
insecticides were spilled into the environment to suppress the locust plague. However, it is 
questionable whether the application of pesticides was a key factor in suppressing this 
plague. A number of environmental and ecological factors may have been responsible for 
the population decline: temperature, solar activity, rainfall, the water level in basins of lakes 
and rivers, the quality and availability of food plants, vegetation succession, soil type and 
so on (Antonov and Kambulin 1997, Berryman 1987, Kambulin 1992, Toleubayev et al. 
2003, White 1976). Uvarov (1977) noted that there is no reason to expect that further 
organizational advances and technological improvements of locust control measures will, in 
themselves, provide a solution. However, it appears that decision makers prefer pesticide 
applications to protect crops from immediate destruction instead of investing in research, 
which would reveal the underlying ecological causes for locust outbreaks, and 
incorporating these findings into a locust preventive control strategy.   
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To effectively contain locust populations the outbreak areas need to be monitored. 
The discovery, during Soviet times, of outbreak areas of the Italian Locust and the Asiatic 
Migratory Locust in Kazakhstan showed that it is possible to prevent mass outbreaks. For 
some other locust species, the detection and destruction of gregarising populations in 
outbreak areas is the key to effective preventive control (Van Huis 2007). In north America 
the Rocky Mountain Locust (Melanopus spretus Walsh.) became extinct due to the 
destruction of its very limited breeding and outbreak areas, i.e., riverine habitats 
(Lockwood and DeBrey 1990). The preventive strategy is still recommended by researchers 
in Kazakhstan, but its implementation requires considerable resources and long-term 
commitment from the government. As Uvarov (1977:527) commented:  
 
...the records of the preventive organisations show, however, that measures 
for the repression of incipient multiplication and gregarisation of locusts in 
their outbreak areas have to be applied very frequently. This means that the 
level of vigilance of these organisations and their continual operational 
readiness as well as the annual expenditure that may be needed for control 
cannot be lowered. 
 
Failure to carry out monitoring and preventive control activities was one of the major 
causes of the locust plague of 1998–2001. In the process of decentralization and 
liberalization the government did not recognize that the resulting institutional degradation 
of the pest-control system would have an impact on the population dynamics of locust 
species. This recognition only came with the invasion of the capital of Kazakhstan by 
locusts in 1999. 
 
 
5.7  Post 1998–2001 plague: Reinventing collective action  
 
5.7.1  Locust invasion of capital: A driver of institutional change  
 
Lin (1989) argues that the institutional changes driven by external forces often require 
collective action facilitated by the state. In our case, the locust invasion of Astana triggered 
a process of institutional change in the plant protection system. It led to the locust problem 
becoming a policy priority. The Government set up an Emergency Locust Control 
Headquarters in Astana and the Prime Minister personally supervised the locust problem. 
Locust issues were discussed in numerous government meetings and scientific gatherings. 
Government authorities, agricultural producers and plant protectionists increasingly 
collaborated to plan control measures. The invasion also brought about longer term 
changes. The president ordered the Ministry of Agriculture to develop a National 
Programme on Preventive Measures against Plagues and the Spread of Destructive Pests 
and Diseases of Agricultural Crops as quickly as possible. Key legislation about plant 
protection and quarantine was introduced, viz.: the Law about Plant Quarantine in 1999 
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and the Law about Plant Protection in 2002. In the latter, the state recognizes its 
responsibility for controlling migratory, highly harmful and quarantine pests, including the 
Italian Locust and the Asiatic Migratory Locust.  
The policy and regulatory measures led to organizational changes in the plant 
protection system. The Kazakh case confirms Lin’s observation that the processes of 
institutional change often involves the reconstruction of previously existing structures (Lin 
1989). In 1999, the Government of Kazakhstan set up a Committee for Plant Protection in 
the Ministry of Agriculture, based on the remains of the former Central Plant Protection 
Station. The Plant Protection Service reacquired the status of a state entity that it lost early 
in the Transition Period. In 1999, the remains of the technical units of the former Plant 
Protection Service, including the Anti-Locust Centres, were united under a new state 
enterprise Fytosanitaria to monitor and control locusts. In 2003, a state entity called The 
Republican Centre for Phytosanitary Monitoring and Forecasting was founded on the 
remains of the former Monitoring and Forecasting Service. 
These legal and organizational changes were supported by a substantial increase in 
government expenditure on locust control. In contrast to the early transition period, the 
expenditure for locust control is now included in the annual state budget at the request of 
the Ministry of Agriculture. For the anti-locust campaign in 2005, the Ministry requested 
438,000,000 Kazakhstan Tenge, (approximately 3,300,000 USD) to treat about 700,000 ha 
of land, mostly occupied by the Italian Locust and the Asiatic Migratory Locust.  
According to official statements, the newly established plant protection entities 
conduct regular locust surveys and treat local outbreaks. However, the interviewees still 
identify serious problems. Public procurement of goods and services is done on the basis of 
competitive tendering for which Article 20, Clause 4 of the Law about Public Purchases 
(as of 2002) specifies ‘...the customer [in this case, the Ministry of Agriculture] purchases 
goods, labour or services from the supplier who proposes the lowest price offer’. This 
procedure applies to both the purchase of pesticides and the selection of private 
organizations to carry out the chemical spraying. In short, the government gives priority to 
price over quality and efficacy: low efficacy and environmental and health risks are 
generally not taken into account in the tender procedures. In addition, many of those we 
interviewed said that delays in releasing funds, due to complicated transaction mechanisms, 
led to failures in conducting timely control operations.  
Today, there is still a shortage of funding and resources for a truly effective locust 
control system. Practitioners have to work with outdated equipment and are short staffed. 
There is still the need for a special locust unit with sufficient researchers and skilled 
technicians and readily available financial and technical resources. 
 
5.7.2  Locust as a transboundary pest  
 
Since locust swarms very often cross national borders, one nation’s food security concerns 
can become that of another. In this sense, locusts can become a political issue, both creating 
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conflicts between countries and also triggering international collective action. The incidents 
of migration of the Asiatic Migratory Locust and the Italian Locust from breeding habitats 
located on the territory of Kazakhstan to Russia, Uzbekistan and China, and vice versa 
illustrate this point. These countries have accused each other of allowing locusts to breed in 
mass on each others’ territories and infesting neighbouring countries. Uvarov (1953:85) 
stated: ‘Locusts recognize no frontiers’, and he added: ‘...in many cases, the ability of 
locust swarms to cross frontiers is more readily admitted when they are entering a country 
than when they are leaving it for the neighbouring one’. To solve this problem, these 
countries have signed a number of intergovernmental agreements. In June 2000, the 
Ministries of Agriculture of Russia and Kazakhstan signed an agreement on information 
exchange, monitoring and controlling locusts across frontiers. In August 2000, in Almaty, 
the representatives of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan signed a 
resolution at a round table meeting, organized by the Government of Kazakhstan and FAO. 
The resolution requested the FAO to study the possible creation of a Regional Locust 
Commission for Central Asia; comparable to the FAO Regional Commissions established 
for the Desert Locust. In February 2001, a round table ‘Problems of combating locusts in 
Central Asia’ was organized at the Institute of Strategic Research in Kazakhstan. 
Participants included representatives of the Ministry of Agriculture, scientists and plant 
protection practitioners from Kazakhstan, Russia, Uzbekistan and China. In December 
2002, Kazakhstan and China signed a number of intergovernmental agreements in Beijing, 
including one on mutual cooperation over anti-locust activities. In March 2006, the 
Ministries of Agriculture of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan signed an agreement on mutual 
cooperation in controlling locusts along their shared borders. All these actions show the 
growing importance of the locust problem in the political agenda of the affected countries.  
 
 
5.8  Discussion   
 
This paper has identified several factors that support the thesis that locust control is a public 
good requiring collective action. Locusts breed and multiply in natural habitats after which 
they migrate to agricultural areas where they destroy crops during outbreaks and plagues. 
Agricultural producers are not able to control locusts outside their private plots. This is why 
many countries treat the control of migratory and highly destructive pests as a public 
service, comparable with emergency services such as the fire-brigade and the police. When 
faced with disasters or a common enemy, nations and international organizations, e.g., UN 
and NATO, often respond with collective action (Sandler 1992). International undertakings 
to control the Desert Locust exemplify the need for collective action: FAO Regional 
Commissions have been established in locust affected countries in Africa, the Middle East 
and southwest Asia. In addition, locusts induce international collective action when they 
cross interstate boundaries, leading states to develop institutions and rules to control this 
transboundary movement.  
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What can we learn from the history of locust control in the Soviet Union? The 
impact of Soviet technoscience is multifaceted. The literature documents periods of 
scientific stagnation, bureaucracy and the subsumption of the organization and content of 
science to political and ideological motives, exemplified by Lysenko’s command of the 
Soviet Academy of Agricultural Sciences (Medvedev 1969). Furthermore, the impact of the 
virgin land campaign and the expansion of irrigated areas, i.e., typical high-modernist 
projects, had unforeseen consequences on the amount of land suitable on which locusts 
could breed. 
However, the seventy years of Soviet history also show a collective response to the 
locust problem. An intensive knowledge system was coupled with an extensive monitoring 
and control system, which seems to have kept locust populations at manageable levels. 
Locust damage was largely prevented through substantial scientific research on population 
dynamics, considerable expenditure on control operations and the establishment of an 
extended network in which monitoring agencies, local practitioners and scientists 
collaborated to generate operational knowledge that led to an effective control strategy. 
Above, efforts were made to develop an ecological perspective on locusts and their control. 
Knowledge building, concerted action, habitat management, understanding ecological 
relationships and long-term analysis and planning were key features of these efforts. This 
does not mean that the system was in equilibrium. It changed continuously and there was a 
high level of model uncertainty (Peterson et al. 1997), i.e., many of the connections 
between forms of land use, climate, locust population developments, locust control 
measures and so on were uncertain. But for quite some time there was a substantial capacity 
for learning and adapting control strategies to ecosystem dynamics, which made the locust 
control system quite resilient (Walker et al. 2002).   
However, this locust control system could not cope with a fundamental uncertainty 
(Peterson et al. 1997), i.e., its dependence upon an unstable political system. The 
transformation of the political system led to a new social-technical configuration, which 
gave very low priority to locust control and changes in the agro-ecosystem. This created 
more favourable conditions for the development of a locust plague in a less desired state of 
ecosystem services (Folke et al. 2004). This new political configuration, which swept away 
concern for delivering many public goods, including pest control, led to a new dilemma 
over collective action. The official hostility to public action and the glorification of 
individualist, profit-driven and market-oriented change during the Transition Period, 
contributed to the breaking up of the organizations and knowledge structures in the field of 
plant protection. The knowledge and capability to control locusts quickly disintegrated in 
Kazakhstan after the collapse of the Soviet Union and plant protection was left to individual 
farmers. However, it was not in their individual interest, and beyond their capacity, to 
invest in monitoring and controlling locusts. This resulted in a many more farmers being 
affected by the subsequent locust plague. In shifting to a market economy, the government 
did not recognize the dramatic impact that institutional collapse would have on the 
monitoring and control of locust populations.   
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The locust plague of 1998–2001 led to a reinvention of collective action. Once the 
locusts invaded the capital top-level decision makers started to realize that the dismantling 
and privatization of the plant protection service had unforeseen consequences. They 
became aware that locust control requires state intervention and some remnants of the 
Soviet knowledge structure were reinstated. Former chiefs of the regional Plant Protection 
Stations and influential scientists in the plant protection domain used this opportunity to 
revive the Plant Protection Service. Their work on locust control regained legitimacy, as 
did public expenditure to support it. The crisis also had other political repercussions 
(Hargrave and Van de Ven 2006). The reinstatement of some elements of the former locust 
control system raises the question of the extent to which this recent form of collective 
action builds on past forms and the extent to which it differs.  
The rebuilt Plant Protection System has to operate with far fewer people than before 
and has to work with market actors, i.e., suppliers of pesticides and spraying services. 
However, from an ecosystems perspective there are other more fundamental differences. 
The latest policies tend to assume that the currently available stock of technology, basically 
pesticide applications, is sufficient to control locust plagues. Decision-makers even express 
the belief that it is possible to eradicate the locust, i.e., that total control of nature is 
possible. Past efforts to construct a more ecological view and to build knowledge and 
knowledge networks for understanding relationships between climatic variability, land use 
changes and locust population dynamics have not yet been taken up again. Furthermore, 
recent policy measures seem to be mainly incident driven and largely take a short-term 
perspective. If we consider ecosystem and locust population dynamics as a slow variables 
(Holling 2004) the collapse of the Soviet Union has made sustaining these variables more 
difficult. This is a major transformation in the sense of Holling (2004) since the interaction 
between structure and processes have become qualitatively different. The long time frame 
for responding to locusts, which was previously institutionalized in the long-term funding 
of plant protection services and knowledge building, career perspectives for scientists and 
the organization of a multi-agency monitoring network, has been not been re-established. 
The most recent transformations have, in fact, institutionalized the short time frame 
perspective that emerged in the Transition Period. 
The reinvention of collective action cannot be seen as a pendulum effect between 
state provision of a public good and market-oriented approaches. Further development of 
collective action on locust control cannot lead to return to the previous social-technical 
system. We can learn from studying past collective action and use this to develop a critique 
of the present form of locust management, but it is not possible to derive a programme of 
adaptive management from it. This would require what Holling (2004) has identified as a 
third mode of learning, which refers to new forms of organization that transform the system 
by developing truly novel strategies and processes.   
It also follows from our discussion of knowledge about locusts that locust control 
requires collective action at a higher level than the local level of, for example, farmer fields 
or single watersheds. National and even transboundary forms of management have to be 
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established. There is little indication that independent civil society groups with an interest 
in locust control will emerge in Kazakhstan in the near future. Service companies have been 
formed that carry out the pesticide spraying at the regional level but, given their objective 
of trading in pesticides and spraying services, it is unlikely that these will soon convert into 
advocates for a sustainable, long-term and ecosystems perspective on locust control. 
Although local level participation may be crucial, as in the past when herders were part of 
the locust monitoring network. These participatory approaches to local level ecosystem 
management (Walker et al. 2002) and the current market-driven, short-term thinking about 
locust control in Kazakhstan are inadequate for developing a framework for rebuilding 
adaptive management of ecological services at a higher level and with a long-term 
perspective.   
 
 
5.9  Conclusions 
 
The comparison of the anti-locust campaign in 2000 in Kazakhstan under the neoliberal 
system, the largest ever undertaken, with the history of 70 years of centrally planned locust 
control history of the former USSR reveals the problematic impact of the transition upon 
ecological knowledge and sustainable locust control. Simplified representations of an 
inherently non-ecological and non-functioning Soviet system (Busch 2000, Scott 1998) 
need to be modified. Clearly, the large-scale land use changes resulting from high-
modernist projects created favourable conditions for locusts. However, the Soviet system 
was also one that regarded locust control as a public good, built ecological knowledge and 
mobilized financial, technical and intellectual resources for monitoring and control. This 
system was better able to deal with locust problems than individualistic, purely market-led 
control based on the idea that an existing, single technology as pesticides can eradicate 
locusts.   
Outbreaks of the Asiatic Migratory Locust and the Italian Locust periodically occur 
in Kazakhstan. It is only a matter of time before the country may face a locust plague 
similar to the 1998–2001 plague. This would test whether the recently reinvented collective 
action, organized around incidents and based solely around pesticides spraying, will 
provide effective control or whether collective action should be extended and reinstate 
important lessons from the past, regarding substantial knowledge building and concerted 
action based on a long-term perspective. We conclude that we cannot expect an effective 
and ecologically sustainable form of locust control either through market-mechanisms or 
local level ecosystem management through participatory methods with farmers and other 
local stakeholders. This has consequences for theory on collective action in agricultural 
development. Public goods such as locust control need a higher level organization for their 
delivery. Dissatisfaction with centralized, bureaucratic state command-and-control or 
market-driven organizational forms for delivering such public goods should not lower the 
level of action to individual actors or very local institutions. We argue that it would be 
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more productive to discuss how higher level social-technical governance systems can be 
reshaped so that they are able to interact with and respond to the complexities and 
uncertainties within large-scale agro-ecosystems. 
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Chapter 6 
 
Conclusions: Back to the future                                
in pest control for Kazakhstan 
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6.1  Introduction 
 
In Kazakhstan a major shift in the political-economic-social contexts occurred after the fall 
of the Soviet Union in 1991, and this brought about a drastic change in pest management 
practices. While during the Soviet time ecological sustainable methods were pursued, the 
focus after the collapse of the Soviet system is almost exclusively on chemical pest-control 
practices. The aim of the thesis was to study why this happened. For that reason this thesis 
analysed the developments in the plant protection domain in Kazakhstan covering a period 
of about 90 years (1917-2007).   
Crops are attacked by a number of pest organisms. Whether, when and how to 
control them has always been a concern for agricultural producers. With the appearance of 
organosynthetic insecticides in the early 1940s, a dramatic change occurred in pest control 
worldwide. Insecticides, because of their convenience and initial effectiveness, quickly 
became standard practice for pest control. Insecticides were used indiscriminately and 
injudiciously from the late 1940s through the mid-1960s. This over-reliance soon led to 
many significant problems such as pest resistance, environmental pollution and 
occupational hazards. Apart from these, pesticide residues have been discovered in the food 
chain that eventually affected health of people and animals. Additionally, density of natural 
enemy (predator and parasitoid) populations declined, leading to resurgence of primary 
pests and secondary outbreaks of pests. This was countered by using more pesticides in 
ever-increasing dosages, causing the (so-called) ‘pesticide treadmill’ in which the cost of 
chemical control became prohibitively expensive. It became apparent that another approach 
was needed. As a result, an integrated pest management (IPM) approach emerged in which 
biological and other means (agronomic, physical, resistant crop varieties, etc.) for pest 
control were combined to reduce pesticide use. Economic thresholds were established in 
order to determine when chemical control should be utilized to prevent pests from reaching 
the economic injury level. The Soviet Union, including Kazakhstan, adhered to this IPM 
approach throughout the 1970s and 1980s. Extensive research on natural enemy/pest 
biology, ecology, population dynamics and alternative management strategies received a lot 
of emphasis. Within this IPM framework, pesticides were only used as a last resort, and 
dosage and negative side effects were carefully monitored.  
However, with the collapse of the Soviet system, the ecologically sustainable pest-
control approaches were abandoned and a pesticide-centred perspective became dominant 
in Kazakhstan after 1991. Was this shift a consequence of the post-1991 transition to a 
neoliberal market economy? This chapter integrates the main findings and arguments from 
the preceding chapters in order to answer this question.    
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6.2  Change in socio-economic organization  
 
Transition to a free market economy is generally supported by prescriptions to liberalize, 
privatize and deregulate, and by the idea that everybody will have an equal chance to 
prosper. After the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, Kazakhstan embraced neoliberal 
reforms and abandoned the state-centred planned economy. Prices were liberalized, state 
assets were privatized and the economy was deregulated.    
As a result, significant changes have occurred in the socio-economic organization of 
the rural sector. While Soviet era policies made the collective farm an economic production 
unit and a socio-political institution, post-1991 neoliberal policies aimed at the creation of 
private and independent individual farmers. By 2006, out of 2,500 sovkhozes and 
kolkhozes, more than 170,000 private farms had emerged (most of these farms were for 
subsistence rather than for commercial farming). However, the privatization and 
fragmentation of collective farms did not solve the supposed inefficiency of collective 
farming, as assumed by neoliberal advisers. This thesis has illustrated that collective 
farming was not the main cause of the inefficiency of Soviet agriculture, but rather 
shortcomings of the distribution system (storage, transportation, processing and marketing).  
The relatively high share of agriculture in the GDP (Gross Domestic Product) in 
Kazakhstan declined four times (from 34% in 1990 to 8.7% in 2001). The irony is that, 
after fragmentation of the farming sector through neoliberal reforms, the government of 
Kazakhstan has recently begun to intervene once again in the rural economy, and is urging 
fragmented farmers to farm collectively and merge their properties into larger entities in 
order to deal jointly with farming technicalities, input issues and marketing problems, and 
thus to contribute more to national food security.    
During the first decade of the transition period (1992-2002) most of the production 
and social infrastructures of the Soviet collective farms deteriorated (resulting in the decay 
of resources built up over several decades in the Soviet era). Much of the physical 
infrastructures was dismantled and sold off as second-hand construction materials. 
Similarly, the infrastructural and other facilities of the agricultural research and extension 
service deteriorated during the transition period, including those designated for pest control, 
because of severe budget cuts. Subsequently, most of the surviving research and social 
infrastructure from the former academic villages was privatized. The plant protection 
stations and their biological and toxicological laboratories were shut down. The buildings 
that hosted these stations were privatized, primarily to be used for other purposes.  
Narratives from the interviewees contributing to this study contradict the situation 
anticipated by neoliberal advisers, especially the notion that everyone would have an equal 
chance to prosper with the transition to a free market.  But to the  contrary, people in 
Kazakhstan after 1991 have found themselves in an environment of ‘wild capitalism’ (a 
chaotic economic situation) in which they have experienced devaluation of life savings, 
prolonged uncertainty, insecurity, social differentiation, a decline in their purchasing power 
and ‘accumulation by dispossession’ (the possibility of appropriation through the robbing 
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of people’s rights and resources). At the same time, people have become aware that the 
state is not a reliable source of support in the era of market relationships. For this reason, 
interviewees sampled in this study characterized the post-Soviet changes with strong words, 
such as neglect, stagnation, devastation, decline, chaos, breakdown and/or disintegration.        
Hence, asking interviewees to reconstruct the previously existing socio-economic 
formation invoked nostalgia among the people who used to live and work under the Soviet 
system. Interviewees of this study were nostalgic not only about a relatively prosperous 
livelihood and welfare state but also about what they regarded as positive aspects of the 
labour process (division of labour, organization of work and the means of production), 
training and career opportunities and knowledge structure during Soviet era. This thesis has 
exemplified this set of perceptions through the study of the plant protection domain where 
specialists were trained, careers were made and sophisticated infrastructures (bio-
laboratories with technological lines for rearing beneficial arthropods and producing bio-
pesticides) and knowledge networks were built, conducive to development, promotion and 
use of an effective system of integrated pest management. A paradox which the thesis has 
attempted to grasp is that ‘nostalgia’ for the Soviet past is in this case also a solidly founded 
regret for a system of pest control that actually worked, and from which Kazakhstan could 
once again benefit, if the scientific system supporting it could be reconstituted.  Several 
stories are told about post-Soviet chaos (Nazpary 2002), and this thesis has likewise added 
its quota to such accounts.  But it has also asked ‘what was lost’? 
    
 
6.3  Change in the technological approach and pest-control 
perspectives 
  
It is often assumed that progressive technological changes precedes and underpins positive 
socio-economic changes. The Kazakhstan case has illustrated a regressive technological 
change. The post-1991 socio-economic changes in the agrarian sector transformed the 
large-scale, highly mechanized and knowledge-intensive farming (using IPM) into a mainly 
small-scale and simplified farming technological system. The number of tractors used in 
the farming sector in Kazakhstan dropped by 80%, from more than 240,000 in 1990 to less 
than 45,000  in 2005. A common practice of using technological maps in the centralized 
crop production system that incorporated crop rotation, fertilization, irrigation and pest-
control schemes was abandoned. Farmers after the break-up of the collective farming were 
disorganized and challenged to deal individually with a wide range of farming technicalities 
such as soil cultivation, seed selection, crop husbandry practices, soil fertility, irrigation and 
pest control. The farmers with professional farming knowledge and skills and with 
advantageous socio-economic, political and knowledge networks from the Soviet past had 
the best chances for the economic survival in the harsh market environment.  
The collapse of collective farming and the unified plant protection system that went 
with it had a problematic impact on pest-control practices after 1991 and brought about a 
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crisis in the IPM perspective. Before 1991 IPM was an essential part of the crop production 
system in Kazakhstan. This approach incorporated biological control technologies, 
monitoring and forecasting, and agronomic and other means to control pests and reduce 
pesticide use. Before 1991 up to 400,000 ha of cropping area in Kazakhstan, and more than 
33,000,000 ha in the USSR as a whole, were protected against pests through biological 
means.  This is an extraordinary fact that ought to be better known among ‘western’ 
conservationists and advocates of ‘sustainable agriculture’.  This effort required a high 
level of organization and coordination of pest-control activities both at collective farm level 
and higher.   
Morse and Buhler (1997) argue that IPM is an ideal approach to crop protection but 
that it is not easily achieved in reality.  This scepticism is based on awareness by these 
authors that IPM is a knowledge-intensive approach requiring a strong research base, 
extension network, highly qualified specialists and significant investments for its 
development, promotion and use. This thesis has demonstrated that this knowledge-
intensiveness of IPM approach was characteristic of a more generally knowledge-intensive 
character of Soviet collectivized farming system.  In those areas where it was widely 
implemented, IPM was backed up by an extensive research and plant protection service. 
The state-facilitated, science-based organization of plant protection activities made IPM 
work, and provided a concerted response to pest problems. Collective responses to pest 
problems were embedded in the centralized structure of the Soviet system. This was 
pragmatic, in the sense that the IPM approach was given priority over chemical control 
perspective, thus reducing negative health and environmental effects.  
After the disintegration of the USSR the pesticide industry colonised the vacant 
agricultural input markets of the newly established independent states. The annual imports 
of pesticides into Kazakhstan increased from about 2,000 tonnes in 1999 to 17,000 tonnes 
in 2006. This only takes into account those chemicals imported and sold through official 
channels; the volume of pesticides smuggled into the country is not known while illegal 
outlets can be found in many towns. But point of particular concern is that the industry was 
able quickly to fill in the institutional gap in knowledge and infrastructure for pest control. 
The numerous fragmented farmers did not have a chance to pursue an IPM approach 
because the organizations that could have delivered the inputs (biocontrol agents) and the 
necessary knowledge (research and extension) were severely handicapped or had 
disappeared. The pesticide industry had the necessary know-how, funds and infrastructure 
to deliver its products to farmers. Its prime interest was to sell its products and not to 
provide the knowledge that would minimize the use of pesticides. Pesticide company 
representatives distribute colourful leaflets and posters and present easily understandable 
and rapidly implementable solutions to pest problems. Farmers literally follow the 
prescriptions provided. Moreover, farmers blindly use readily available pesticides, being 
afraid of losing cultivated crops and risking to become a bankrupt. Consequently, the 
pesticide use perspective has become dominant in the pest-control practices of 
individualized farmers in Kazakhstan after 1991.   
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6.4  Change in knowledge generation and ecological 
consequences  
 
A sound scientific research base is necessary prerequisite for knowledge and technologies 
to proliferate. In the transition period, the research base in Kazakhstan has been severely 
eroded. Low salaries, deteriorating research facilities and lack of perspective in the public 
research institutes have made the recruitment of young researchers difficult. Many 
researchers have emigrated or left the scientific domain in search of better paid jobs in the 
private sector. The number of researchers in all research domains in Kazakhstan dropped 
more than 70%, from 31,250 in 1990 to 9,000 in 2000. Public science became an under-
financed sector because of deliberate policy reforms and/or severe budget cuts. 
Expenditures for R&D (research and development) from GDP declined from 0.80% in 
1991 to 0.18% in 1999. As a result, agrarian knowledge generation and technological 
development became ‘endangered species’ in contemporary Kazakhstan.     
The government has recognised that loss of scientific and technological capacity is 
an important problem associated with post-1991 transition.  Various S&T (science and 
technology) policies and R&D models have been tried out to ‘fill the gap’. Under one 
‘model’ ministerial authorities in charge of managing the public research institutes have 
more or less forced researchers to commercialize their research outputs and market them to 
end-users in order to become financially self-supporting. In the pest-control field this had 
the effect of pushing public plant protection researchers to accept incentives provided by 
the pesticide industry in order to cope with periods of economic instability. The pesticide 
industry was able to make use of this situation and took over the human capital needed for a 
more rational IPM approach.  As a result, plant protection research has become 
commercially-oriented through pesticide testing and promotion. In this way, plant 
protection research carried out according to ecologically sound principles on highly 
destructive pest organisms threatening national food security has diminished, and the 
development of sustainable pest-control approaches is now severely neglected. The thesis 
has demonstrated that the public good characteristics of the plant protection research have 
been replaced by market orientation and commoditization.  The demand for immediate 
outputs in research has led to a policy culture dominated by short-term thinking, and the 
negative effect of this short-termism can be immediately seen in areas such as control of 
highly destructive migratory pests such as locusts.    
This thesis has identified that the financial and ideological reasons for dismantling 
the existing pest-control system and knowledge structure did not recognize the potential 
impact of policy-induced changes on agro-ecological conditions, control practices and 
locust development. ‘Proof’ of this argument can be seen in the fact that an extremely 
harmful locust plague developed by the end of the 1990s in Kazakhstan. When locusts 
arrived in agricultural fields they had already reached plague proportions and it was beyond 
the capacity of individual farmers to deal with them. This resulted in a many more farmers 
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being affected by the subsequent locust plague than might otherwise have been the case. 
This case (explored in Chapter 5) has shown the extent to which locust control depends on 
collective action and intervention at the level of the state (see Chapter 5). The thesis has 
shown that before 1991 a complex and dynamic system of locust management was 
developed. Knowledge building, concerted action, habitat management, understanding 
ecological relationships and long-term analysis and planning were key features of this 
system. Chapter 5 also revealed the extent to which market-driven mechanisms are 
inadequate to solve locust problems. The management of locusts cannot be handled by 
individual farmers, because control requires knowledge spread over vast territories 
concerning their biology, ecology, and population dynamics, resulting in effective control 
strategies that require to be implemented at both national and international levels.  A 
problem now is how to recapture the initiative on a large enough scale to deal with the 
problem.   
 
 
6.5  Governing pests – the future 
    
This thesis has argued that pest control, as a strategically important sector of knowledge, 
requires a direct involvement of state institutions. This is not an easy or popular argument 
to make in a former Soviet country, where neoliberal enthusiasts assume that everything 
associated with the old state system must, by definition, have been bad.  A new state order 
established in Kazakhstan after 1991 broke up the organizations and knowledge structures 
that had previously developed and promoted ecologically sustainable pest-control 
approaches. The farming sector also underwent significant socio-economic changes, 
resulting in the break up of the old collective farms and resulting in a highly fragmented 
agrarian sector. The damage that then resulted has been documented in this study.  A 
question that remains is ‘what now is to be done’?   Can elements of a positive legacy of 
ecological thinking associated with science under the Soviet system (Weiner 1988) be 
recovered and put back to work?  
Under the current situation in farming sector, with fragmented and resource-poor 
farmers, implementation of IPM/ecology-based protection of crops will only be possible if 
it receives relevant institutional support (information, knowledge, training and facilitation).  
The experience with IPM, globally, is that it requires farmers to learn about their agro-
ecosystems (e.g. via the farmer field school systems fostered by FAO), because ecological 
pest control is often counter intuitive at two levels. The first is that plants can tolerate quite 
some defoliation by herbivores before yields are affected. The second is that pesticides 
create pests because natural enemies are destroyed. Very often natural enemies are not 
recognized and showing their existence and actions serves as an eye-opener to farmers. 
This may help farmers to understand agro-ecosystems better, and thus lead them towards 
use of this knowledge in pest management strategies that are less reliant on pesticides. This 
focus-shifting from an exclusive pesticide perspective is a major challenge in Kazakhstan, 
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considering the current ways in which policymakers think about pest-control issues at the 
farm, research, extension levels.  Perhaps some exposure of policymakers to IPM initiatives 
in other countries using (for example) the farmer field school approach would be a useful 
starting point for changing attitudes.   
At policymaking level the state has fulfilled the mission it defined, for itself, i.e. to 
facilitate the transition to a free market economy. Consequently, the state distanced itself 
from providing public goods in strategically important domains of research and practice, in 
particular the pest-control sector. After 1991 the state no longer supported development, 
promotion and use of ecologically sound and environmentally benign pest-control 
approaches and testing of pesticide residues in farm produce. A vacuum was created, with 
ample opportunity for the pesticide industry to influence the plant protection research 
agenda and to gear pest-control practices to an exclusive focus on pesticides, despite the 
manifest unsuitability of such approaches to major problems, such as locust control, facing 
Kazakhstan. There is probably now need to curtail this pesticide approach through 
emphasis on regulatory environments, e.g. legislation restricting pesticide imports and tight 
control of pesticide retailing and use. Also strict and enforced sanitary requirements on 
pesticide residues in farm produce (especially when driven by customer and consumer 
concerns) may help invoke more judicious use of pesticides, and make farmers look for 
alternative pest-control methods. Currently the public plant protection domain lacks the 
necessary resources to address the demands and opportunities of fragmented farmers and to 
develop and promote ecology/IPM-based pest-control approaches for a large mass of 
independent small holders. Bottom up approaches (as attempted in many developing 
countries) are still weak because farmers, largely, are not well enough organized to express 
their need for support. 
This thesis has pointed to an urgent need to rethink and rebuild the role of the 
government in pest-control issues.  Without stronger policy – less afraid to embrace 
positive aspects of the former Soviet pest-control system, highly destructive pest organisms 
will keep threatening national food security, and indiscriminate and injudicious pesticide 
use will continue to pose considerable hazards for human health and environment. It has 
been shown that plant protection is more than just getting rid of pest organisms at the farm 
level. Pest-control issues are deeply embedded in political-economic-social contexts via 
which the development and use of ecologically sustainable approaches and collective action 
for pest control can be either promoted or hindered. The government of Kazakhstan has a 
key function in supporting this long-term endeavour and creating conducive conditions for 
this to happen, as this will ultimately contribute to a more sustainable system of agricultural 
production and thus benefit society as a whole.   
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Appendix 1.1 
 
 
 
 
 
Activated windows of computer software Atlas.ti 5 for qualitative data analysis.  
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Appendix 2.1 
 
 
 
 
 
Technological map of kolkhoz named after Lenin composed for cropping season in 1965. 
(Archive of Almaty oblast, retrieved by author in June 27, 2007) 
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Appendix 2.2  
 
 
Dismantled two-storey kindergarten in the village ‘Bokenshi’, Semey region, northeast 
Kazakhstan. Dismantled parts were sold as second-hand construction material 
(photo by author June 05/06/2006).   
 
Appendix 2.3 
 
 
Dismantled irrigation facilities of the former sovkhoz ’60 Years of October’, Semey region, 
northeast Kazakhstan (photo by author 05/06/2006). Dismantled parts were sold.   
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Appendix 3.1 
 
 
 
 
 
Annual reviews (1967, 1978, 1981 and 1988) of distribution of pest organisms in the 
Kazakh SSR and forecast for next year (photo made by author 31/03/2006). 
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Appendix 3.2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Neglected and partly dismantled building of the former district Plant Protection Station in 
Esik town. (Enbekshi-Kazakh raion, Almaty oblast. Photo made by author 30/05/2006) 
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Appendix 3.3  
 
 
 
 
 
Chemicals of unknown nature in bags (with Chinese characters on them) sold as 
insecticides at village market. Bags of these apparently poisonous chemicals (with very bad 
smell, personal experience) lay next to bags with food spices such as black paper and bay 
leaves. According to the seller, she stores all items pictured on the table in one box at the 
end of the day (photos made by author 24/08/2005). 
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Appendix 4.1  
 
 
 
 
 
The Soviet time research equipment at the Kazakh Research Institute for Plant Protection  
(photos made by author 13/03/2006).  
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Acronyms 
 
 
IPM Integrated Pest Management 
 
IPP Integrated Plant Protection 
 
Kazakh SSR Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic (equally used as Kazakhstan) 
 
KRIPP 
 
Kazakh Research Institute for Plant Protection 
KZT Kazakhstani Tenge (currency of the Republic of Kazakhstan 
introduced in 1993) 
 
PPS 
 
Plant Protection Service  
  
USSR Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (equally used as the Soviet Union) 
 
VASKhNIL [Russian acronym for] All-Union Academy of Agricultural Sciences 
named after Lenin 
  
VIZR [Russian acronym for] All-Union Research Institute for Plant 
Protection 
 
 
 
 
Glossary  
 
 
Candidate of Sciences  Scientific degree in the former USSR, which is still in use in Russia 
and Kazakhstan and can be placed between M.Sc. and Ph.D. of western 
academia. Some equate this degree to western Ph.D., but after pursuing 
Candidate of Sciences degree one need at least another 4-5 or more 
years to pursue ‘Doctor of Sciences’ degree that equal to Ph.D. degree 
of western academia.           
   
Commercial farming Profit-driven farming.  
 
Kolkhoz   [in Russian] Collective farm enterprise in the Soviet period. It differs 
little from sovkhoz, at least in the context of Kazakhstan. The 
difference can be in allotted area, sovkhoz had larger area than kolkhoz. 
Yet, this type of farm was introduced in earlier periods of the Soviet 
state than sovkhoz. [plural kolkhozes]  
 
Oblast [in Russian] Administrative division of the territory of the country into 
regions/provinces.    
  
Pest  In this thesis, an agricultural pest is defined broadly, as a living 
organism (rodent, insect, mite, nematode, fungus, bacterium, virus or 
weed) that damages crops, affects crop development or reduces 
quantity and quality of yield before or after harvest. The terms 
‘agricultural pest’, ‘pest organism’ and ‘pest’ will be used 
interchangeably. 
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Raion [in Russian] Administrative sub-division of the oblast; English 
equivalent – district.   
 
Sovkhoz [in Russian] State farm enterprise in the Soviet period. It differs little 
from kolkhoz, at least in the context of Kazakhstan. The difference can 
be in allotted area, sovkhoz had larger area than kolkhoz.  
[plural sovkhozes]   
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Summary 
 
This thesis examines why and how plant protection issues are embedded in political, 
economic and social contexts. It analyses the domain of plant protection in Kazakhstan under 
two different socio-economic and political formations, namely the Soviet period before 1991 
and the post-Soviet period thereafter. The study of plant protection in a country in transition 
demonstrates how the wider political and socio-economic structures shape this particular 
field of agrarian science and practice.  
An in-depth, qualitative research approach was employed to study micro-processes in 
both periods, in order to understand how these processes are shaped by wider structures and 
to connect the present to the past in anticipation of the future. A technographic approach was 
used to describe social and biological worlds in their full complexity and to achieve a 
contextual understanding of sustainable agro-ecosystem development. Data analysis was 
based on cross-checking information from documents, literature, media, own observations 
and interviews.  
This thesis illustrates how Integrated Pest Management (IPM)/ecology-based pest-
control approaches were broadly developed and practised in the USSR, including 
Kazakhstan. It identifies a shift from a knowledge system aiming at sustainable pest control 
in the Soviet era to an exclusive focus on pesticides in post-1991 Kazakhstan. This shift – 
which contradicts the global trend towards sustainability – leads to the central question of 
this dissertation: Why did such a shift occur in Kazakhstan after 1991? This thesis argues 
that the transformation of the agrarian structure, the destruction of the state-led/public 
organization of pest control, the neglect of research and extension and the aggressive 
promotion campaigns of the pesticide industry changed the plant protection perspectives in 
Kazakhstan. This dissertation describes how, and explains why, thinking about pest control 
changed within the wider knowledge system, including farming, research, extension and 
policymaking. As a result, essential elements of sustainable pest-management approaches 
were abandoned in Kazakhstan after 1991. 
The study shows that the Soviet system created conditions that were conducive to the 
functioning of ecological forms of pest control. The institutionalized plant protection system 
was able to facilitate broad-scale collective action to control pests locally and regionally. 
Plant protection research that developed and promoted sustainable pest-control approaches 
was seen as a public good. The neoliberal ideology that was introduced after the fall of the 
Soviet system undermined collective initiatives and the creation of public goods and brought 
the sustainable pest-control system into crisis. New farmers had little knowledge about plant 
protection. They also lacked the institutional backup and the technical and financial 
resources to practise sustainable pest-control approaches. The public plant protection domain 
was severely underfunded and dramatically reduced in size and capacity. Hence, 
IPM/ecology-based pest-control approaches were no longer developed, promoted or applied.  
This thesis introduces the above-mentioned issues in Chapter 1 and synthesizes them 
in Chapter 6. These issues are discussed more in detail in the four empirical chapters (2–5), 
which are summarized below.  
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Chapter 2 examines the post-Soviet changes in the farming sector in Kazakhstan.  It 
describes the transformation of the agrarian structure and the new ordering of large farms 
and smallholdings in the context of the changing socio-economic, political and technological 
landscape. It identifies the major changes in land use, farm types and size and discusses how 
state interventions affected access to land and other inputs during the various stages of 
transition.  The chapter analyses how different actors perceive the transformation of 
agriculture, livelihoods and social infrastructure that occurred in rural areas after 1991, why 
they talk about this period in terms of crisis and chaos, and why many people have a feeling 
of nostalgia for the Soviet past.  Subsequently, it examines the role of knowledge and the 
remarkable degree to which it was lost in the transition process. This chapter also describes 
the technological rationale and the organization of knowledge within Soviet agriculture and 
examines what happened to those structures afterwards.  The loss and lack of knowledge, in 
the context of rapidly changing conditions for practising agriculture, are key factors in 
explaining the agricultural crisis that followed the collapse of the Soviet Union.  Neoliberal 
ideology, which informed much of the policy changes in the transition period, severely 
constrained the maintenance of the essential pest-control knowledge required for sustainable 
forms of agriculture. 
Chapter 3 illustrates the wide application of IPM approaches in the USSR, including 
Kazakhstan, during the 1970s and 1980s. It shows that IPM is a knowledge-intensive 
approach that requires a strong research base, a functioning pest-control extension network 
and collective action for its development, promotion and use. This chapter argues that the 
collapse of collective farming and the disintegration of a unified plant protection system had 
a problematic impact on post-1991 pest-control perspectives. It analyses why individual 
farmers became focused exclusively on pesticide use. It also examines why the research 
concentrated their efforts only on chemical control issues. The pesticide industry succeeded 
in filling up the knowledge and information gap in pest-control issues. It was able to set up 
the necessary infrastructure to deliver its products to farmers in Kazakhstan after 1991. The 
role of the plant protection service and research system that had delivered IPM-related 
knowledge and information was severely diminished.  
Chapter 4 shows that tremendous changes took place in plant protection research in 
Kazakhstan after 1991. It argues that plant protection research dealing with migratory pests 
and with IPM has the characteristics of a public good that needs to be adequately supported 
by the state. This is because highly destructive organisms such as locusts threaten national 
food security, while IPM deals with ecologically sound and environmentally safe pest-
control approaches. The pesticide industry is governed by market forces that commercialize 
and commoditize pest-control knowledge and products. This chapter analyses how 
agricultural research institutes faced an alarming shortage and ageing of research staff. 
Recruitment of young researchers became difficult and middle-aged researchers could not be 
retained. Public science lost its prestige and became underfinanced and unattractive. 
Researchers in the public research institutes became nostalgic about the former Soviet 
scientific establishment, in which research facilities and infrastructure, the training and 
qualification of research staff and funding were all significantly better than in the post-1991 
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period. The weak management of science and numerous organizational and management 
shifts after 1991 increased feelings of uncertainty in the research community. The chapter 
discusses how the current short-termism in the research agenda and the demand for 
immediate results undermines the research on sustainable pest-control approaches.  
Chapter 5 examines the co-evolution of locust populations, land use systems, 
knowledge systems, campaigns and the institutional framework before and after 1991. It 
demonstrates that a very complex and dynamic system of locust management was developed 
during the Soviet era. Knowledge building, concerted action, habitat management, 
understanding ecological relationships and long-term analysis and planning were key 
features of this system. The biology, taxonomy, ecology and population dynamics of the 
locust species were the focus of study by many scientists. In the wake of the collapse of the 
USSR, the plant protection system in Kazakhstan lost much of the expertise that had been 
acquired over many years, including that concerning locusts. At the same time, the 
production of new knowledge was seriously diminished. The financial and ideological 
reasons for dismantling the existing pest-control system did not recognize the potential 
impact of policy-induced changes on agro-ecological conditions, pest-control practices and 
pest development. Nature hit back with an extremely harmful locust plague between 1998 
and 2001. The locust invasion in 1999 of the newly established capital of Kazakhstan 
triggered a process of institutional change in the plant protection system. The Plant 
Protection Service was partly revived. This chapter provides further evidence that market-
driven approaches fail to address pest-management problems like the locust problem 
effectively. Furthermore, agricultural producers are unable to control locusts outside their 
private plots. The locust case supports the argument that pest control has public good 
characteristics requiring collective action.  
 
 
In conclusion, this thesis points to an urgent need to rethink and rebuild the role of the 
government in pest control.  Without stronger policy, less afraid to embrace positive aspects 
of the former Soviet plant protection system, highly destructive pest organisms will continue 
to threaten national food security, and indiscriminate and injudicious pesticide use will 
continue to pose considerable hazards for human health and the environment. The study 
shows that plant protection is more than just ‘getting rid of pests’ at the farm level. Pest-
control issues are deeply embedded in political–economic–social contexts, through which 
the development and use of ecologically sustainable approaches and collective action for 
pest control can be either promoted or hindered. The government of Kazakhstan has a key 
function in supporting this long-term endeavour and creating conducive conditions for this to 
happen, as this will ultimately contribute to a more sustainable system of agricultural 
production and thus benefit society as a whole.   
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Samenvatting 
 
(Gewasbescherming in post-Sovjet Kazachstan:  
het verlies van een ecologisch perspectief) 
 
Deze studie onderzoekt hoe en waarom issues rondom gewasbescherming zijn ingebed in de 
politieke, economische en sociale contexten. Het analyseert het domein van 
gewasbescherming in Kazachstan onder twee verschillende sociaal-economische en politieke 
formaties, namelijk de Sovjet periode voor 1991 en de post-Sovjet periode daarna. De studie 
van de gewasbescherming in een land in overgang toont aan hoe de bredere politieke en 
sociaal-economische structuren dit veld van agrarische wetenschap en beoefening vormgeeft. 
Een diepgaande, kwalitatieve onderzoekbenadering is gebruikt om micro-processen 
te onderzoeken in beide periodes om te begrijpen hoe deze processen zijn gevormd door 
bredere structuren en om het heden te verbinden met het verleden in anticipatie op de 
toekomst. Technografie is de gebruikte benadering om de sociale en biologische werelden in 
hun volledige complexiteit te omschrijven en een beter begrip van de ontwikkeling van 
duurzame agro-ecosystemen te verkrijgen. Gegevensanalyse is gebaseerd op het kruislings 
controleren van informatie van documenten, literatuur, media, eigen observaties en 
interviews. 
Dit proefschrift illustreert hoe benaderingen van Geïntegreerde Gewasbescherming 
(IPM, naar de engelse afkorting van Integrated Pest Management), dat wil zeggen op 
ecologie gebaseerde ziekte- en plaagbestrijding, zich hebben ontwikkeld en in de praktijk 
zijn gebracht in de USSR, Kazachstan inbegrepen. Het identificeert een verschuiving van 
een kennissysteem dat streeft naar duurzame gewasbescherming in het tijdperk van de Sovjet 
naar een exclusieve focus op pesticiden in post-1991 Kazachstan. Deze verschuiving – in 
tegenstelling tot de wereldwijde trend gericht op duurzaamheid – leidt naar de centrale vraag 
van dit proefschrift: waarom deed zich een dergelijke verschuiving voor in Kazachstan na 
1991? Dit proefschrift beargumenteert dat de transformatie in de agrarische structuur, de 
vernietiging van de door de staat geleide (publieke) organisatie van ziekte- en 
plaagbestrijding, de verwaarlozing van onderzoek en verspreiding, en de agressieve promotie 
campagnes van de pesticide industrie de houdingen ten aanzien van gewasbescherming in 
Kazachstan hebben veranderd. Dit proefschrift omschrijft hoe, en verklaart waarom, het 
denken rondom ziekte- en plaagbestrijding veranderde met het gevolg dat essentiële 
elementen in de benaderingen van duurzame ziekte- en plaagbestrijding zijn afgeschaft in 
Kazachstan na 1991. 
De studie toont aan dat het Sovjet systeem voorwaarden creëerde die het functioneren 
van ecologisch verantwoorde vormen van ziekte- en plaagbestrijding bevorderde. Het 
geïnstitutionaliseerde systeem van gewasbescherming maakte grootschalige collectieve actie 
van ziekte- en plaagbestrijding mogelijk op lokaal en regionaal niveau. Onderzoek naar 
methodes voor duurzame bestrijding van ziekten en plagen werd gezien als 
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gemeenschappelijk goed. De neoliberale ideologie, die na de val van het Sovjetsysteem werd 
geïntroduceerd, ondermijnde collectieve initiatieven en de verwezenlijking van publieke 
goederen en bracht het systeem van duurzame ziekte- en plaagbestrijding in crisis. Nieuwe 
boeren hadden weinig kennis van gewasbescherming. Verder hadden zij niet de institutionele 
ondersteuning en de technische en financiële middelen om te werken met benaderingen van 
duurzame bestrijding. Het domein van de publieke gewasbescherming kampte met een 
ernstig tekort aan financiële middelen en kromp dramatisch in omvang en capaciteit. IPM en 
op ecologie gebaseerde ziekte- en plaagbestrijding werden niet langer ontwikkeld, bevorderd 
of gebruikt. 
Dit proefschrift introduceert de bovengenoemde kwesties in Hoofdstuk 1, en vat ze 
samen in Hoofdstuk 6. Deze kwesties worden in detail besproken in de vier empirische 
hoofdstukken (2-5), die hieronder zijn samengevat. 
Hoofdstuk 2 bestudeert de post-Sovjet veranderingen in de landbouw sector van 
Kazachstan. Het beschrijft de verandering van de agrarische structuur en de herordening van 
grote landbouwbedrijven en opkomst van kleine boerenbedrijven in de context van een 
veranderend sociaal-economische, politieke en technologisch landschap. Het identificeert de 
grote veranderingen in landgebruik, de verschillende types en grootte van boerenbedrijven, 
en bespreekt de gevolgen van interventie van de staat in de distributie van land en andere 
productiemiddelen gedurende de verschillende stadia van de transitie. Het hoofdstuk 
analyseert hoe verschillende actoren de transformatie van de landbouw, de wijze van 
levensonderhoud en de sociale infrastructuur beleefden en begrepen. Het onderzoekt waarom 
ze over deze periode na 1991 praten in termen van crisis en chaos, en waarom vele mensen 
nostalgische gevoelens koesteren ten aanzien van het Sovjet verleden. Daaropvolgend 
onderzoekt het hoofdstuk de rol van kennis en het opmerkelijke verlies hiervan gedurende de 
transitieperiode. Verder beschrijft dit hoofdstuk ook de technologische redenatie en de 
organisatie van kennis in de landbouw van de Sovjet en hetgeen er daarna is gebeurd met 
deze structuren. Het verlies en gebrek aan kennis, in de context van snel veranderende 
omstandigheden voor landbouwbeoefening, zijn belangrijke factoren in het verklaren van de 
agrarische crisis die volgde na de instorting van de Sovjet-Unie. De neoliberale ideologie, 
die voor een groot gedeelte bepaalde hoe beleid werd aangepast gedurende de 
transitieperiode, heeft het behoud van essentiële kennis van ongediertebestrijding voor 
duurzame landbouw ernstig beperkt. 
Hoofdstuk 3 illustreert de grootschalige toepassing van IPM benaderingen in de 
USSR, inclusief Kazachstan, gedurende de jaren ‘70 en ‘80. Het toont aan dat IPM een 
kennisintensieve benadering is, die bestaat bij gratie van een sterke onderzoeksbasis, een 
goed werkende voorlichting, en collectieve actie voor de ontwikkeling, stimulering en 
gebruik van IPM. Dit hoofdstuk beargumenteert dat de ineenstorting van de collectieve 
landbouw en de desintegratie van een geïntegreerd gewasbeschermingssysteem een 
problematische impact heeft gehad op de opvattingen over ziekte- en plaagbestrijding na 
1991. Het analyseert waarom individuele boeren zich uitsluitend gingen concentreren op het 
gebruik van pesticiden. Ook bestudeert het waarom onderzoek zich uitsluitend nog richtte op 
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het gebruik van chemicaliën in ziekte- en plaagbestrijding. De pesticide industrie slaagde 
erin om de kennislacune over gewasbescherming op te vullen. Het was in staat om de nodige 
infrastructuur te creëren zodat de producten geleverd konden worden aan boeren in 
Kazachstan na 1991. De rol van de Gewasbeschermingsdienst en het onderzoek systeem dat 
IPM gerelateerde kennis en informatie verschaftte, was aanzienlijk kleiner geworden. 
Hoofdstuk 4 toont aan dat er enorme veranderingen plaatsvonden in onderzoek naar 
gewasbescherming in Kazachstan na 1991. Het beargumenteert dat onderzoek naar 
gewasbescherming gericht op migrerende plagen en IPM de karakteristieken hebben van een 
publiek goed dat voldoende ondersteund moeten worden door de staat. Zeer vernietigende 
organismen, zoals sprinkhanen, kunnen een vormen bedreiging voor de nationale 
voedselveiligheid. Het primaire doel van IPM is ecologisch verantwoorde en 
milieuvriendelijke benaderingen van ziekte- en plaagbestrijding. De pesticide industrie wordt 
beheerst door marktwerkingen die enkele elementen van dergelijke kennis en producten 
commercialiseren. Dit hoofdstuk analyseert hoe landbouw onderzoeksinstituten zich 
geconfronteerd zagen met zowel een alarmerend tekort aan, als verouderd 
onderzoekspersoneel. Het werd lastig om jonge onderzoekers te rekruteren en onderzoekers 
van middelbare leeftijd konden niet worden behouden. De openbare wetenschap verloor haar 
prestige, werd niet voldoende financieel ondersteund en was niet langer aantrekkelijk. 
Onderzoekers van publieke onderzoeksinstituten werden nostalgisch over de 
wetenschappelijk orde in de tijd van de Sovjet periode, waarin onderzoeksfaciliteiten en 
infrastructuur, de opleiding en kwalificatie van onderzoekspersoneel en de financiering 
significant beter was dan in de post-1991 periode. Het zwakke beheer van de wetenschap en 
de talrijke organisatorische en management veranderingen na 1991 zorgden voor een 
toename in gevoelens van onzekerheid in de onderzoeksgemeenschap. Het hoofdstuk 
bediscussieert hoe het huidige korte termijn denken in de onderzoeksagenda en de vraag naar 
onmiddellijke onderzoeksresultaten, het onderzoek naar duurzame ziekte- en 
plaagbestrijding ondermijnt. 
Hoofdstuk 5 onderzoekt de co-evolutie van sprinkhanen populaties, landgebruik, 
kennissystemen, bestrijdingscampagnes en de institutionele organisatie voor en na 1991. Het 
toont aan dat gedurende het Sovjet tijdperk een zeer complex en dynamisch systeem van 
sprinkhanenbeheer werd ontwikkeld. Generatie van kennis, gezamenlijke actie, habitat 
management, begrip voor ecologische verhoudingen, en lange termijn analyse en planning 
waren kerneigenschappen van dit systeem. Vele wetenschappers concentreerden zich op 
onderzoek naar de biologie, taxonomie, ecologie en populatiedynamiek van 
sprinkhaanrassen. Na de val van de USSR, is veel van de verworven expertise ten aanzien 
van gewasbescherming, evenals kennis omtrent sprinkhanen, in Kazachstan verloren gegaan. 
Tegelijkertijd is de generatie van kennis ernstig afgenomen. De financiële en ideologische 
redenen om bestaande systemen van ziekte- en plaagbestrijding systemen te ontmantelen 
erkenden niet het potentiële effect van de, door beleid veroorzaakte, veranderingen in agro-
ecologische omstandigheden, praktijken van plaagbestrijding, en plaagontwikkeling. De 
natuur sloeg haar slag met een zeer vernietigende sprinkhanenplaag tussen 1998 en 2001. De 
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invasie van sprinkhanen in 1999 in de nieuwe hoofdstad van Kazachstan bracht een proces 
teweeg van institutionele veranderingen in het gewasbeschermingssysteem. De 
Gewasbeschermingsdienst werd gedeeltelijk vernieuwd. Dit hoofdstuk levert verder bewijs 
aan dat benaderingen gedreven door marktwerking er niet inslagen om ongedierteproblemen, 
zoals de sprinkhanenplaag, effectief aan te pakken. Bovendien, zijn landbouwproducenten 
niet instaat om sprinkhaanplagen, die zich buiten hun eigen velden ontwikkelen, te 
controleren. Het gevalstudie van de sprinkhanen ondersteunt het argument dat ziekte- en 
plaagbestrijding collectieve karakteristieken heeft en collectieve actie vereist. 
 
Samenvattend, dit proefschrift wijst op een dringende behoefte om de rol van de overheid in 
ziekte- en plaagbestrijding te heroverwegen en opnieuw op te bouwen. Zonder sterk beleid, 
dat minder bang is om positieve aspecten van het voormalige Sovjet 
gewasbeschermingssysteem te incorporeren, zullen destructieve plantenziekten en plagen de 
nationale voedselveiligheid blijven bedreigen. Tevens zal het onkritische en onverstandige 
pesticidengebruik de volksgezondheid en het milieu aan aanzienlijke gevaren blootstellen. 
Deze studie laat zien dat gewasbescherming meer is dan alleen ‘het bestrijden van ziekten en 
plagen’ op het niveau van boerenbedrijven. Kwesties van ziekte- en plaagbestrijding zijn 
sterk ingebed in politiek-economische en sociale contexten die de ontwikkeling en het 
gebruik van ecologisch duurzame benaderingen en collectieve actie ten aanzien van ziekte- 
en plaagbestrijding kunnen bevorderen of belemmeren. De overheid van Kazachstan heeft 
een zeer belangrijke functie in de ondersteuning van deze lange termijn onderneming en zo 
bij te dragen aan een meer duurzame landbouwproductie ten voordele voor de gehele 
maatschappij. 
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